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Academic financial economists have been keenly interested in the value of active
portfolio management since the seminal paper of Jensen (1968). This book examines the
information advantages that active mutual fund managers attain in financial markets
through an analysis of disclosed fund holdings. Performance evaluation at the security
level allows us to paint a more comprehensive picture of fund managers’ security-selection
talents. The three chapters in this book constitute an empirical investigation of the
information content of mutual fund portfolio disclosure. Chapter 2 examines the value of
active funds’ portfolio disclosure from an outside investor’s perspective. Hypothetical
copycat funds that duplicate the disclosed asset holdings of actively managed funds can
generate performance that is comparable their primitive targets. More interestingly, their
relative success increases after the U.S. SEC mandates more frequent portfolio disclosure.
Chapter 3 studies the information content of the active portion of fund investments by
creating a stock-level measure that seeks to aggregate various pieces of information
scattered among active funds, as revealed through their over- and underweighting
decisions. Active funds’ portfolio deviations from benchmarks can strongly and positively
predict future stock returns. The findings establish a robust link between active fund
investments and asset prices. Chapter 4 further explores the role that active mutual funds
play in bringing about price efficiency. Active funds are able benefit from fundamental
analysis and their information advantages are mainly attributed to their expertise in
forecasting and processing fundamental information. 
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iPreface
Back in 2008 when I became part of this research project, the majority of the academic studies
on mutual funds used return-based performance measurement. The general consensus of this
line of research was a puzzle that the fast-growing actively managed mutual funds on average
generate disappointing net performance, underperforming passive benchmark indices. Domutual
fund managers who aggressively add stocks to (or liquidate stocks from) their portfolios add
value? This is a question over which there has been a longstanding dispute in both academia and
financial industry. Fortunately, we have seen more and more papers attempting to gain deeper
understanding of this issue by examining performance at the security level based on portfolio
holdings. This PhD thesis is among one of them. I thank Marno Verbeek, my supervisor, for
initiating this fascinating and challenging research project. I hope my research efforts in the past
three years can shed some light on the topic of active asset management.
The very first paper of our project, the basis for Chapter 2 of this book, is a very important
step in my PhD life. This paper looks at the impact of reporting frequency on the profitability of a
free-riding strategy, i.e. the simplest way in which holdings information can be used by outsiders.
What I learned along the path of achieving this paper, not only the research skills but also how
to face intellectual challenges will be an estate for my life. I am so grateful to Marno, who
guided me through the entire project, for his patient guidance, generous understanding, and most
importantly, endless encouragement. Thanks to Marno, I came to understand what an excellent
researcher means: creative, conscientious, independent, and never give up! Marno is a great
econometrician, a committed supervisor and a trustworthy coauthor. This book would not have
been completed without his trust and support, whenever I needed. Another very important person
who has a tremendous influence on my academic research is Hao Jiang, one of my coauthors.
We cooperated on my second paper (Chapter 3 of the book) that examines the informational role
of active mutual funds in financial markets by relating active fund investments to asset prices.
My interactions with Hao steered the focus of my research into the information content of fund
portfolio decisions, the main message this whole book aspires to deliver. I owe him many many
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thanks for his inspiring ideas, openness to discussions, and selfless help throughout the whole
process. Hao is a very clever researcher, but he is also a very supportive friend in life. I am
also indebted to my coauthor Rui Shen, a key contributor to my third research paper in which
we further explore the nature of the information possessed by fund managers. I thank him for
introducing me to the accounting literature on security fundamental analysis and for the many
valuable research insights he gave me. Brainstorming with Rui was always a pleasant experience,
even on a basketball court.
My special thanks go to other members of my doctoral committee, Mathijs van Dijk, Willem
Verschoor, Lars Norden, Gerard Mertens, from Erasmus University, Alessandro Beber, from
University of Amsterdam, Jenke ter Horst from University of Tilburg, and Russ Wermers from
University of Maryland. I would like to express my gratitude again to Russ for his kind sugges-
tions on programming tools when I started my PhD. Many of his research works use holdings
data and he has broken new ground for fund performance evaluation. This book owes an enor-
mous intellectual debt to all of the many people who have taken the time to give me comments at
seminars and conferences. I thank all my colleagues at RSM for creating an enjoyable and pro-
ductive working environment. I appreciate several generations of finance PhD students at RSM
who brought a lot of fun to my work and life, especially Jingnan, Tao, Eric, Olga, Oliver, Henry,
Xiaohong, Melissa, Ruben, Pooyan, Dimitrios, Manuel, Dominique, Teng, and Teodor. I am
also grateful to ERIM and the Department of Finance of RSM for providing generous financial
support, which made international conference presentations possible.
My parents deserves a special place in this preface. Their unconditional support and endless
love have been the most precious treasure in my life. I always hope that one day I could achieve
something that they can be proud of. My deepest gratitude goes to my mother who left me for-
ever when I just started my PhD. I miss her so much. This book is dedicated to my dearest mother.
Yu Wang
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
April, 2011
iii
Contents
Preface i
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Outline of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Better than the Original? The Relative Success of Copycat Funds 7
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Institutional Background and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Constructing Copycat Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Measuring Copycat Portfolio Gross Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 Estimating Trading Costs and Expenses of Copycat Funds . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.3 Representativeness of Fund Portfolio Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Disclosure Frequency and Copycat Fund Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.1 Performance Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2 Disclosure Frequency and Tracking Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.3 The Impact of Disclosure Policy Change on the Tracking Performance . . 23
2.5 The Cross-Section of Copycat Fund Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.1 Panel Regressions Explaining the Performance Differential . . . . . . . . 29
2.5.2 Portfolio Sorts on Representativeness of Holdings . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5.3 Portfolio Sorts on Past Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.A Database Construction and Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3 Information Content when Mutual Funds Deviate from Benchmarks 47
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Measuring Mutual Funds’ Deviations from Benchmarks, DFB . . . . . . . . . . 53
iv CONTENTS
3.3 Sample and Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.1 Data and Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.2 Benchmark Index Holdings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.3 Summary Statistics for the Mutual Fund Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.4 Characteristics of Stocks with Extreme DFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4 Information Content of DFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4.1 Return Forecasting Power of DFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.2 Informed Fund Managers or Mutual Fund Herding? . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4.3 Stock Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4.4 Fund Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.5 DFB and Corporate Earnings News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.6 DFB and Mutual Fund Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.5.1 Alternative Measures of DFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.5.2 Changes in DFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5.3 Subperiod Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5.4 Conditional Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5.5 Preferential allocations of IPOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.A An Illustrative Interpretation of DFB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.B Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.C Benchmark Holdings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.D Comparison with Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4 Do Mutual Fund Managers Trade on Stock Intrinsic Values? 93
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.2 The Residual Income Valuation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3 Sample Description and Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3.1 Stock Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3.2 Mutual Fund Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3.3 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4 Do Mutual Funds Trade on Intrinsic Value? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4.1 Confirming the V/P Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4.2 Mutual Funds Trade on the V/P Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
CONTENTS v
4.5 Do Mutual Funds Profit from Discovering Intrinsic Value? . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.5.1 Mutual Fund V/P Timing Measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5.2 Characteristics of Funds with Extreme V PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.5.3 Do High-V PT Funds Profit from V/P Effect? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.6 Mutual Fund Trading and V/P Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.A Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5 Concluding Remarks 123
Bibliography 127
Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 135
Biography 139

1Chapter 1
Introduction
The enviable pace of growth of the U.S. mutual fund industry for much of the past decades has
witnessed the increasing investors’ reliance on professional investment advice. The U.S. mutual
fund industry–with $11.1 trillion in assets under management at year-end 2009–has become one
of the largest groups of investors in U.S. companies, holding 24 percent of the outstanding shares
of U.S.-issued stocks by the end of year 2009 (2010 Investment Company Institute). Investor de-
mand for mutual funds is influenced by a variety of factors, one of which is the return-generating
ability of fund managers who presumably, as a group, are supposed to possess superior private
information regarding security mispricing.
Academic financial economists have been keenly interested in the value of active portfolio
management since the seminal paper of Jensen (1968). The general consensus that mutual funds
on average fail to outperform market and their passive benchmarks does not preclude finding
subgroups of skilled managers.1 From the perspective of equilibrium accounting, the aggregate
portfolio of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds is close to the market portfolio (Fama
and French, 2010). This means the active investment must be a zero sum game—-active funds
with positive true alpha are balanced by other funds with negative alpha. A skilled active fund
manager will exhibit portfolio tilts consistent with the private information he receives concern-
ing future stock returns. The present thesis examines such information through an analysis of
disclosed fund holdings. Performance evaluation at the security level allows us to gain a more
comprehensive understanding of the value of active money management and decompose vari-
ous security-selection talents. The thesis further provides insight into the informational role that
active fund managers play in financial markets.
1Studies of mutual fund returns generally report disappointing fund performance (e.g., Jensen, 1968, Malkiel,
1995, Carhart, 1997, Fama and French, 2010). For evidence supporting the value of active investing, see Avramov
and Wermers (2006) and Wermers, Yao, and Zhao (2007).
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1.1 Motivation
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requires each mutual fund to periodically dis-
close a complete portfolio holdings schedule to investors. If the reported holdings unveil valu-
able investment opportunities and more importantly such opportunities are not transitory, outside
investors who trade on such information would be able to share the benefits of fund research
without incurring the actual cost of owning the fund shares. In 2004, the SEC adopted enhanced
regulations that increased the frequency of portfolio disclosure from semi-annually to quarterly.
On the one hand, more frequent portfolio disclosure by mutual funds would allow investors to
better monitor the extent of their portfolio diversification and hence make more informed asset
allocation decisions. On the other hand, under a more frequent disclosure mandate, predatory
trading practices would increase and adversely affect fund performance by preventing a fund
from fully realizing the potential benefits of its research efforts. The first part of this thesis ad-
dresses the question to what extent fund portfolio disclosure reveals valuable information for
outsiders and whether the enhanced SEC regulations have increased the potential for outsiders
to benefit. These questions are important to increase our understanding of the simplest way in
which disclosed holdings information can be exploited by individual investors.
Despite the increasing importance of mutual fund industry, the informational role that mu-
tual funds play in determining security prices remains ambiguous. Given the large amount of
resources active funds spend on security analysis and research, we might expect them to be good
candidates for informed investors, whose costly information acquisition helps impound infor-
mation into asset prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Prior literature on fund performance,
however, has painted a disheartening picture of active funds’ performance at the aggregate level.
Can we reconcile this in a fully rational framework? Berk and Green (2004) outline a model in
which managers collect fees as a fixed percentage of assets under management and thus attempt
to maximize fund assets. In their model, managers mix their alpha-generating ideas with a bench-
mark portfolio. Their information-based investments in an individual stock will push the price of
that stock toward fair value. Hence, the amount of profit that a manager can extract from a given
investment idea is limited. In equilibrium each manager will raise assets until the fees are equal
to the alpha that can be extracted from his private information. This leaves individual investors
with a return close to the benchmark. With portfolio holdings data at hand, we are interested in
evaluating the performance of the information-driven portion of active funds’ investments and
understanding how effectively active fund managers can exploit market inefficiencies based on
their superior information concerning future stock returns. To better assess whether active fund
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managers attain informational advantages in discovering valuable investment opportunities, the
second part of the thesis examines the active portion of fund investments, that is, the portfolio de-
viations from the benchmark.2 This is because a mutual fund manager can attempt to outperform
its benchmark only by deviating from it.
If active fund managers are able to make advantageous portfolio bets based on their infor-
mational advantages, what is the nature of such information? In stock markets, the cornerstone
of investing is fundamental analysis, a technique that attempts to determine a securitys intrinsic
value by focusing on underlying factors that affect a company’s actual business and its future
prospects. When information and trading costs are not trivial in reality, stock prices may diverge
from their intrinsic values (e.g., Shiller (1984), Summers (1986), DeBondt and Thayler (1987),
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). If investors have su-
perior information on a firm’s fundamental prospects or more comprehensive ways of processing
such information, they will trade on such information and thus help mitigate the mispricing rel-
ative to stock intrinsic values. Do active mutual funds rely on fundamental analysis? If so, can
they profit from it? Furthermore, what are the implications of funds’ exploitation of fundamental
information on asset prices? The third part of the thesis will investigate these issues in more
detail.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
The three essays presented in this book constitute an empirical investigation of the information
content of mutual fund portfolio disclosure. Chapter 2 studies the value of active funds’ portfolio
disclosure from an outside investor’s perspective. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 attempt to relate active
fund investments to asset prices and further explore the role of active mutual funds in bringing
about price efficiency in financial markets.
Chapter 2 constructs hypothetical copycat funds to investigate the performance of free-riding
strategies that duplicate the disclosed asset holdings of actively managed mutual funds. We
measure the relative success of free-riding by comparing the performance between a copycat
fund with its target active fund. Analyzing disclosed holdings of 3,046 active U.S. equity funds
over the 1985-2008 period, we find that copycat funds on average can generate performance that
is comparable to their actively managed counterparts, after trading costs and expenses. More
interestingly, their relative success increased significantly after 2004 when the SEC imposed
2Cremers and Petajisto (2009) document a rapid increase in closet indexers whose portfolios largely resemble
those of their benchmarks while still claiming to be active.
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quarterly disclosure regulations on all mutual funds. The stabilizing pattern is especially salient
for the subsample of mutual funds that have experienced and survived past the policy change.
The improvement in net relative returns for those copycat funds amounts to 0.05% per month.
The improved tracking performance after the policy change in 2004 is associated with a steady
increase in the representativeness of fund portfolio disclosure, i.e. the extent to which a fund’s
disclosed holdings are representative of its true investment style in the recent past. We measure
the representativeness by the tracking error of a mutual fund relative to a characteristic-based
benchmark. These findings confirm our expectations that requiring more frequent portfolio dis-
closure expands the opportunities for potential free-riders to successfully track or even beat their
actively managed counterparts. In this chapter, we also document a substantial cross-sectional
dispersion in the relative success of copycat funds. A copycat strategy targeted at past winning
funds provides investors with a cheap momentum strategy. Further, the representativeness of
holdings also appears to be a powerful predictor of the relative success of copycat funds. Copy-
cat strategies exploiting ‘more representative’ holdings tend to outperform not only their actively
managed counterparts but also the vast majority of active funds. The superior performance of
such selective copycat strategies helps to identify those active target funds that provide the most
attractive free-riding opportunities. Distinct from prior studies, our work evaluates the effective-
ness of the disclosure policy change in 2004 and the impact of mandating more frequent disclo-
sure on the tracking performance. This chapter provides insights into how investors could use
disclosed fund holdings and to what extent free-riders gain at the expense of fund shareholders.
Chapter 3 establishes a robust relation between the active funds’ deviations from bench-
marks and future stock returns. We study the information content of the active portion of fund
investments by creating a stock-level measure that seeks to aggregate various pieces of informa-
tion scattered among active funds, as revealed through their over- and underweighting decisions.
Specifically, we compare the portfolio holdings of an active fund with its benchmark index and
compute the excess weight for each stock on top of the benchmark portfolio. Then we use the
simple average of these excess weights on one stock across all active funds to characterize the
consensus active bet of fund managers on that stock, which we label funds’ Deviations From
Benchmarks, DFB. We find that DFB strongly and positively predicts future stock returns.
The return premium on stocks heavily overweighted by mutual funds, relative to their under-
weighted counterparts, reaches more than 7% per year even after adjustments for their loadings
on the market, size, value, momentum, and liquidity factors. These results are also robust to the
various specifications of Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) cross-sectional regressions with common
stock return predictors, to the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) characteristic-
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adjustment procedure, for different weighting schemes, to the exclusion of IPO allocations, and
across various subperiods. A significant portion of this premium occurs around corporate earn-
ings announcements, which suggests that part of the active funds’ superior information relates to
firms’ fundamental prospects. However, there is evidence that mutual funds tend to herd (Werm-
ers, 1999; Sias, 2004). To differentiate an alternative interpretation based on price pressure from
our story of informed fund managers, we examine the dynamics of changes in DFB, the return
persistence of high-DFB stocks, and the possible influence of future demand shocks. The results
uniformly support our information-based story. In addition, we find that the return forecasting
power of DFB is stronger among mid-cap firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatilities and
those that attract fewer mutual fund investors. Our results are more pronounced for past-winning
funds and growth-oriented funds. Finally, we find that in aggregate, mutual funds invest less than
10% of their assets in high-DFB stocks but approximately 34% in low DFB stocks. Therefore,
a large four-factor alpha of 6–7% per year on high DFB stocks translates into a small mutual
fund alpha of less than 1% per year. These results are consistent with the prediction of Berk
and Green (2004) on the equilibrium behavior of mutual fund managers. Different from previous
studies, our measure of deviations from benchmarks is less subject to the influence of fund flows.
Moreover, we connect mutual fund investing to asset prices without assuming any a priori links
between firms and funds.
Chapter 4 explores the relation between active mutual funds’ trading behavior and stock price
divergence from intrinsic value. Over the 1981 to 2008 period, we find that mutual funds in ag-
gregate tend to buy (sell) underpriced (overpriced) stocks as measured by a V/P ratio, where V
denotes the intrinsic value estimated by a residual income valuation model. We attribute the mu-
tual funds’ exploitation of a stock’s intrinsic value to their superior expertise in forecasting and
processing fundamental information (Cheng, Liu and Qian, 2006). To characterize the portfolio
choices of mutual funds based on V/P and assess how successfully they exploit such informa-
tion, we construct a fund-level V/P -timing measure, V PT , in the spirit of Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1995). V PT is the weighted average V/P decile rank of all stocks held by a mutual
fund. A high value of V PT indicates that the fund manager actively trades on fundamentals and
tilts her portfolio toward underpriced stocks (with high V/P ratios). In univariate portfolio sorts,
D10 funds with the highest V PT have an average return of 1.19% per month over a six-month
horizon and significantly outperform the lowest-V PT funds in D1 by 0.55% per month. The
results are robust to various forms of factor risk adjustments. Hence, mutual funds that actively
exploit the fundamental mispricing are able to benefit from such information and generate both
statistically and economically significant profits. This confirms the findings that mutual funds
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benefit from fundamental-relevant information in Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009)
and Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010). Finally, we find that the V/P effect is more
pronounced among stocks with less intense past mutual funds’ exploitation. We find that high-
V/P stocks with the lowest mutual funds’ ownership upon the release of accounting information
continue to generate a significant 4-factor alpha of 0.42% per month in the subsequent one year.
Furthermore, we also show that high-V/P stocks that have been heavily sold by mutual funds
in the recent past can generate even higher future performance. Our evidence supports the view
that the tendency of mutual funds to trade in the direction of V/P mitigates mispricing and fa-
cilitates impounding fundamental information into stock prices. This study is among the first to
empirically test the trading behavior of delegated informed traders using a stock mispricing mea-
sure based on a comprehensive valuation model. Our findings that mutual funds tend to exploit
mispricing opportunities are consistent with the theoretical prediction of Grossman and Miller
(1988), De Long, Shleifer, Summers, Waldman (1990) and Campbell and Kyle (1993).
7Chapter 2
Better than the Original? The Relative
Success of Copycat Funds∗
2.1 Introduction
Mutual funds are required to periodically disclose their portfolio holdings. In 2004, the SEC
adopted enhanced regulations that increased the frequency of portfolio disclosure from semi-
annually to quarterly. The amendment was designed to provide investors more frequent access to
portfolio information to monitor whether a fund is complying with its stated investment objective,
and, if so, how. As discussed by Wermers (2001), Frank et al. (2004) and Parida and Teo (2010),
more frequent disclosure potentially imposes new costs on mutual funds. For example, it can
become easier for other investors to exploit information on fund flows to front-run the fund’s
trades (Coval and Stafford, 2007). Moreover, disclosure can allow outside investors to share the
benefits of fund research without incurring the actual cost of owning the fund shares. Investors
can simply “free-ride” on mutual fund investment strategies through the direct mimicking of
disclosed portfolio holdings, even though this information is typically two months old at the
time of publication.1 The reported holdings can thus unveil valuable investment opportunities.
For example, Daniel et al. (1997) examine fund holdings and show that certain groups of mutual
∗This chapter is based on the article by Verbeek and Wang (2011). I am grateful to John Adams, Stefano
Bubellini, Susan Christofferson, Richard Fu, Hao Jiang, Tarun Ramadorai, Jan Wrampelmeyer, Russ Wermers
and the participants of the Midwest Finance Association Meeting (Las Vegas, 2010), Eastern Finance Association
Meeting (Miami, 2010), EFMA Conference (Aarhus, 2010), FMA European Conference (Hamburg, 2010), the 4th
Professional Asset Management Conference (Rotterdam, 2010) and the FMA Annual Meeting (New York, 2010)
for helpful comments and suggestions. This paper received the Outstanding Research Award in Investments at the
Eastern Finance Association Meetings in Miami, Florida, April 2010. I also wish to thank Kenneth French and Russ
Wermers for making their data available through their websites.
1Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) and Wermers (2001) find that profits from fund research tend to accrue
over periods ranging from 12 to 18 months after the date a newly acquired stock is first added to a fund’s portfolio.
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funds exhibit selectivity ability. If such opportunities are not transitory, investors who trade
on such information, even with a time lag, would be able to make a substantial profit. In this
paper we address the question to what extent portfolio disclosures reveal valuable information for
outsiders and whether the enhanced SEC regulations have increased the potential for such free-
riding strategies. These questions are important to increase our understanding of the simplest
way in which disclosed holdings information can be exploited and to establish the potential costs
of disclosure to mutual funds.
To address these issues, we construct hypothetical copycat funds by strictly duplicating the
active funds’ disclosed portfolios and rebalancing whenever new holdings are reported. We
measure the relative success of free-riding by comparing the performance between a copycat
fund and the target active fund. Analyzing disclosed holdings of 3,046 active U.S. equity funds
over the 1985-2008 period, we find that copycat funds on average can generate returns that are
close to their actively managed counterparts, after trading costs and expenses. More interestingly,
the average relative performance of copycat funds stabilizes and increases significantly after the
SEC requires more frequent portfolio disclosure in 2004. The pattern is especially salient for
a subsample of mutual funds that have experienced and survived past the policy change. The
improvement in net relative returns for those copycat funds amounts to 0.05% per month, which
is statistically significant. The improved tracking performance after the policy change in 2004 is
associated with a steady increase in the representativeness of fund portfolio disclosure, i.e. the
extent to which a fund’s disclosed holdings are representative of its true investment style in the
recent past. We measure the representativeness by the tracking error of a mutual fund relative to
a characteristic-based benchmark. These findings confirm our expectations that requiring more
frequent portfolio disclosure expands the opportunities for potential free-riders to successfully
track or even beat their actively managed counterparts.
A potentially interesting free-riding strategy focuses on the holdings reported by certain types
of mutual funds, for example, funds with a proven track record of success. Outside investors
might apply various techniques to returns and holdings data to infer the stock-picking talents of
active funds. In this paper we document a substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the relative
success of copycat funds. A copycat strategy targeted at past winning funds provides investors
with a cheap momentum strategy that significantly outperforms the majority of the mutual fund
universe after trading costs and expenses. Further, the representativeness of holdings also appears
to be a powerful predictor of the relative success of copycat funds. Copycat strategies exploiting
‘more representative’ holdings tend to outperform not only their actively managed counterparts
but also the vast majority of active funds. The superior performance of such selective copycat
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strategies helps to identify those active target funds that provide the most attractive free-riding
opportunities.
An extensive literature has examined mutual fund performance and new money growth based
on holdings data or trades derived from holdings.2 Few studies have focused on the tracking
performance of a free-riding strategy and the association of portfolio disclosure with fund per-
formance and investor reactions.3 Our study evaluates the effectiveness of the disclosure policy
change in 2004 and the impact of mandating more frequent disclosure on the tracking perfor-
mance. To enhance the practical relevance of our study we take into account the possible trans-
action costs for copycat funds. Further, we investigate the cross-sectional variation in the perfor-
mance of copycat funds. Brown and Schwarz (2010) examine the use of hedge funds’ 13(f) fil-
ings by market participants and find that mandatory disclosure of hedge fund portfolio positions
provides little long-term benefit to investors who seek to free-ride on the information released
in these disclosures. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) investigate the impact of unobserved
actions of U.S. equity funds on future fund performance by defining the ‘return gap’ between the
reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund
holdings. Our work differs from theirs in that we shift the object of study from active funds to
potential free-riders who expect to track the active fund’s performance. More importantly, we
aim at measuring the extent to which outdated holdings are valuable. Our study provides insights
into how investors could use disclosed fund holdings and to what extent free-riders gain at the
expense of fund shareholders.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews the dynamics
of U.S. disclosure regulations for mutual funds and describes the data used in this study. Section
2.3 presents the main methodology to construct copycat portfolios and defines a measure for
the representativeness of disclosed holdings. In Section 2.4, we examine the effect of mandating
more frequent portfolio disclosure in 2004 on the tracking performance of copycat funds. Section
2.5 focuses on the determinants of the relative success of copycat funds and analyzes the cross-
sectional variation in the performance of copycat funds. Section 2.6 concludes.
2The literature includes, among others, Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995),
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997), Wermers (1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003), Chen, Jegadeesh, Werm-
ers (2000), Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005, 2008), Cohen, Coval and Pastor (2005), Kosowski, Timmermann,
Wermers and White (2006), Baks, Busse and Green (2006), Ge and Zheng (2006), Cremers and Petajisto (2009).
3An exception is Frank et al. (2004), which analyzes the average tracking performance of copycat funds based
on the semi-annually reported holdings of 20 high-expense mutual funds in the 1990s.
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2.2 Institutional Background and Data
The Investment Company Act historically required all registered U.S. investment management
companies to transmit reports to their shareholders and to file these shareholder reports with the
SEC within 10 days after transmission to shareholders. These fund reports have long served as
the primary vehicle to communicate information regarding both fund performance and portfolio
composition to investors. Since 1985 the SEC required under Rule 30b1-1 that all registered
investment companies file their portfolio holdings within 60 days after the end of each fiscal
six-month period. Aiming at improving the effectiveness of such information disclosure, many
petitioners had suggested ways to improve the disclosure regime by the end of 2003.4 They
believed that investors could benefit from the enhanced transparency by both increasing the fre-
quency with which mutual funds are required to disclose their portfolio holdings and streamlining
the portfolio schedules delivered to shareholders. In their petitions they also argued that more
frequent portfolio disclosure by mutual funds would allow investors to better monitor the extent
of their portfolio diversification and consequently enable them to make more informed asset al-
location decisions. In addition, the transparency supporters believed that investors would have
better information to check how a fund was complying with its stated investment objective, so
as to identify style-drifting funds. In their opinions, more frequent disclosure would also shed
light on the problems of portfolio manipulation such as ‘window dressing’ and ‘portfolio pump-
ing’5. In response to the demand for more effective portfolio disclosure regulation, the SEC
issued a release proposing rule amendments under SA of 1933, SEA of 1934 and ICA of 1940
on December 18, 2002. By February 14, 2003, the SEC had received 65 comment letters from
industry members, investor advocacy groups, consultants and academics. Some of these letters
supported the SEC’s proposal to improve the transparency of the periodic portfolio disclosures
provided to investors. By contrast, other petitioners, including members of the investment man-
agement groups, raised concerns that frequent portfolio disclosure with a short reporting delay
might encourage predatory trading practices in the market.6
4The SEC received six rule-making petitions byMay 10, 2004. See “Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio
Disclosure of Registered Management Investment Companies; Final Rule”, 17 CFR Parts 210, 239, 249, 270, and
274, available from http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8393.htm.
5“Window Dressing” is defined as buying or selling portfolio securities shortly before the date as of which a
fund’s holdings are publicly disclosed, to convey an impression that the manager has been investing in companies
that have had exceptional performance during the reporting period. “Portfolio Pumping” is defined as buying shares
of stock the fund already owns on the last day of the reporting period, to drive up the price of the stocks and inflate
the fund’s performance results. See Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny (1991), Sias and Starks (1997), Musto
(1999), O’Neal (2001) and Meier and Schaumburg (2006), Duong and Meschke (2009).
6The commenters from ICI and Fidelity argued that free-riding could be achieved and facilitated by more fre-
quent disclosures of fund holdings. See letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, ICI, to the SEC (February 14,
2.2 Institutional Background and Data 11
More frequent portfolio disclosure would facilitate the ability of professional traders and
other opportunists to expropriate the results of mutual funds’ proprietary research and invest-
ment acumen. Such exploitation of reported holdings could lead to additional costs that will be
passed on to fund shareholders in the form of sacrificed fund performance and the consequent
erosion of market share. Wermers (2001) examines the potentially harmful consequences of re-
quiring more frequent portfolio disclosure and concludes that under a more frequent disclosure
mandate abusive activities such as free-riding would increase and adversely affect fund perfor-
mance by preventing a fund from fully realizing the potential benefits of its research efforts. In an
attempt to strike a balance between the benefits and costs associated with disclosing fund hold-
ings, the Commission decided to adopt a quarterly disclosure requirement with a 60-day filing
delay in the final amendments that took effect in May of 2004. Accordingly, our analysis is also
motivated by the desire to understand the impact of increased mandatory reporting frequency on
fund performance. Examining the information content of the disclosure per se allows us to gain a
deeper insight into the value of outdated portfolio data for free-riding activities and the possible
responses by mutual funds to such predatory trading practices.
Our empirical analysis employs data on stock prices, mutual funds and their holdings ex-
tracted from three major sources: the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database
(MFDB), the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum S12 equity holdings data, and the CRSP stock
files. Our sample spans the 24-year period from January 1985 to December 2008. The CRSP
mutual fund database provides monthly fund net returns, TNAs, and annual data on portfolio
turnover ratios, 12b1 fees, expense ratios and other fund characteristics (investment styles, asset
allocations, etc.) for all open-end mutual funds. The second mutual fund database contains a
history of quarterly/semi-annual portfolio holdings for all U.S. equity mutual funds, and lists the
number of shares of each stock held by a fund and the self-declared investment objective at the
beginning of each calendar quarter. The SEC filings, together with the voluntary quarterly fund
reports to shareholders and informal reports to CDA constitute the main source of this database.
The third database contains stock prices and returns from the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq
stock files. We merge the CRSP MFDB with the TFN CDA/Spectrum holdings data using the
MFLINKS database provided by WRDS to obtain a complete record of stock holdings of a given
mutual fund along with the fund’s net returns and other characteristics.7 To concentrate our anal-
ysis on open-end U.S. domestic active equity mutual funds, for which the holdings data are most
complete and reliable, we eliminate bond, money market, international and sector funds, as well
2003) ‘Re: Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment Compa-
nies’.
7The MFLINKS data set is maintained by Russ Wermers and the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
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as funds not primarily invested in equity. We also exclude index funds that target to (more or
less passively) replicate an equity index. For funds with multiple share classes, we eliminate the
duplicate funds sharing one underlying portfolio. Appendix A provides details on the sample
selection (based on investment objectives and portfolio equity concentration) and the merging
process of the aforementioned three databases.
Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics for our mutual fund database. Our sample
includes 3,046 distinct U.S. equity mutual funds over the period from 1985 to 2008. The mutual
funds in our sample on average invest 95.06% of their assets in common stocks and less than
5% in other asset classes. Therefore, our sample well represents the universe of U.S. domestic
funds with an investment focus on equity. Besides the investment composition, Table 2.1 also
summarizes other fund attributes that are used in the analyses below. An average mutual fund in
our database has a TNA of $876 million, expense ratio of 1.30% per year and turnover of 91.6%
per year. The relatively high expense ratios of active funds facilitate the potential free-riders’
relative success by taking the most of their cost advantage. In our sample, the average fund age
is 12.63 years which is higher than the median fund age of 7.75 years due to the existence of
several old funds, such as Massachusetts Investors Trust introduced in 1924.
In Panel B of Table 2.1 we report the summary statistics for all common stocks held by mutual
funds in our sample. Size refers to the market capitalization of the stock. On average, 0.74% of
the stock market capitalization is traded every month. The book-to-market ratio is determined
for each stock at the end of each calendar year using the book value of the fiscal year end and
the market value at the end of the calendar year. Momentum is defined as the cumulative stock
return over the past one year (month t-11 to t-1). Size and momentum scores, ranging from 1 to
5, are calculated by assigning all stocks into quintile portfolios at the end of each month using
NYSE breakpoints, with a score of 1 for the lowest quintile. BM ratio scores are calculated in a
similar way except that the quintile portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each year. On average,
mutual fund portfolios have a slight tilt toward small, growth and momentum stocks
2.3 Constructing Copycat Funds
This section describes the construction of copycat funds, taking into account trading costs and
expenses. It also introduces a measure of representativeness for disclosed portfolio holdings,
which appears an important characteristic to describe the relative success of copycat strategies.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Merged Mutual Fund Database
Panel A of this table presents the summary statistics for the sample of U.S. equity mutual funds over the period 1985
to 2008. Merging the Thomson Financial/CDA database, CRSP MFDB and CRSP stock files results in a sample of
3,046 distinct funds. 12(b)1 fees are the actual 12(b)1 fees in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database and the maximum
12(b)1 fees in case the actual 12(b)1 fees are missing. Proportion of investments in each asset class is from the CRSP
mutual fund summary database. We average the expense ratios, turnover ratios, 12(b)1 fees and other proportion of
investments characteristics at the end of each year. TNAs and fund ages are averaged using monthly data. Panel B
reports the summary statistics for the U.S. common stocks held by our sample of U.S. equity mutual funds. Stock
size is the product of the stock price and the number of outstanding shares. Book-to-Market ratio is determined for
each stock at the end of last calendar year using the book value of last fiscal year end and the market value of the
stock at the end of last calendar year. Momentum is defined as the cumulative stock return over the past one year
(t− 11 to t− 1). Size and momentum scores are calculated by assigning all stocks into quintile portfolios at the end
of the each month using NYSE breakpoints with score of 1 for the quintile of the lowest characteristic values and
vice versa. BM ratio scores are calculated in a similar way except rebalancing the quintile portfolios at the end of
each year.
Panel A: Mutual Funds Mean
25%
percentile Median
75%
percentile
Standard
Deviation
Total Net Assets (millions) 875.70 25.10 107.50 448.95 3827.41
Expense Ratio (% per year) 1.30 0.95 1.20 1.50 1.12
Fund Turnover Ratio (% per year) 91.58 35.70 67.00 114.00 120.22
12(b)1 fees (% per year) 0.29 0.00 0.25 0.30 0.31
Common Stock Investments (%) 95.06 93.25 97.23 99.75 6.99
Fund Age (years) 12.63 3.92 7.75 15.09 13.91
Panel B: Stocks Held by Mutual Funds Mean
25%
Percentile Median
75%
Percentile
Standard
Deviation
Volume/Size (% per month) 0.74 0.13 0.32 0.79 2.06
Size (Millions) 2070.83 88.59 271.78 966.45 10690.09
Size Score (1∼5) 2.23 1.00 2.00 3.00 1.35
Book-to-Market Ratio 0.69 0.31 0.55 0.90 0.61
Book-to-Market Ratio Score (1∼5) 2.71 1.00 3.00 4.00 1.46
Momentum (%) 21.97 -10.42 11.44 37.69 80.62
Momentum Score (1∼5) 3.11 2.00 3.00 4.00 1.46
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2.3.1 Measuring Copycat Portfolio Gross Returns
We compute the gross return for a copycat fund as the total return of a hypothetical buy-and-
hold portfolio that invests in the most recently disclosed fund asset positions and is rebalanced
at the next disclosure date. The gross monthly holding period return for a copycat fund targeting
mutual fund j is defined as
GRjt =
N∑
i=1
w˜ji,t−1Ri,t, (2.1)
where Ri,t denotes the return on asset i, and the value weights are given by
w˜ji,t−1 =
N ji,t−τPi,t−1
N∑
i=1
N ji,t−τPi,t−1
, (2.2)
where N ji,t−τ denotes the number of shares of stock i held by mutual fund j at the most recent
disclosure date at time t − τ , and Pi,t−1 is the stock price at the end of the previous month.
Different from Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008), we do not use the snapshot dates (RDATE
in the TFN/CDA database) to rebalance our portfolio because we are constructing a practically
implementable copycat strategy. Typically, the disclosure dates are less than 60 days after the
end of each fiscal quarter. Considering the amount of work and degree of difficulty for individual
investors to access the SEC’s EDGAR filings, we assume that a disclosure date is 60 days after
each snapshot date to ensure that all the holdings data are available to individual investors at the
time of portfolio construction. Our copycat portfolio for each active fund is rebalanced on each
disclosure date. Accordingly, copycat funds are at least two months out of date in tracking the
active mutual fund’s portfolio. We also adjust the number of shares and the stock prices across
months in each holding period for stock splits and other share adjustment using the accumulative
adjustment factor given by CRSP.
The TFN/CDA holdings database only contains common stock positions and excludes other
non-equity holdings. To adjust the copycat fund returns for the various asset classes, we proxy
for these assets’ returns using published indexes. We assume all bonds and preferred stocks held
by mutual funds earn the Barclays Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index returns and all cash
and other asset classes earn the Treasury-bill monthly return. The value weights for all other
asset classes are collected from the CRSP mutual fund summary database.
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2.3.2 Estimating Trading Costs and Expenses of Copycat Funds
The copycat fund returns defined above ignore transaction costs and other expenses. We estimate
the trading costs for copycat funds based on the studies by Keim and Madhavan (1997), Wermers
(2000) and Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008). Keim and Madhavan (1997) provide fitted
regressions to estimate the total institutional (explicit and implicit) execution costs for a sample
of mutual funds during the period 1991-1993. Wermers (2000) re-computes the coefficients in
this regression, excluding trader dummies, since trader types for fund transactions are hard to
collect. We start by calculating the numbers of trading orders (both buy and sell) for each stock
by comparing the fund’s holdings at two consecutive disclosure dates. For simplicity, we assume
that the copycat fund is managing the same amount of assets as its primitive fund.8 We then
follow Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008) and compute the execution costs for each trade
using
CBi,t = 1.098 + 0.336D
Nasdaq
i,t + 0.092Trsizei,t − 0.084Log(mcapi,t) + 13.807(
1
Pi,t
), (2.3)
CSi,t = 0.979 + 0.058D
Nasdaq
i,t + 0.214Trsizei,t − 0.059Log(mcapi,t) + 6.537(
1
Pi,t
), (2.4)
where CBi,t is the total costs (in percentage of the trade value) of buying stock i during period
t, while CSi,t is the total costs (in percentage of the trade value) of selling stock i during period
t; Trsize is the trade size (dollar value of the stock trade divided by market capitalization of
the stock); Log(mcapi,t) is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the stock (in
thousands); Pi,t is the stock price; D
Nasdaq
i,t is a dummy variable that equals one if the trade
occurs on Nasdaq (as opposed to NYSE or AMEX). Having computed the costs of all trades for
a fund at a certain disclosure date, we estimate the total trading costs for that fund by summing
the costs of all trades and dividing by the total value of the fund’s stock portfolio at the beginning
of the period. In addition, we winsorize the estimated trading costs in percentage of the trade
value or asset value at the 1% tails to remove the contaminating effect of outliers. Monthly
transaction costs are calculated by dividing the aggregate transaction costs at a given disclosure
date by the number of months since the previous disclosure date.
By assumption, copycat funds do not spend anything on research. Accordingly, they can
operate with relatively low levels of expenses. Following Frank et al. (2004), we assume that
8In unreported results, we find that the trading costs of maintaining a copycat fund that is 25%, 50%, 75% and
100% as large as the target active fund would only differ in the second decimal place in percentages. This finding
justifies our construction of copycat funds buying the same amount of assets as the active funds in the present study.
Smaller copycat funds could perform slightly better than the numbers reported in this paper.
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they incur expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in 2002, 20
basis points. This index fund invests in both large and small capitalization stocks, so its expense
ratio should be able to represent a broad cross-section of potential copycat funds. Nevertheless,
because this fund is an extreme example of efficiency, some readers may prefer to impose higher
expense ratios, and this will lead to straightforward adjustments in our calculations.
2.3.3 Representativeness of Fund Portfolio Disclosure
A potentially important element for the relative success of copycat funds is the validity of the
information contained in each portfolio disclosure. A mutual fund manager might have different
incentives to either reduce or increase the information revealed by portfolio disclosures hoping to
revise the investors’ impression on the fund beyond what has been revealed in past returns, e.g.
by ‘window dressing’ or ‘portfolio pumping’. Besides, mutual funds that expect large money
flows can also attempt to conceal their true positions because predatory traders may be able
to front-run on their trades (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Chen, Hanson, Hong and Stein, 2008).
Other funds may just engage in active interim trading so that their disclosed holdings hardly
represent their average investment styles in the recent past. In short, reported holdings may not
be representative of the true underlying investment style of a mutual fund. It is therefore useful
for any investor to evaluate the accuracy and representativeness of the disclosed holdings. In
our study, we measure the representativeness of the reported holdings by computing the tracking
error between the reported fund returns and the returns on a characteristics-based benchmark.
The higher the tracking error, the lower is the holdings’ representativeness.
To define a benchmark for each mutual fund, we follow Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wer-
mers (1997, DGTW), Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (1998) and Chan, Chen and Lakonishok
(2002). A fund’s style is determined by the characteristics of the fund’s portfolio holdings along
three dimensions: market capitalization, value-growth orientation and momentum. At the end
of June, all stocks meeting the selection requirements for both the CRSP stock file and Com-
pustat database are triple-sorted into 125 fractile portfolios based on size, book-to-market (BM)
ratio and momentum, where the BM-ratios are industry-adjusted using 48 Fama-French industry
groupings. The value-weighted portfolio returns are then computed for each portfolio in the post-
ranking months. This provides a set of 125 characteristics-based benchmark portfolio returns.
At each disclosure date, we match a stock in a disclosed portfolio to one of the 125 characteristic
portfolios to which it belonged on the snapshot date. Next, we calculate the fund style benchmark
returns for the disclosed portfolio over the 5 months prior to the disclosure date using the dis-
closed portfolio weights calculated on the snapshot date and the characteristics-based benchmark
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returns.
Inspired by Brown, Harlow and Zhang (2009), for each disclosure date t the representative-
ness of the portfolio holdings disclosed by mutual fund j are measured by
TrackingErrorjt = σ〈R˜j,t−s −
∑
i
w˜i,t−2R˜
bi,t−2
j,t−s 〉, s = 0, 1, ..., 4, (2.5)
where R˜j,t−s denotes the realized monthly return of mutual fund j for each of the five months
prior to the each disclosure date t, w˜i,t−2 is the value weight for stock i (disclosed at time t) two
months before the disclosure date, i.e. the date on which the holdings are valid, and R˜bi,t−2j,t−s is
the month t − s return of the style benchmark portfolio that is matched to stock i at the end of
month t − 2. Equation (2.5) defines the tracking error of the mutual fund relative to a DGTW-
based benchmark five months before the disclosure date (three months before and two months
after the snapshot date). The portfolio holdings that are valid at the end of each quarter not only
serve as an indication for a fund’s investments in that quarter but also convey information of the
fund’s intended investment strategy in the coming quarter.9 If the portfolio disclosure is very
informative of the investment style the fund has maintained, the style benchmark returns should
be highly correlated with the realized fund returns and thus generate a low tracking error. High
tracking errors could be driven by window dressing, portfolio pumping, intra-quarter trading as
well as overall market volatility. Therefore, we argue that our measure of the disclosure repre-
sentativeness is a good proxy for the accuracy of holdings in revealing a fund’s true investment
style.10
2.4 Disclosure Frequency and Copycat Fund Performance
In this section, we evaluate whether the reporting frequency of active mutual funds influences the
relative success of copycat funds. We start our analysis by looking at the average copycat fund
performance relative to active mutual funds. Then we examine the effect of disclosure frequency
9Our reporting representativeness measure differs from style consistency in Brown, Harlow and Zhang (2009)
in that we impose an additional linear structure in the regression of fund returns against general style benchmark
returns. We attempt to capture the extent to which an active fund deviates from its disclosed holdings in a short 5-
month period. Besides, holdings-based style evaluation stands out for its higher precision and deeper classification
(Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok, 2002; ter Horst, Nijman, and de Roon, 2004). ter Horst, Nijman, and de Roon (2004)
evaluate various aspects of returns-based style analysis and find that factor loadings of mutual funds are in general
different from the actual portfolio weights.
10We find a substantial dispersion in our measure of the representativeness of disclosed fund holdings. In unre-
ported results, we calculate the distribution statistics of the representativeness measures at each disclosure date and
then average them over time. The average inter-quartile range is 1.03 standard deviations, which is close to 1.35 for
a normal distribution. More importantly, the average kurtosis amounts to 10.25, which indicates excessive numbers
of observations in both tails of the distribution.
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on the tracking performance of copycat funds by comparing the performance of copycat strate-
gies with different rebalancing frequencies. Finally, we investigate the impact of the disclosure
policy change in 2004 on copycat performance and on the information content of the reported
holdings.
2.4.1 Performance Comparisons
We compare the performance of copycat funds with their primitive active funds in terms of gross
returns as well as net returns. The monthly gross return (GRt) of a mutual fund is computed
by adding back expenses to the reported net return, where expenses include management fees,
12b-1 fees and other administrative expenses.11 We follow Cohen, Coval and Pastor (2005) and
divide the annual expense ratio by 12, and add the resulting number to each monthly net return
(NRt) in a given year.
Table 2.2 reports various performance measures and fund characteristics averaged across all
funds year by year. To minimize any possible survival requirements, we include in our calcula-
tions each mutual fund that exists during a given month, regardless of whether that fund survives
the entire year. For each month we compute the equally weighted average return across all funds
existing during that month. These equally weighted monthly fund returns are then compounded
into annual returns for both mutual funds and copycat strategies. The U.S. domestic active equity
funds on average earn a net return of 10.33% per year, thus underperforming the CRSP value-
weighted market index by 1.02%. This is consistent with previous studies showing that actively
managed mutual funds on average underperform the market portfolio in net returns (Brown and
Goetzmann, 1995; Carhart, 1997; Wermers, 2000). However, with an average annual expense
ratio of 1.26%, mutual funds in aggregate outperform the market by 0.24%, suggesting fund
managers are able to recoup at least part of their expenses. Average expense ratios increase over
time, until 2003, and then start to decline. Turnover ratios show a similar pattern with a peak
value of 106% appearing in 2001 and 2002.
Table 2.2 also presents the performance measures and the estimated trading costs for copycat
funds. Our copycat strategies generate an average gross return of 11.44% per year, 0.09% higher
than the market. However, in practice copycat fund managers cannot exactly replicate the gross
performance computed from closing prices due to the reality of liquidity deficiency and price
impacts (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Wermers, 2006). The average trading costs for copycat
11The net mutual fund return is before load fees. Because load fees are borne by investors, ignoring them would
only render the relative success of copycat funds more difficult.
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Table 2.2: Annual Fund Performance & Characteristics
For each month, we calculate the equally weighted average performance measures and fund characteristics across all
funds in our sample. To minimize the potential survivorship bias, if any, all funds will be included in the calculation
in each month regardless of whether the fund could survive past the next period. Then the equally weighted average
monthly returns are compounded into annual returns. Gross copycat fund returns are the returns on the hypothetical
portfolios that invest in the disclosed holdings and are rebalanced as soon as the updated holdings are available to
the public. Trading costs for copycat funds are estimated using the fitted regression from Kacperczyk, Sialm and
Zheng (2008). Trade size and portfolio value of copycat funds are assumed to be identical to their active targets.
The estimated trading costs are averaged across all copycat funds for a given year. We assume that for all years in
our sample, each copycat fund incurs expenses equal to those of the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund in
2002, 20 basis points. We also calculate the average expense ratios and turnover ratios for active funds at the end of
each year. This table also presents the number of distinct mutual funds in our merged database each year. In CRSP
MFDB, turnover ratios are missing in 1991.
Mutual Funds Copycat Funds
Year No.
CRSP
VW
Index
Return
(% per
year)
Mutual
Fund
Return
(% per
year)
Expense
Ratio (%
per year)
Turnover
Ratio (%
per year)
Gross
Copycat
Return
(% per
year)
TC for
Copycat
Funds (%
per year)
Net
Copycat
Return
(% per
year)
1985 300 31.41 27.96 1.00 79.17 29.86 0.67 28.78
1986 345 15.56 13.18 0.99 75.62 14.31 0.74 13.24
1987 394 1.83 0.39 1.06 91.84 1.60 0.84 0.64
1988 430 17.56 14.65 1.27 81.19 16.73 0.84 15.54
1989 476 28.43 25.64 1.27 76.99 27.01 0.71 25.81
1990 439 -6.08 -6.65 1.23 84.45 -5.71 0.72 -6.58
1991 533 33.64 37.44 1.02 - 39.38 0.65 38.29
1992 566 9.06 9.24 1.29 71.89 9.22 0.63 8.35
1993 744 11.58 12.82 1.26 75.10 12.66 0.64 11.70
1994 893 -0.76 -1.30 1.25 80.91 -0.42 0.65 -1.27
1995 996 35.67 31.52 1.30 88.93 32.33 0.60 31.27
1996 1088 21.16 19.12 1.29 90.77 20.15 0.59 19.21
1997 1242 30.33 24.34 1.30 87.19 25.82 0.57 24.85
1998 1388 22.28 13.84 1.30 89.11 14.93 0.57 14.00
1999 1374 25.27 25.63 1.29 89.08 24.90 0.49 24.06
2000 1530 -11.09 -0.02 1.28 99.36 0.81 0.49 0.18
2001 1602 -11.27 -10.27 1.35 105.99 -8.96 0.58 -9.63
2002 1655 -20.84 -22.65 1.40 105.91 -21.33 0.72 -22.02
2003 1707 33.14 33.56 1.46 97.23 35.48 0.67 34.34
2004 1699 13.00 12.46 1.34 89.43 13.92 0.62 12.99
2005 1705 7.33 6.97 1.34 89.87 8.59 0.59 7.76
2006 1617 16.22 12.46 1.33 87.36 14.04 0.54 13.19
2007 1602 7.30 6.26 1.30 88.29 7.13 0.48 6.40
2008 1508 -38.31 -38.61 1.28 101.98 -37.85 0.69 -38.52
1985∼2008 3046 11.35 10.33 1.26 88.57 11.44 0.64 10.52
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funds amount to 0.64% per year.12 Looking at the average net returns, we find that copycat funds
are able to outperform their actively managed counterparts by 0.19% per year, which is mainly
due to the lower expense ratios of copycat funds. The disadvantage of copycat funds in timely
access to portfolio information is thus partly offset by their lower expenses.
Table 2.3: Performance Comparison
This table compares the average performance of active mutual funds and copycat funds in terms of various measures.
We first calculate the equally weighted average fund returns for a given month and then compute the time-series av-
erages. The numbers in the table are the outperformance (underperformance) of copycat funds relative to their
actively managed counterparts in percentages per month. Gross copycat fund returns are the returns on the hypo-
thetical portfolios that invest in disclosed holdings and are rebalanced as soon as the updated holdings are available
to the public. Trading costs and expenses for copycat funds are defined as previously. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level.
Average Performance Comparison (% per month) Gross Mutual Fund Return Net Mutual Fund Return
Gross Copycat Fund Return -0.01
(-1.19)
Gross Copycat Fund Return after TC -0.070***
(-5.54)
Gross Copycat Fund Return after Exp 0.073***
(6.15)
Net Copycat Fund Return 0.020*
(1.67)
The aggregate picture is summarized in Table 2.3, which compares the gross/net monthly
return measures between copycat funds and active mutual funds. The return difference between
the two strategies is used as a proxy for judging the relative success of copycat funds. Before any
trading costs and expenses, the copycat funds on average underperform the active funds by 1.0
basis point per month, but this difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero.13 Taking
into account transaction costs for copycat funds the return difference becomes -7.0 basis points
per month (significant at the 1% level). Thus, before expenses the average active mutual fund
outperforms its copycat fund. However, in terms of net returns, copycat funds outperform mutual
funds by 2.0 basis points per month, although this difference is statistically significant only at
the 10% level. Finally, Table 2.3 also compares the net returns before trading costs for copycat
funds and the reported net returns for mutual funds. Ignoring the possible trading costs results
in a statistically significant outperformance by copycat funds. The difference of 7.3 basis points
12The magnitude of our estimated trading costs is close to other studies. For example, Chalmers, Edelen and
Kadlec (1999) estimate the average trading costs for mutual funds to be 0.75% per year. Kacperczyk, Sialm and
Zheng (2008) obtain an average of 0.70% per year for trading costs. Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec (2001), Karceski,
Livingston and O’Neal (2004), Edelen, Evans and Kadlec (2006), Wermers (2000) all have estimated trading costs
for U.S. mutual fund industry over different subperiods. Their estimates range from 0.75% per year to 0.96% per
year. Note that copycat funds, by construction, trade less than the active mutual funds.
13Due to the compounding into annual returns in Table 2.2, the numbers in Table 2.3 are slightly different.
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per month is larger than the finding of Frank et al. (2004), who consider only a small segment of
the mutual fund industry.
The results in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 confirm that, on average, copycat funds are able to generate
returns comparable to their actively managed counterparts after trading costs and expenses.14
The relatively high expenses of mutual funds eliminate almost all the expected gains from active
investments. These findings suggest that periodic portfolio disclosure provides outside investors
with free-riding opportunities to generate net performance that is comparable to active funds.
Outside investors are thus able to obtain the benefits of fund research and investment strategies
without incurring the same level of expenses. This raises doubts over the effectiveness of the
Commission’s mandatory portfolio disclosure requirement that has aimed for protecting fund
shareholders’ interests.
2.4.2 Disclosure Frequency and Tracking Performance
More frequent access to portfolio holdings might increase the potential for free-riding activities.
Nevertheless, before 2004 a substantial number of mutual funds already voluntarily disclosed
their holdings more frequently than required. Frank et al. (2004) list several reasons for mutual
funds to do so. It is documented, however, that these frequent reporters are not a random sample
of the cross-section of mutual funds. In particular, Ge and Zheng (2006) find that funds that are
more likely to have an information advantage are less likely to disclose more frequently. Parida
and Teo (2010) further study the impact of portfolio disclosure frequency on fund performance
and find that the SEC’s mandate on more frequency disclosure has adverse effect on the perfor-
mance of past winning funds. To obtain a first impression on the impact of disclosure frequency
we now construct an alternative copycat strategy where we update the copycat portfolio at most
two times per year. We do so by always selecting the next snapshot date (and the corresponding
disclosure date) for a given fund at least 6 months from the previous one. We then implement our
copycat investment strategy using the less frequently (semi-annually) available holdings data. In
this case the portfolio weights can be as old as eight months. In Table 2.4 we compare the average
performance of the quarterly rebalanced copycat funds (whose portfolios are updated as soon as
new holdings are disclosed) and the semi-annually rebalanced copycat funds (whose portfolios
are updated at least six months after the previous update). Before transaction costs, the quarterly
rebalanced copycat funds outperform the semi-annually rebalanced ones on average by 0.10%
14In unreported results, we also compare the risk-adjusted gross and net performance between active funds and
our copycat funds using the Fama-French three-factor and Carhart four-factor models, respectively. In terms of
economic and statistical significance, the results are very similar.
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Table 2.4: Disclosure Frequency and Copycat Fund Performance
For each month, we calculate the equally weighted average copycat fund performance measures across the entire
database. To minimize the potential survivorship bias, if any, all funds will be included in the calculation in each
month regardless of whether the fund survives past the next period. Then the equally weighted average monthly
returns are compounded into annual returns. Gross copycat fund returns are the returns on the hypothetical portfolios
that invest in disclosed holdings. Trading costs and expenses for copycat funds are defined as previously. Q stands
for quarterly rebalancing frequency, i.e. rebalancing the copycat portfolio as soon as the new holdings are available.
We also revise our copycat rebalancing algorithm by always selecting the next snapshot date (and the corresponding
disclosure date) for each fund at least 6 months from the previous one (and the corresponding disclosure date). S
stands for this semi-annual rebalancing frequency. In the last row, the means of performance measures and trading
costs are compared between copycat strategies with different rebalancing frequencies. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level.
Gross Copycat Fund Return TC for Copycat Funds Gross Copycat Fund Return
(% per year) (% per year) after TC (% per year)
Year Q S Q S Q S
1985 29.86 29.63 0.67 0.58 29.03 28.86
1986 14.31 14.31 0.74 0.62 13.46 13.62
1987 1.60 1.43 0.84 0.71 0.85 0.78
1988 16.73 16.82 0.84 0.69 15.77 15.98
1989 27.01 26.72 0.71 0.62 26.06 25.87
1990 -5.71 -5.93 0.72 0.60 -6.39 -6.55
1991 39.38 39.34 0.65 0.55 38.56 38.70
1992 9.22 9.47 0.63 0.53 8.57 8.88
1993 12.66 12.43 0.64 0.54 11.93 11.81
1994 -0.42 -0.35 0.65 0.56 -1.08 -0.91
1995 32.33 32.12 0.60 0.53 31.53 31.45
1996 20.15 20.09 0.59 0.53 19.44 19.45
1997 25.82 25.67 0.57 0.50 25.10 25.07
1998 14.93 14.68 0.57 0.50 14.22 14.04
1999 24.90 24.09 0.49 0.42 24.30 23.61
2000 0.81 0.38 0.49 0.41 0.39 0.05
2001 -8.96 -8.77 0.58 0.49 -9.45 -9.21
2002 -21.33 -21.13 0.72 0.62 -21.86 -21.58
2003 35.48 35.47 0.67 0.55 34.60 34.73
2004 13.92 13.93 0.62 0.51 13.21 13.35
2005 8.59 8.43 0.59 0.46 7.98 7.96
2006 14.04 14.00 0.54 0.42 13.41 13.49
2007 7.13 6.98 0.48 0.39 6.61 6.57
2008 -37.85 -37.76 0.69 0.56 -38.39 -38.31
1985∼2008 11.44 11.34 0.64 0.54 10.74 10.74
Compare 0.11** 0.10*** 0.01
Means (2.39) (21.48) (0.13)
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per year. This differential is statistically significant at the 5% level. Additional analyses (not
reported) indicate that the majority of this performance difference is located in the fourth month
after construction of the semi-annual copycat strategy (where the quarterly portfolio is updated
with more recent portfolio information), which is consistent with our expectations. However, the
significantly lower transaction costs resulting from the infrequent trading make the two copycat
strategies break even in terms of the average gross return after trading cost (10.74% per year).
While more timely access to portfolio information facilitates the discovery of valuable invest-
ment opportunities, the additional trading costs incurred by exploiting such information appear
to erode realized performance.
2.4.3 The Impact of Disclosure Policy Change on the Tracking Perfor-
mance
The previous comparison provides only limited evidence for establishing the impact of imposing
mandatory quarterly disclosure for all funds, as was done in 2004. First, as mentioned above,
the cross-section of funds that voluntarily provides quarterly portfolio updates is a non-random
sample of the entire group of mutual funds and, conceivably, is dominated by funds that poten-
tially benefit most (or suffer less) from more frequent disclosure (cf. Wermers, 2001). Second, it
ignores the potential equilibrium effects of imposing quarterly disclosure upon all mutual funds.
One channel for this is that the additional information could affect investors’ money flows. Third,
and related to this, it could also affect the incentives for window dressing or other actions that
affect the information content of portfolio disclosure.
To investigate the influence of the disclosure policy change in 2004 on the average tracking
performance of copycat funds, Panel A of Figure 2.1 plots the time series of monthly average net
return differentials between copycat funds and active mutual funds. Around 2004 we observe a
dramatic change. The fluctuations in the return differences, which were quite high in the period
before the Commission mandated quarterly disclosure, flatten out after 2004. Apparently, the av-
erage copycat fund is able to track its target fund much more closely since 2004 (we will explore
this issue in more detail in Table 2.5). The average level of the performance differential has also
increased around 2004 and is slightly above zero in the latter part of the sample period. Besides,
we also observe that the 95% confidence interval for the average net tracking performance starts
to narrow down gradually after 2004.
Apart from the change in the amount of information related to the more frequent portfolio
disclosure per se, it is also possible that the information content of the disclosures themselves
24 The Relative Success of Copycat Funds
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increased after mandatory disclosure was imposed upon all funds. In Panel B of Figure 2.1, we
also present how the average representativeness of the disclosed holdings evolves over time. As
explained above, portfolio representativeness is measured by the tracking error of mutual funds
relative to their style benchmarks, where lower tracking error corresponds to higher represen-
tativeness. The most volatile average net return differences all appear during periods when the
average representativeness is relatively low (1988, 1991-1993 and 2000-2003). This is consis-
tent with Duong and Meschke (2009), who document a distinctive increase in portfolio pumping
during the period 1998-2001, followed by a sharp decrease afterwards. Similarly, the average
representativeness (which will be inversely affected by portfolio pumping) increases dramati-
cally after the 2004 policy change. The tracking error declines and stays between 0.50% and
1.20% from 2004 to the end of 2007. To make sure that representativeness is not a simple
proxy for market volatility, we also plot the residual representativeness that is orthogonalized
with respect to market volatility (the standard deviation of the value-weighted CRSP index over
the five months before each disclosure date). Controlling for market volatility strengthens our
findings on the impact of the disclosure policy change. Accordingly, the increase in reporting
representativeness after 2004 is mainly attributed to the actions on behalf of fund managers to
reduce fluctuations in portfolio weights. Overall, the change in mandatory disclosure rules cor-
responds to much less variation in the average performance differential between copycat funds
and their targets, a larger performance differential, and an increase in the representativeness of
the disclosed holdings reports.
Panel A of Table 2.5 quantifies the relative success of all copycat funds over time. In terms
of net returns, the outperformance of copycat funds relative to active funds increases on aver-
age by 0.02% per month after 2004. This difference is statistically insignificant. At the same
time, the standard deviation of the net return differences drops substantially from 0.22% per
month to only 0.07% per month, and this difference is statistically highly significant.15 We
also present the average representativeness of the disclosed holdings before and after the policy
change. Clearly, disclosed holdings on average have become significantly more representative
since 2004. Specifically, the average tracking error measure significantly decreases by 0.62%
after the policy change. This pattern is particularly eminent if we constrain the pre-2004 period
to the most recent five years.
A potentially disturbing effect is that the cross-section of mutual funds before and after 2004
is not exactly the same. New funds enter the market and a substantial number of older funds get
15To control for the possible effect of sample size on the standard deviation comparison, we conduct Levene’s
F-test to test for the homogeneity of population variances.
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liquidated at some point. Such funds may be easier or more difficult to track for a copycat fund.
To control for this, we also investigate the effect of the policy change for the subset of mutual
funds that experienced the disclosure policy change, and thus existed before and survived past
the year 2004. This results in a sample of 1,601 funds. As can be seen from Panel B of Table
2.5, qualitatively the results do not change. Around the policy change the representativeness of
the reported holdings increases, the average performance differential between copycat funds and
their targets increases and becomes much less volatile. With a t-value of 3.37 the increase of
0.05% per month in the performance differential for this group of copycat funds is statistically
significant.
A final subsample only considers those funds that survived the policy change but were al-
ready disclosing frequent portfolio information on a voluntary basis. We define this subgroup
by the condition that the fund on average issues at least 3.5 portfolio reports per year before
2004. This reduces the sample to 241 funds, which could be expected to be least affected by
the policy change. The results shown in Panel C of Table 2.5, however, are again similar. The
average net return difference between copycat funds and their targets, which was -0.03% before
2004, improves significantly and becomes positive after 2004, while its volatility reduces from
0.25% to 0.12% per month. Somewhat surprisingly, the relative performance of copycat funds
increases after the policy change, even within the group that already frequently disclosed port-
folio information. This could be attributable, though, to the increased representativeness of the
holdings disclosures. Before 2004, the holdings disclosed by frequent reporters are in general
slightly more representative of their recent underlying investment styles than other funds. How-
ever, mandating quarterly portfolio disclosure in 2004 forces all funds including the frequent
reporters to increase the representativeness of their disclosures to the same level regardless of
their past reporting frequencies.
To summarize, mutual funds that experienced the disclosure policy change in general suffer
significantly from revealing private information more frequently to the public. Copycat funds are
able to remarkably improve their relative tracking performance after the policy change in 2004.
The result is robust to controlling for market volatility and restricting the mimicking targets to
the past frequent reporters that should be less affected by the increased mandatory disclosure fre-
quency. In general, the policy change has led to an increase in the representativeness of portfolio
holdings information, possibly by the desire of fund managers to attract investors who evaluate
fund performance and manager skills based on portfolio disclosure. Only by conveying more
valuable investment ideas through portfolio disclosure a mutual fund, even a past frequent re-
porter, can distinguish itself from others that now have the same reporting frequency. On the
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other hand, the access to less opaque portfolio information enables copycat funds to generate
more stable tracking performance. Therefore, the results confirm our expectations that man-
dating more frequent portfolio disclosure expands the opportunities for potential free-riders to
successfully track or even beat their active counterparts.
2.5 The Cross-Section of Copycat Fund Performance
2.5.1 Panel Regressions Explaining the Performance Differential
Our analysis so far shows that copycat strategies on average could generate marginally higher
net returns than their active target funds, particularly after the disclosure policy change in 2004.
We now turn to exploring the cross-section of copycat funds. To do so, we first relate the return
differential between a copycat fund and its target fund to a set of fund characteristics using a panel
regression. The dependent variables of the regressions are the gross return difference, the gross
return difference after trading costs, and the net return difference. As the return differences can be
correlated to common risk factors, we use the residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model
as the dependent variable.16 As explanatory variables we include the mutual fund’s expense ratio,
turnover ratio, total net assets, fund age, past performance and the representativeness of reported
holdings. Past performance of a mutual fund in a given month is measured by the Carhart four-
factor alpha estimated over the prior 12 months. For a given copycat fund in each month we
first identify the disclosure date of the holdings information used in that month. Then the 4-
factor alpha over the 12 months prior to this disclosure date and the representativeness measure
corresponding to this disclosure date are aligned with the other explanatory variables for that
fund-month observation.
Table 2.6 summarizes the results for three different specifications. We find a significant neg-
ative relation between the past performance of active funds and the relative success of copycat
funds in all specifications. Other things equal, a 1% increase in past performance of mutual
funds on average leads to 0.098% per month decrease in the abnormal discrepancy in net returns
between copycat funds and mutual funds. Apparently, it is much easier for a copycat fund to
outperform a past loser fund than a past winner fund, even after controlling for fund size, the
representativeness of the portfolio holdings and other characteristics. We come back to this issue
below. The mutual fund’s tracking error has a significantly negative influence on the return dif-
16At the beginning of each month for a given fund, we estimate factor loadings over the previous 12 months. We
use these estimated coefficients to determine the predicted return differential for the subsequent month. Since the
estimation of the factor loadings requires at least one year of data we lose the first year of data for each fund.
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Table 2.6: Determinants of The Relative Success of Copycat Funds
This table presents the determinants of the outperformance/underperformance of copycat funds relative to their target
active mutual funds. Trading costs and expenses for copycat funds are defined as previously. Past performance is
measured here using the Carhart alpha of the fund’s net returns over the 12 months before each snapshot date. The
representativeness of portfolio holdings is measured by the standard deviation of the return gap between the net
fund returns of its style benchmark returns over the 5 months prior to each disclosure date. The DGTW (1997)
methodology is used to construct our style benchmark for each stock. We use the same portfolio weights computed
on the date on which the holdings are valid for each of the 5 months. Fixed effect panel regressions are employed.
Standard errors are clustered at fund level. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** at
5% level, *** at 1% level.
Abnormal Gross
Return Difference
Abnormal Gross
Return Difference
After TC
Abnormal Net Return
Difference
Expense Ratio 3.876*** 8.628*** 16.266***
(6.81) (13.25) (24.98)
Turnover Ratio -0.004 -0.023*** -0.023**
(-0.64) (-3.33) (-3.40)
Log(TNA) 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(7.92) (8.36) (8.29)
Fund Age 0.076*** 0.080*** 0.080***
(4.94) (4.79) (4.99)
Past Performance -0.089*** -0.098*** -0.098***
(-14.17) (-14.92) (-14.91)
Representativeness (Tracking Error) -1.564*** -2.019*** -1.991**
(-3.66) (-4.53) (-4.47)
Time-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
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ferences in all specifications. Holdings that are more representative imply a larger performance
differential. We also find a significant positive relation between fund size and the return dif-
ferential in all specifications. On average, a 1% increase in the TNA of an active fund results
in 0.051% per month increase in the relative net performance of its copycat counterpart. The
expense ratio and fund age both have a significant positive effect on the net return differences,
while the effect of turnover is negative.
While the results in Table 2.6 suggest that it can be attractive for a copycat fund to target,
for example, past losers or funds with more representative holdings, it is not necessarily the case
that such a strategy performs well relative to other copycat strategies. To investigate this issue,
we evaluate the performance of copycat funds for different subsets of mutual fund targets using
univariate portfolio sorts. We focus on two dimensions: the representativeness of the periodically
disclosed portfolio holdings, and past fund performance.17 The first dimension is particularly
interesting given that representativeness has been affected by the increased mandatory disclosure
policy since 2004.
2.5.2 Portfolio Sorts on Representativeness of Holdings
Before moving to portfolio sorts, we first analyze the determinants of the representativeness of
disclosed holdings. At each snapshot date, we collect TNAs, new money growth over a three-
month period prior to the snapshot date, expense ratios, fund net turnover, fund age, past per-
formance measured by the Carhart four-factor alphas over the previous 12 months, and market
volatility. Table 2.7 summarizes our main findings. We add the squared past performance in the
second specification because both skilled and unskilled funds could have incentives to camou-
flage their portfolios. For instance, past losers may be reluctant to disclose their true investment
positions because they try to avoid exposing their excessive risk taking or style drifting behavior
to investors. On the other hand, past winners may tend to do so hoping to protect their valu-
able private information derived from costly research. In both specifications, time dummies are
included. The results show a significantly positive (and nonlinear) relation between the past per-
formance of mutual funds and the tracking error measure. This is consistent with Meier and
Schaumburg (2006) who report that funds with poor recent performance are more likely to re-
port misleading holdings. Portfolio turnover, fund expenses and market return volatility are all
significantly and positively associated with the tracking error measure. Intuitively, frequent and
17We believe these two dimensions, namely, information validity and fund performance, are the primary concerns
for an ordinary outside investor. Results using sorts based on other fund characteristics are not reported and available
upon request.
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dramatic changes in fund portfolio weights and stock returns will make it harder for copycat
funds to track their active targets. Furthermore, younger funds and funds with capital outflows
are found to disclose holdings less representative of their true investment styles. Intuitively, more
experienced managers tend to manipulate their portfolio disclosures while the fund managers fac-
ing shrinking assets would likely paint a different picture of their investment strategy hoping to
attract more investor money.
Table 2.7: Determinants of Representativeness of Portfolio Disclosures
This table presents the determinants of window dressing which leads to variation in how representative the disclosed
holdings of a mutual fund are of its true investment style. The representativeness measure is defined as previously
and is aligned with other variables at each snapshot date for each mutual fund. Past performance is measured here
using the Carhart alpha for the fund’s net returns over the 12 months before each snapshot date. New money growth
is defined as the relative change in TNA over the 3 months before each snapshot date given the net return and the
assumption that all inflows happen at the end of the period. Market volatility is the standard deviation of the value-
weighted CRSP index over the five months before each disclosure date. Fixed effect panel regressions are employed.
Standard errors are clustered at fund level. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10% level, ** at
5% level, *** at 1% level.
Representativeness of Portfolio Disclosure (Tracking Error)
Past Performance 0.07*** 0.06***
(4.66) (4.46)
Past Performance2 4.05**
(2.13)
Turnover Ratio 0.00** 0.00***
(2.74) (2.65)
Expense Ratio 0.06*** 0.05***
(5.52) (4.60)
Log(TNA) 0.00 0.00
(1.52) (1.53)
Fund Age 0.00*** -0.00***
(-3.85) (-3.44)
New Money Growth -0.00*** -0.00***
(-100.67) (-98.02)
Market Volatility 0.07*** 0.07***
(19.25) (19.06)
Time-Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 (in %) 24.48 20.49
F -value 122.35*** 121.58***
We next analyze the performance of copycat strategies focused at particular levels of repre-
sentativeness. To do so we first sort all funds into decile portfolios, at the end of each February,
May, August and November18, and then calculate the equally weighted post-ranking portfolio
returns across all active and copycat funds for the subsequent three months. If any disclosure
18Although some mutual funds have snapshot dates that do not coincide with calendar quarter ends, the vast
majority of mutual funds file their holdings in these months.
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happens for a mutual fund between the portfolio rebalancing dates, we adjust the copycat repli-
cating strategy for that fund and wait until the next portfolio rebalancing date to re-rank all
mutual funds.19 Next, we link the post-ranking portfolio returns across disclosure periods to
generate full time series of post-ranking returns. Table 2.8 reports the cross-sectional variation
in copycat fund performance sorted on our representativeness measure, where decile 10 contains
the funds whose reported holdings are the least representative of their true investment strategies
in the recent past (highest tracking error). Panel A presents the time-series average return differ-
ences across decile portfolios, panel B provides similar measures after controlling for exposure
to the three Fama-French factors, and panel C presents four-factor Carhart (1997) alphas. The
post-ranking average returns for active funds in decile 10 and the returns for the corresponding
copycat funds tend to be significantly lower than those for the other decile portfolios in both
panels. The discrepancies in gross/net copycat fund returns between the two extreme deciles are
all negative and in many cases statistically significant.
Before trading costs, no clear pattern is found in the gross return differences between the
copycat funds and their targets (panel A). Moreover, the majority of these gross return differences
are all insignificantly different from zero. When we take trading costs into consideration, the
average relative gross performance of copycat funds decreases monotonically from -0.02% per
month (significant at 10% level) in decile 1 to -0.15% per month (significant at 1% level) in decile
10. The difference between these two extreme deciles is -0.13% per month, which is significant
at 1% level. The monotonic pattern is mainly attributed to the increasing trading costs for copycat
funds across deciles (from 0.03% to 0.12%). In unreported results, the increasing trading costs
for copycat funds are closely related to increasing net turnover of the active funds. The last
column of Panel A in Table 2.8 presents the net return differences between the copycat funds
and the active funds. The net return differences still decrease (though not strictly monotonically)
from the low tracking error decile (1) to the high tracking error decile (10). The difference in
average returns between the two extreme deciles equals -0.08% per month, which is significant at
the 1% level. Interestingly, copycat funds in decile 1 significantly outperform their active targets
that disclose highly representative holdings.
The evidence of the relative success of copycat funds is robust to alternative ways of risk
adjustment, as shown in Panels B and C of Table 2.8. Using the four-factor alpha of net re-
19For instance, if a mutual fund has disclosure dates in February and March we rebalance the copycat strategy
at the end of March based on the newly released holdings information. Thus after the sorting procedure at the end
of February the post-ranking returns for the decile portfolio to which this fund belongs will be influenced by the
holdings disclosed in March. However, this does not influence our sorting procedure because we wait until May to
rebalance the decile portfolios.
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turns, we find that copycat funds significantly outperform their active counterparts on average
by 0.05% per month in decile 1, but underperform by 0.02% per month in decile 10. Funds in
the lower deciles report the most representative holdings and copycatting them results in a net
return of around 1% per month, which exceeds the net return of mutual funds in each decile.
Therefore, by identifying the active funds whose reported holdings are highly representative of
their true investment styles, investors are able to outperform these target funds as well as the ma-
jority of the fund universe by simply replicating their portfolios. Thus, the use of representative
reported holdings for copycat strategies helps achieve superior performance net of trading costs
and expenses at both relative and absolute levels.
To consider the evolution of the relative net return difference across deciles, we plot the
net return difference for the two extreme deciles sorted on reporting representativeness against
time in Figure 2.2. We observe that the funds that disclose the most representative holdings
information are much easier for the potential copycat funds to track. The tracking volatility using
the most representative holdings is significantly smaller than using the most opaque information.
Moreover, the influence of the 2004 policy change appears to be important mainly for funds that
used to engage in activities of camouflaging their portfolio disclosures. When we compare the
average net return difference (between copycat funds and their active targets) before and after
the 2004 policy change, the results show a significant increase in the net return difference for
funds in decile 10 that disclose the least representative holdings versus an insignificant change
for funds in decile 1.
2.5.3 Portfolio Sorts on Past Performance
We conclude our analysis by investigating the performance of copycat strategies focusing upon
winning or losing mutual funds. Table 2.9 presents the results when we construct decile port-
folios based on the average fund returns over the previous year. Sorting funds using their past
four-factor alpha produces very similar results. In Panel A, we present the gross and net perfor-
mance of the mutual funds in these portfolios, the gross and net performance of the copycat funds
and their differences, all in terms of raw returns. Panels B and C present the results after risk
adjustment using the Fama-French three-factor and the Carhart four-factor models. The results
in the table confirm the findings of relative performance persistence of Carhart (1997), with a
net return spread of 0.56% between winner and loser funds. As shown in panel C, this relative
performance persistence is mainly attributable to the stock momentum documented by Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993).
In Panel A of Table 2.9, we see that copycat funds tracking past losers in decile 1 on average
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significantly outperform their actively managed counterparts by 0.06% per month before trading
costs and expenses. In contrast, the copycat funds mimicking past winner funds significantly
underperform their mimicking targets by 0.12% per month. The gross return difference between
these two extreme deciles is -0.18% per month (significant at 1% level), which confirms our
earlier findings that past performance of active funds is negatively related to the relative success
of copycat funds. If past performance is an appropriate proxy for fund manager skills, skilled
managers seem to be better at protecting their private information while the unskilled funds
can be easily outperformed by a simple copycat strategy. Alternatively, the unobserved interim
trading by past skilled managers enhances their performance, while that of unskilled managers
deteriorates their (already bad) performance.
Deducting trading costs for copycat funds does not change the decreasing trend of the gross
return differences across deciles but now almost all of them become significantly negative. This
is in line with our previous result that copycat funds on average significantly underperform the
active funds in gross returns after trading costs. The last column of Panel A in Table 2.9 shows the
variation in net return differences after trading costs and expenses. Tracking past losers results
in an average outperformance of 0.09% per month in net returns while mimicking past winners
leads to an underperformance of 0.11% per month. Both differences are statistically significant at
the 1% level. The 0.20% per month difference between the two extreme deciles is also significant.
Correcting for exposure to the four Carhart factors results in an even bigger return difference. In
Panel C, we find a net Carhart alpha difference of -0.13% per month for decile 10 and 0.09% per
month for decile 1. The discrepancy between the two extreme deciles is 0.23% per month. All
numbers are significant at the 1% level. The copycat funds’ advantages in lower expenses explain
their significant outperformance when tracking past losing funds. However, this advantage is not
large enough to offset the significant underperformance in gross returns after trading costs when
tracking past winners. It is noteworthy that the trading costs for copycat funds and the expense
ratios for active funds are comparable in magnitude and both show a U-shaped pattern across
deciles. This is exactly why the pattern of net return differences is similar to that of the gross
return differences.
Overall, we see a significant cross-sectional variation in the relative success of copycat funds
when the mimicking targets differ in their past performance. Despite underperforming their ac-
tive counterparts, copycat funds mimicking past winners can still generate an average net return
of 1.02% per month that beats nine out of ten decile portfolios formed on past fund performance.
Given that the performance persistence for mutual funds can be mainly attributed to momentum,
duplicating the holdings of past winning funds provides investors with a cheap momentum strat-
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egy as found by Wermers (2003). This could also explain why such superior performance of
copycat funds relative to the majority of active funds vanishes when adjusting for the momen-
tum factor. Parida and Teo (2010) also document a significant performance decrease for winning
funds in recent years after the SEC mandates more frequent portfolio disclosure. It appears that
past winners are more exposed to the exploitation of reported holdings by outsiders, especially
after the disclosure policy change.
2.6 Conclusion
Portfolio disclosure can be costly to actively managed mutual funds because it enables competi-
tors to construct portfolios that mimic, with a lag, the primitive fund’s holdings. Using a large
database of active mutual fund holdings, we show that, on average, copycat funds can produce
returns that are close to their target funds, taking into account transaction costs and expenses. Af-
ter extensive discussion and deliberation, the SEC increased the mandatory reporting frequency
of mutual fund holdings from semi-annually to quarterly in 2004. Our results show that this pol-
icy change leads to an increase in the return differential between copycat funds and their targets,
and a strong reduction in the volatility of the return differentials. This implies that since 2004 it
is easier for outside investors to free-ride on disclosed fund holdings, which might contradict the
Commission’s original intention to protect fund shareholders’ interests. At the same time, the
policy change has increased the representativeness of the reported holdings, which could indicate
that window dressing and other ways of camouflaging the true fund’s holdings have reduced in
the situation where all funds are mandated to quarterly disclose their holdings.
This paper also characterizes certain subgroups of mutual funds whose disclosed holdings are
most valuable for free-riding investors. The significant cross-sectional dispersion in the relative
success of copycat funds helps the potential free-riders to better understand the way in which
holdings information can be used. We show that past fund performance and the representative-
ness of reported holdings are important determinants of the relative success of copycat funds. It
appears that the smartest copycat strategy would be to mimic the portfolios of funds that disclose
representative holdings and exhibit good recent performance. Finally, our findings provide some
insights into the hidden cost of frequent portfolio disclosure for active funds. Policymakers will
also have to consider the benefits of portfolio disclosure such as increased transparency to strike
a balance for an optimal disclosure policy design.
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2.A Database Construction and Sample Selection
We select all U.S. open-ended mutual funds from both CRSP MFDB and TFN/CDA databases
spanning the period January 1985 – December 2008. When a mutual fund offers multiple share
classes we select the share class having the longest history of data; if there is no difference by
this measure, we select the fund with the lowest CRSP fund identifier (in our sample more than
90% of funds have more than one share class).20 During the majority of the sample period U.S.
mutual funds are required to file their holdings to the SEC on a semi-annual basis (according to
section 30 of ICA 1940). At the same time, the CDA data team also managed to obtain more
frequent holdings data for funds that provide voluntary quarterly portfolio disclosures to their
shareholders, large institutional clients or fund-tracking firms such as Morningstar Inc. To focus
on U.S. equity funds, we follow a procedure similar to Pastor and Stambaugh (2002).21 We use
the CRSP investment objective codes provided by Lipper (L), Wiesenberger (OBJ) and Strategic
Insight (SI) to select all growth funds, income funds and capital gains funds. In particular, we
require all mutual funds to have at least one of the following investment objective classifications
or missing:
Lipper(L):‘EI’, ‘EIEI’, ‘EMN’, ‘G’, ‘GI’, ‘I’, ‘LCCE’, ‘LCGE’, ‘LCVE’, ‘LSE’, ‘MC’, ‘MCCE’,
‘MCGE’, ‘MCVE’, ‘MLCE’, ‘MLGE’, ‘MLVE’, ‘SCCE’, ‘SCGE’, ‘SCVE’, ‘SESE’, ‘SG’.
Wiesenberger (OBJ): ‘SCG’, ‘AGG’, ‘G’, ‘G-S’, ‘S-G’, ‘GRO’, ‘LTG’, ‘I’, ‘I-S’, ‘IEQ’,
‘ING’, ‘GCI’, ‘G-I’, ‘G-I-S’, ‘G-S-I’, ‘I-G’, ‘I-G-S’, ‘I-S-G’, ‘S-G-I’, ‘S-I-G’, ‘GRI’, ‘MCG’.
Strategic Insight (SI): ‘SCG’, ‘GRO’, ‘AGG’, ‘ING’, ‘GRI’, ‘GMC’.
Furthermore, we also require that the investment objective code reported by TFN/CDA Spec-
trum is aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, balanced, unclassified or missing. We
then look at the percentage of stocks in the portfolio as reported by CRSP and select the funds
on average hold more than 80% and less than 105% in common stocks. All these criteria to-
gether most notably exclude any bond funds, asset allocation funds, international funds, precious
metal funds and sector funds because these funds generally hold and trade minimal quantities
of domestic equities (Wermers, 2000). Finally, we eliminate index funds if fund names contain
the following keywords: ‘INDEX’, ‘INDE’, ‘INDX’, ‘INX’, ‘IDX’, ‘S&P’, ‘ISHARES’, ‘DOW
JONES’ and ‘MSCI’. To avoid any abbreviation and misspelling errors, we manually inspect the
data and filter out remaining international funds, sector funds, tax-managed funds, fixed-income
20Our method here is similar to that of Cohen, Coval and Pastor (2005). In particular, we select the share class
with the greatest number of months of valid data throughout the whole sample period instead of restricting this filter
to each given year. We believe this would render our data more consistent over time.
21According to the March 2008 quarterly updated guide for the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund
Database, ICDI codes have been removed and new Lipper codes have been added to the style table.
2.A Database Construction and Sample Selection 45
funds, balanced funds, real estate funds and annuities.
We use the MFLINKS database provided by WRDS to assign a unique Wharton Financial
Institution Center Number (WFICN) to each fund in both CRSPMFDB and TFN CDA/Spectrum
data sets. As MFLINKS concentrates on U.S. domestic equity funds, we further exclude some
non-equity mutual funds if any by assigning the WFICN identifiers. Approximately 92% of
the target universe, which was derived by using objective codes and stock holding percentages
in CRSP MFDB, has been linked successfully. MFLINKS also resolves several issues includ-
ing re-used fund identifiers and arbitrary changes in fund identifiers in the TFN CDA/Spectrum
database.
The CDA/Spectrum data set provides two dates for holdings information, RDATE and FDATE.
RDATEs represent the dates on which the holdings are valid (i.e. actually held by fund man-
agers). FDATEs (‘vintage dates’ at quarter ends) signify a particular vintage of data and serve as
a primary key to join multiple tables in CDA/Spectrum S12 master files. We only keep a distinct
series of snapshot dates (RDATE) for our analysis.22
22Further details on Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum database are available in ‘M. Boldin, & B. Ding, 2008,
User’s Guide to Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund and Investment Company Common Stock Holdings Databases on
WRDS.’ and Wermers (1999, 2000). These data are free of survival bias as noted by Daniel et al. (1997).
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Chapter 3
Information Content when Mutual Funds
Deviate from Benchmarks∗
3.1 Introduction
The mutual fund industry is becoming increasingly important in financial markets. At the end
of 2009, total assets managed by U.S. mutual funds reached more than $11 trillion, growing by
more than 80 times from the $135 billion they managed at the end of 1980 (Investment Company
Institute, 2010). As a result of this dramatic expansion, 21% of U.S. households’ financial assets
are managed by mutual funds.
Despite the increasing importance though, the role that mutual funds play in determining se-
curity prices remains insufficiently understood. Considering the dominance of actively managed
mutual funds in this industry and the resulting vast amount of resources they spend on security
analysis and research,1 we might expect active funds to be good candidates as informed investors,
whose costly acquisition and implementation of information help impound information into asset
prices (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Prior literature on the performance of actively managed
mutual funds, however, has painted a picture of active funds generally failing to outperform
∗This chapter is based on the article by Jiang, Verbeek, and Wang (2011). I appreciate the helpful suggestions
from Yakov Amihud, Lily Fang, Marcelo Fernandes, Mark Grinblatt (discussant), Chris Schwarz, Zheng Sun, Sheri-
dan Titman, Lu Zheng, Russ Wermers, and participants in the 2011 Utah Winter Finance Conference and seminars
at the Erasmus University, UC Irvine, and University of London for helpful suggestions. I thank Kenneth French
for making data on factor returns and Antti Petajisto for data on active share available through their Web sites, and
am also grateful to the Frank Russell Company for data on the Russell indexes and to Oanh Hoang for helpful
assistance. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Inquire-Europe.
1In 2009, active equity funds manage approximately 87% of total U.S. equity mutual fund net assets, pushing the
average expense ratio for stock funds to be 0.99% (2010 Investment Company Fact Book, p. 33 and p. 64). French
(2008) argues that the annual cost of active investing is 0.67% of the aggregate market value.
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passive benchmarks, without creating value from active investing.2 This disheartening image
appears to contradict the view of active mutual funds as informed investors in financial markets.
In this study, we provide strong evidence of the informational role of actively managed mu-
tual funds in the determination of stock prices. We deviate from prior research by studying the
information content of the deviations of active funds from their performance benchmarks. As
the performance of an active fund is typically evaluated against a performance benchmark, the
manager often invests a substantial portion of fund assets in the benchmark (Cremers and Peta-
jisto, 2009). Therefore, focusing on the performance of the active portion of fund investments,
that is, the deviations from the benchmark, should grant us more power to identify active funds’
informational advantages.
To assess the information content of active funds’ deviations from benchmarks, we create a
stock-level measure that seeks to aggregate various pieces of information scattered among active
fund managers, as revealed through their over- and underweighting decisions. Specifically, for
each stock in our sample, we first compute the difference between the stock’s weight in each in-
dividual fund portfolio and its weight in the stock index against which that fund is benchmarked.
We average this difference in portfolio weights across active funds whose investment universe
includes this stock,3 thereby creating a stock-level measure of mutual funds’ deviations from
benchmarks, DFB.
This measure of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks strongly predicts future stock
returns. In univariate portfolio sorts, for example, stocks in the decile portfolio with the highest
DFB, which are those most heavily overweighted by active funds, perform substantially better
than those with the lowest DFB. Over the period 1980–2008, the average equal-weighted return
on the top decile of stocks with the highest DFB was higher than that on the bottom decile of
stocks, or those with the lowestDFB, by 0.74% per month, and this return difference was highly
statistically significant with a t-statistic of 4.38. The superior performance of the stocks that ac-
tive funds overweight relative to those that they underweight does not simply reflect the high risk
propensity of active funds. As we show, the risk-adjusted returns on the spread portfolio between
high and low DFB stocks are 0.66%, 0.72%, 0.58%, and 0.61% per month, as calculated by the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model, a four-
factor model that includes momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), and a five-factor model that
2Analyses of mutual fund returns generally report disappointing fund performance (e.g., Jensen, 1968, Malkiel,
1995, Carhart, 1997, Fama and French, 2010). Studies based on fund portfolio holdings suggest better but still
moderate fund performance before expenses and trading costs (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1989 and 1993, Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997, Wermers, 2000).
3A stock enters a mutual fund’s investment universe if it is held by the mutual fund or it is a member of the
fund’s benchmark index.
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also includes Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity factor, respectively. The statistical signifi-
cance of the returns on the spread portfolio remains high even after these risk adjustments. These
results also are robust to the various specifications of Fama andMacBeth’s (1973) cross-sectional
regressions with common stock return predictors, to the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997) characteristic-adjustment procedure, for different weighting schemes, and across various
subperiods. They suggest that actively managed mutual funds possess value-relevant information
that is not fully reflected in stock prices.
Although interesting, these results also may be subject to alternative interpretations. For
example, the higher returns on stocks with higher DFB may be a result of mutual funds’ de-
mand pressure, which pushes stock prices above equilibrium levels and thus generates higher
in-sample returns. This interpretation is possible because there is evidence that mutual funds
tend to herd (Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004) and that they may continue to buy the stocks they have
overweighted. To differentiate this alternative interpretation based on price pressure from our
story of informed fund managers, we conduct a number of tests, which uniformly support our
information-based story.
First, we explore the distinct implications of informed managers and price pressure hypothe-
ses for the dynamics of changes in mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks. Specifically,
suppose that, in the world with informed fund managers, a risk-averse manager receives a pos-
itive signal about a stock in period t and decides to increase his portfolio weight in this stock
relative to his benchmark, which results in an increase in DFB from t − 1 to t. In the next
period t + 1, as his positive private information transmits into the stock price, the risk-averse
manager has incentives to at least partially unwind the position that he has built up to capture
the gains to his information. This position reversal takes place because the manager desires to
reduce the long-run risk of future price changes arising from future events he cannot predict.
In this scenario, a large increase in DFB in one period should predict a subsequent decline in
DFB. In the world dominated by mutual fund herds, however, a large increase in the excess
weight of a stock in an average fund’s portfolio attracts further demand from the herd, which
leads to increases in the stock price. According to this interpretation, a large increase in DFB in
one period should forecast a further increase in DFB. Our tests show that an increase in DFB
in one quarter reliably predicts a decline in DFB in the subsequent quarter, which concurs with
the story of informed fund managers but contradicts the price pressure-based interpretation.
Second, a simple approach to examine the influence of demand pressure on our findings is to
test the return forecasting power of our measure of deviations from benchmarks after we control
for realized future demand shocks. If active funds’ deviations from benchmarks can forecast
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future returns mainly through the channel of future demand shocks, the return predictive power
should cease to exist once the association between future returns and future demand shocks is
controlled for. We find, however, that the return forecasting power of active funds’ deviations
from benchmarks remains intact after we control for future demand shocks.
Third, we examine the persistence of the performance of stocks overweighted by mutual
funds: If the high returns on stocks with highDFB arise mainly from demand pressure, these re-
turns subsequently should reverse. If, however, the high returns come mostly from value-relevant
information possessed by fund managers and the market reacts properly to that information, we
expect to observe no subsequent return reversal. Our tests show that the positive association be-
tween DFB and future excess returns concentrates for the most proximate quarter. This positive
association shows no tendency to reverse for the subsequent two to four quarters. Thus, DFB
appears to forecast returns due primarily to the value-relevant information that DFB aggregates
from diverse mutual fund managers, as revealed through their investment decisions.
To further increase our confidence in this information-based story, we conduct a series of
tests based on stock and fund attributes. First, we examine the return forecasting power of DFB
across size groups. The idea is that very large firms tend to be more transparent, with better
disclosure policy. They also tend to be more closely followed and researched by market partic-
ipants. It is therefore more difficult for mutual funds to gain information advantages on those
firms. On the other hand, returns to analyzing tiny firms appear to be small relative to the costs of
information acquisition. These considerations prompt us to conjecture that mid-cap stocks could
be the fields where information miners or stock pickers have the greatest information advantage.
Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the return forecasting power of DFB concentrates
among mid-cap stocks. Along a similar vein of thinking, if mutual funds have informational
advantages about individual stocks, we expect their advantages to be greater among stocks with
more firm-specific information. Also, we expect the funds’ informational advantages to be more
valuable when the funds have fewer competitors. Consistent with these predictions, we find that
the return forecasting power of DFB is stronger among firms that have higher idiosyncratic
volatilities and those that attract fewer mutual fund investors.
Second, our measure of DFB reflects the investment decisions of all active mutual funds in
our sample. Prior literature shows heterogeneous levels of skills or alphas across mutual funds
(e.g., Fama and French, 2010). If fund managers with a higher level of alphas have better infor-
mational advantages, a DFB measure constructed from the universe of those high-performing
funds could be a better return predictor than that from the universe of the low-performing funds
with a lower level of alphas. We find that, indeed, a strategy that buys high DFB stocks and sells
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low DFB stocks based on the portfolio decisions of high-performing funds generates a monthly
four-factor alpha of 0.54% (t=5.42), which is more than twice as large as the four-factor alpha of
0.25% (t=2.64) on a similar strategy based on the portfolio decisions of low-performing funds.
Interestingly, the higher returns on the DFB strategy implemented on higher-alpha managers
come from both the higher returns on stocks that they overweight and the lower returns on stocks
they underweight. We also find that a DFB strategy based on the portfolio selection of growth
funds generates significant returns whereas a similar strategy based on the investment decisions
of income funds generates insignificant returns.
To explore the nature of the information content captured by DFB, we examine the relation
between DFB and firms’ future earnings surprises. We find that stocks with high DFB tend to
experience large and positive earnings surprises during the following four quarters, and the effect,
strongest for the most proximate quarter, decays substantially through time. Even after we adjust
for the possibility that active funds might trade on earnings momentum, we still find reliably
positive earning surprises in the most proximate quarter for stocks they overweight. We also find
that a significant portion of the return premiums on the stocks with high DFB occurs around
corporate earnings announcements. These results suggest that part of active funds’ superior
information relates to firms’ fundamental prospects.
Finally, how can we reconcile evidence that points to strong informational advantages of
mutual funds in stock markets with the overall lackluster performance of mutual funds reported
by prior literature? We find that in aggregate, mutual funds invest less than 10% of their assets
in high DFB stocks but approximately 34% in low DFB stocks. Therefore, a large four-factor
alpha of 6–7% per year on high DFB stocks translates into a small mutual fund alpha of less
than 1% per year. After we take into account trading costs and fees, little, if any, alpha remains
for mutual fund investors to capture. These results are consistent with the predictions of Berk
and Green (2004) on the equilibrium behavior of mutual fund managers.
Our paper joins a small but growing body of literature that connects mutual fund investing
to asset prices. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) use geography to identify a link between mutual
fund investments and stock prices. They find that the holdings of geographically proximate
firms by local fund managers perform better than their holdings of distant firms, which suggests
fund managers have better access to local information and that their investments facilitate the
transfer of information into the prices of local stocks. Cohen, Frazzini, andMalloy (2008) exploit
educational background to establish a social link between corporate managers and fund managers
that in turn influences stock prices.4 Unlike these two studies, which use a priori links between
4In a similar vein, Tang (2009) examines the information advantages of portfolio managers for firms they previ-
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firms and funds, we track the investment decisions of mutual fund managers and extract and
aggregate the information that is scattered among these managers from their portfolio decisions.
We also provide strong evidence that this measure of aggregated information predicts future stock
returns, which is particularly useful for a better understanding of the informational role played
by mutual funds in stock markets.
Our paper also relates to Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), who assess the value of
active portfolio management by examining the association between mutual fund trades and future
stock returns (see, also, Grinblatt and Titman, 1993). The trading decisions of mutual funds,
however, could reflect not only informational motives but also other motivations such as flow-
driven liquidity needs (e.g., Alexander, Cici, and Gibson, 2007). Our measure of deviations from
benchmarks is less subject to the influence of fund flows, because fund managers can simply scale
up or down fund assets in response to flows, without having to substantially alter the composition
of their active portfolios. Therefore, our measure could have more power to detect active funds’
information advantages. Empirically, we are able to show that our measure of deviations from
benchmarks dominates the trade-based measure used by Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers.5
In some recent study, Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2010) document the superior performance of
fund managers’ best idea stocks. Their analysis focuses on the top holdings in each manager’s
portfolio; we are interested instead in whether a measure that aggregates information dispersed
among fund managers captures their informational advantages as an investor group. Our analysis
of the entire portfolio composition of mutual funds enables us to detect the negative abnormal
returns on stocks that active funds choose to underweight. Moreover, our results are insensitive
to the exclusion of each manager’s best ideas in computing DFB. Shumway, Szefler, and Yuan
(2009) propose a novel technique to elicit fund managers’ beliefs about expected stock returns
from their portfolio holdings. They apply their method to rank these fund managers and find
that skilled managers possess superior information relative to their unskilled peers. Our primary
interest, however, is in whether an average mutual fund has informational advantages in stock
markets.
To pursue these interests, we organize the rest of this chapter as follows: In Section 3.2,
we introduce our measure of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks, DFB, and in Section
3.3, we describe our sample selection and summary statistics. With Section 3.4, we explore
the information content of mutual funds that deviate from benchmarks, then provide several
robustness checks in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes our paper.
ously served as financial analysts.
5In Appendix D, we compare our measure of active funds’ deviations from benchmarks with the Chen, Je-
gadeesh, and Wermers (2000) trade measure.
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3.2 Measuring Mutual Funds’ Deviations from Benchmarks,
DFB
We measure a mutual fund j′s deviation from its benchmark for stock i in quarter t as the dif-
ference between this stock’s weight in the fund portfolio, wji,t, and its weight in the stock index
against which the fund’s performance is benchmarked, wbi,t. Our primary interest is in whether
mutual funds, as an investor group, have informational advantages for individual stocks in their
investment universe; therefore, we create a stock-level measure of mutual funds’ deviations from
benchmarks, DFB, by averaging the difference in portfolio weights across all mutual funds
whose investment universe comprises this stock. A stock enters a mutual fund’s investment uni-
verse if it (1) is held by the mutual fund or (2) is a member of the fund’s benchmark index. We
thus can define a measure of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks for stock i as:
DFBi,t =
Ni∑
j=1
(wji,t − wbi,t)/Ni, (3.1)
where Ni is the number of funds whose investment universe includes stock i. Our simple mea-
sure of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks equally reflects each fund’s distance from its
performance benchmark and therefore captures a typical fund’s deviation from its benchmark.
Other ways to aggregate information across mutual funds include weighting each fund’s distance
from a benchmark based on net fund assets, which captures funds’ deviations from benchmarks
for every invested dollar, or weighting each fund’s distance from a benchmark based on how
active the funds are. Our results remain robust when we use such weighting schemes, but we
present our main results using the simple equal-weighting scheme, which also is economically
intuitive.
If fund managers deviate from their benchmarks for informational reasons, DFB can aggre-
gate diverse pieces of information about the future value of individual stocks scattered among
fund managers. If not yet has this aggregated information been fully reflected in current market
prices (i.e., mutual funds as an investor group possess private information), DFB should pre-
dict future stock returns relatively well. A stock with a higher value for DFB, ceteris paribus,
should have higher future returns. If mutual funds do not possess value-relevant private informa-
tion or deviate from performance benchmarks for other considerations,6 we expect DFB to be
unrelated, or even negatively related, to future stock returns. In Appendix A, we show that with
6A growing literature analyzes the incentives of mutual fund managers, which suggests that they may deviate
from their performance benchmarks for agency considerations, beyond the objective of return maximization or
portfolio diversification (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).
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certain assumptions, DFB linearly relates to expected future excess returns, conditional on fund
managers’ information set.
3.3 Sample and Summary Statistics
In this section, we describe our data set and sample selection criteria, as well as our methods for
selecting funds’ performance benchmarks, followed by summary statistics for the mutual fund
sample and the characteristics of stocks with large mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks,
DFB.
3.3.1 Data and Sample Selection
To construct our mutual fund database, we combined the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database (MFDB) with the CDA/Spectrum Mu-
tual Fund Holdings Database from Thomson Financial.7 Because we wish to examine the infor-
mational advantages of mutual funds in stock markets, we only include active mutual funds that
invest primarily in U.S. common stocks; we eliminate balanced, bond, money market, interna-
tional, index funds, and sector funds, as well as funds not invested primarily in equity securities
(for details on our selection, see Appendix B). Our sample covers the period from 1980 to 2008.
Data on the monthly returns, prices, and market values of equity for common stocks traded on
the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ come from the CRSP. Consistent with previous literature, we
exclude closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REIT), American Depository Receipts
(ADR), foreign companies, primes, and scores (we keep only shares with codes of 10 or 11).
To mitigate the concern that our stock return tests might be influenced by return outliers, we
eliminate stocks with prices below $5 as of the portfolio formation date (typically the end of the
previous quarter).
3.3.2 Benchmark Index Holdings
We next must compute the weights of each fund’s holdings against its performance benchmark;
the crucial step is selecting the stock index that the fund seeks to outperform. We use two
methods to identify each fund’s performance benchmark index. First, because there might be
a discrepancy between a mutual fund’s self-declared performance benchmark and the actual
benchmark the fund follows (Sensoy, 2009), we adopt Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) method
7Our merging procedure uses the MFLINKS data set maintained by Russ Wermers and the Wharton Research
Data Services (WRDS).
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and select 19 benchmark indexes commonly used by practitioners: the S&P 500, S&P 400, S&P
600, S&P 500/Barra Value, S&P 500/Barra Growth, Russell 1000, Russell 2000, Russell 3000,
Russell Midcap, the value and growth variants of the four Russell indexes, Wilshire 5000, and
Wilshire 4500. For each fund in each quarter, we select from the 19 indexes the one that mini-
mizes the average distance between the fund portfolio weights and the benchmark index weights.
Data on the index holdings of the 12 Russell indexes since their inception come from the Frank
Russell Company, and data on S&P 500, S&P 400, and S&P 600 index holdings since Decem-
ber 1994 are from Compustat. For the remaining indexes and time periods, we use the holdings
of index funds to approximate the index holdings.8 In Appendix C, we describe in detail our
selection of benchmark indexes.
Second, for each individual fund, we tailor a performance benchmark by constructing a value-
weighted portfolio of all stocks the fund actually holds.9 Since these two approaches generate
qualitatively similar results, we report our main results based on the first approach.
3.3.3 Summary Statistics for the Mutual Fund Sample
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics for our mutual fund sample, which includes 2,691 dis-
tinct U.S. active equity funds. During 1980–2008, the industry of active equity mutual funds
experienced dramatic expansion: The number of actively managed funds increased from 201
in 1980 to 1397 in 2008, with total assets under their management increasing from $26.55 to
$953.91 billion. On average, these funds invested 93% of their assets in common stocks, which
suggests that our sample effectively represents the universe of U.S. active funds with an invest-
ment focus on domestic equity. Throughout our sample period, the expansion of mutual funds
outpaced the growth of stock markets, which led them to become increasingly important share-
holders of common equity. In particular, mutual funds’ ownership of U.S. stocks in the CRSP
database increased from approximately 2% to around 10%.
3.3.4 Characteristics of Stocks with Extreme DFB
What are the characteristics of stocks with heavy mutual fund bets? In this subsection, we
examine the characteristics of stocks with large mutual fund over- and underweighting. We
present univariate results based on the decile portfolios in Table 3.2. Specifically, at the end of
8We obtain qualitatively similar results if we use index fund holdings throughout our sample period.
9A mutual fund might respond to negative information about a firm by avoiding holding its shares, so we also use
a value-weighted benchmark consisting of all stocks that the fund held during the previous five years. The results
are qualitatively similar.
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Table 3.1: Stock Holdings of Active Mutual Funds
Each year-end from 1980 to 2008, we calculate the number of distinct actively managed equity mutual funds in our
sample (see Appendix B for details on sample selection) and compute the average proportion of fund assets invested
in common stocks. We also report the total number and dollar amount of common stocks held by those mutual funds
and their proportion in the CRSP stock database. The calculations exclude stocks with prices lower than $5 at the
year-end.
Year
No. of
Distinct
Funds
% of Fund
Assets
Invested in
Common
Equity
No. of
Distinct
Stocks Held
by Funds
% of CRSP
Stocks
(Number)
Total Mutual
Funds Assets
($ Billions)
% of CRSP
Stocks ($)
1980 196 88.01 1900 39.52 26.81 2.04
1981 197 83.05 1865 35.87 18.25 1.49
1982 202 86.4 2055 39.85 27.69 1.97
1983 225 87.22 2934 51.01 43.28 2.49
1984 237 85.59 3059 52.01 45.47 2.71
1985 261 86.35 3353 56.98 66.59 3.19
1986 300 85.61 3547 57.06 74.99 3.19
1987 339 85.19 3454 53.49 88.5 3.83
1988 358 84.86 3572 57.52 85.6 3.41
1989 392 86.02 3558 59.51 104.8 3.43
1990 421 84.72 3289 56.42 101.14 3.68
1991 450 86.95 3461 58.78 142.29 3.83
1992 552 86.28 3737 62.08 211.73 5.14
1993 681 87.7 4879 74.47 232.21 4.97
1994 793 90.83 5123 74.54 267.72 5.78
1995 907 90.95 5545 78.09 403.14 6.38
1996 1013 92.2 5953 78.72 575.74 7.47
1997 1126 93.25 5997 78.95 823.27 8.22
1998 1218 93.59 5671 78.99 1073.73 8.69
1999 1358 93.06 5633 82.27 1270.82 8.05
2000 1490 92.24 5458 83.25 1283.24 8.96
2001 1541 93.46 4933 84.53 998.35 7.89
2002 1607 94.03 4266 78.84 938.53 9.52
2003 1630 95.29 4481 88.28 1307.75 10.18
2004 1641 94.26 4479 89.99 1684.5 11.8
2005 1617 96.4 4156 84.99 1691.34 11.43
2006 1580 96.83 4188 87.05 2053.51 12.48
2007 1587 96.28 4286 91.46 2004.32 12.15
2008 1510 95.92 3997 90.84 1024.99 10.26
Average 877 90.09 4098 69.15 643.8 6.37
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each quarter, we sort stocks into deciles according to their DFB, calculate the cross-sectional
averages of the characteristics, and report their time-series averages.
The results show that stocks heavily overweighted by mutual funds tend to have low portfolio
weights in benchmark indexes, whereas stocks heavily underweighted by mutual funds tend to
have high portfolio weights in benchmark indexes. A typical stock in Decile 10 with the highest
DFB has an average portfolio weight of only 3 basis points in its benchmark index, which is
substantially lower than the average portfolio weight of 29 basis points in the benchmark for a
typical stock in Decile 1 with the lowestDFB. We also find that most stocks in Decile 10 remain
outside of mutual funds’ performance benchmarks. On average, approximately two thirds of the
stocks in Decile 10 are outside of benchmark indexes, whereas no stocks in Decile 1 are outside
of benchmark indexes.
Furthermore, the results show that stocks in Decile 10 tend to be the least popular among
mutual funds; they reside in the investment universe of only 34 funds. On the contrary, stocks in
Decile 1 appear in the investment universe of 213 funds. On average, only 16 mutual funds hold
stocks in Decile 10, compared with 36 funds holding stocks in Decile 1. These results indicate
that stocks with high active fund bets do not pertain just to a few “hot” or popular names among
money managers.
Finally, we find that stocks heavily overweighted by mutual funds tend to be relatively small
with an average decile rank value of 3.3, based on NYSE market-cap decile breakpoints in as-
cending order. They also have a slight tendency to be winners in the previous year and have
higher idiosyncratic volatilities. There exists no apparent relation between DFB and the book-
to-market ratio. We note that the high excess weights of Decile 10 stocks in mutual fund portfo-
lios should not result mechanically from their high past returns: Large increases in the relative
prices of those stocks increase their weights not only in the mutual fund portfolio but also in the
benchmark index.
3.4 Information Content of DFB
In this section, we explore whether our measure of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks
contains information relevant for future stock returns. We start by looking at the relation between
DFB and future stock returns using both univariate portfolio sorts and the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) cross-sectional regressions. Then we examine and find evidence contradicting an alterna-
tive interpretation of the return forecasting power of DFB, namely, the demand pressure from
mutual funds. We provide further evidence regarding the information content of DFB by inves-
58 Information Content of DFB
Ta
bl
e
3.
2:
Su
m
m
ar
y
of
th
e
D
at
a:
D
ec
ile
Po
rt
fo
lio
s
A
tt
he
en
d
of
ea
ch
qu
ar
te
r,
w
e
co
m
pu
te
fo
r
ea
ch
st
oc
k
a
m
ea
su
re
of
m
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
’
de
vi
at
io
ns
fr
om
be
nc
hm
ar
ks
,D
F
B
,w
hi
ch
is
th
e
si
m
pl
e
av
er
ag
e
of
th
e
st
oc
k’
s
w
ei
gh
ti
n
a
m
ut
ua
lf
un
d
po
rt
fo
lio
in
ex
ce
ss
of
its
w
ei
gh
ti
n
th
e
fu
nd
’s
be
nc
hm
ar
k
in
de
x,
ac
ro
ss
al
lm
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
in
th
e
st
oc
k-
fu
nd
co
ho
rt
.
W
e
th
en
so
rt
st
oc
ks
in
to
de
ci
le
s
in
as
ce
nd
in
g
or
de
r
ba
se
d
on
D
F
B
,a
nd
ca
lc
ul
at
e
th
e
st
oc
k
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
fo
r
ea
ch
de
ci
le
po
rt
fo
lio
.
A
m
ut
ua
l
fu
nd
be
lo
ng
s
to
a
st
oc
k-
fu
nd
co
ho
rt
if
th
e
st
oc
k
ap
pe
ar
s
in
th
e
m
ut
ua
lf
un
d
po
rt
fo
lio
or
is
a
m
em
be
r
of
th
e
in
de
x
ag
ai
ns
tw
hi
ch
th
e
fu
nd
is
be
nc
hm
ar
ke
d.
Fo
r
ea
ch
m
ut
ua
l
fu
nd
in
ea
ch
qu
ar
te
r,
w
e
se
le
ct
fr
om
19
st
oc
k
in
de
xe
s
on
e
be
nc
hm
ar
k
in
de
x
th
at
m
in
im
iz
es
th
e
av
er
ag
e
di
st
an
ce
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
fu
nd
po
rt
fo
lio
w
ei
gh
ts
an
d
th
e
be
nc
hm
ar
k
in
de
x
w
ei
gh
ts
.
O
ur
se
to
f
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
cl
ud
es
th
e
av
er
ag
e
de
vi
at
io
ns
fr
om
be
nc
hm
ar
ks
D
F
B
,t
he
av
er
ag
e
be
nc
hm
ar
k
w
ei
gh
t,
th
e
av
er
ag
e
nu
m
be
ro
ff
un
ds
in
th
e
st
oc
k-
fu
nd
co
ho
rt
,t
he
av
er
ag
e
nu
m
be
ro
ff
un
ds
th
at
ho
ld
th
e
st
oc
ks
,t
he
av
er
ag
e
pr
op
or
tio
n
of
st
oc
ks
ou
ts
id
e
th
e
be
nc
hm
ar
ks
,
th
e
av
er
ag
e
pr
op
or
tio
n
of
fu
nd
s
in
th
e
st
oc
k-
fu
nd
co
ho
rt
fo
rw
hi
ch
th
e
st
oc
k
is
no
th
el
d
by
fu
nd
s
bu
ti
n
th
ei
rb
en
ch
m
ar
ks
,t
he
m
ar
ke
tc
ap
,t
he
bo
ok
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
t
ra
tio
,p
as
to
ne
ye
ar
re
tu
rn
(s
ki
pp
in
g
th
e
m
os
tr
ec
en
tm
on
th
),
an
d
th
e
re
si
du
al
re
tu
rn
vo
la
til
ity
in
th
e
pa
st
qu
ar
te
r.
T
he
m
ar
ke
tc
ap
of
a
st
oc
k
is
co
m
pu
te
d
by
m
ul
tip
ly
in
g
th
e
st
oc
k
pr
ic
e
w
ith
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g
sh
ar
es
at
ea
ch
qu
ar
te
r
en
d
(i
n
m
ill
io
ns
).
T
he
bo
ok
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
tr
at
io
is
de
te
rm
in
ed
fo
r
ea
ch
st
oc
k
at
th
e
en
d
of
la
st
ca
le
nd
ar
ye
ar
us
in
g
th
e
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
th
e
st
oc
k
at
th
e
en
d
of
la
st
fis
ca
l
ye
ar
an
d
th
e
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
th
e
st
oc
k
at
th
e
en
d
of
la
st
ca
le
nd
ar
ye
ar
.
W
e
re
gr
es
s
th
e
da
ily
st
oc
k
re
tu
rn
s
ag
ai
ns
td
ai
ly
Fa
m
a
Fr
en
ch
fa
ct
or
s
in
a
gi
ve
n
qu
ar
te
ra
nd
us
e
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
th
e
re
si
du
al
s
as
th
e
re
si
du
al
vo
la
til
ity
of
th
e
st
oc
k
fo
rt
ha
tq
ua
rt
er
(a
tl
ea
st
40
da
ily
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
of
st
oc
k
re
tu
rn
s
m
us
tb
e
av
ai
la
bl
e)
.T
o
fa
ci
lit
at
e
co
m
pa
ri
so
n
ac
ro
ss
de
ci
le
s,
w
e
sc
or
e
fo
re
ac
h
qu
ar
te
rt
he
si
ze
,b
oo
k-
to
-m
ar
ke
t,
an
d
pa
st
re
tu
rn
s
fr
om
1
to
10
,w
ith
10
re
pr
es
en
tin
g
th
e
de
ci
le
s
w
ith
th
e
la
rg
es
tm
ar
ke
tc
ap
(b
as
ed
on
N
Y
SE
br
ea
k-
po
in
ts
),
hi
gh
es
tb
oo
k-
to
-m
ar
ke
t,
an
d
hi
gh
es
tp
as
to
ne
-y
ea
rr
et
ur
n.
St
oc
ks
w
ith
pr
ic
es
lo
w
er
th
an
$5
at
th
e
qu
ar
te
re
nd
ar
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
.
D
ec
ile
D
F
B
(%
)
B
en
ch
m
ar
k
W
ei
gh
ts
(%
)
N
o.
of
Fu
nd
s
in
th
e
St
oc
k-
Fu
nd
C
oh
or
t
N
o.
of
Fu
nd
s
H
ol
di
ng
th
e
St
oc
k
Pr
op
or
tio
n
of
St
oc
ks
O
ut
si
de
of
B
en
ch
m
ar
ks
(%
)
M
ar
ke
tC
ap
Sc
or
e
(1
-1
0)
B
M
Sc
or
e
(1
-1
0)
Pr
1Y
rS
co
re
(1
-1
0)
R
es
id
ua
l
Vo
la
til
ity
(%
)
1
-0
.1
5
0.
29
21
3
36
0
6.
75
4.
6
5.
95
1.
94
2
-0
.0
3
0.
08
16
7
19
0.
9
4.
49
4.
88
5.
45
2.
4
3
0
0.
05
14
4
16
8.
15
3.
57
4.
96
5.
37
2.
61
4
0.
04
0.
03
99
11
23
.1
5
2.
8
5.
28
5.
27
2.
74
5
0.
09
0.
04
10
6
14
31
.6
5
3.
12
5.
27
5.
38
2.
69
6
0.
14
0.
04
12
1
18
27
.3
4
3.
6
5.
12
5.
58
2.
57
7
0.
2
0.
05
11
7
21
27
.2
4
3.
83
5.
06
5.
82
2.
52
8
0.
29
0.
05
99
22
30
.7
8
3.
95
4.
94
6.
11
2.
52
9
0.
44
0.
05
74
22
40
.9
1
3.
87
4.
79
6.
28
2.
59
10
1.
01
0.
03
34
16
67
.3
4
3.
28
4.
7
6.
74
2.
76
D
10
-D
1
1.
17
-0
.2
7
-1
80
-2
0
67
.3
4
-3
.4
7
0.
1
0.
79
0.
82
3.4 Information Content of DFB 59
tigating the association between DFB and stock returns for different subgroups of stocks and
funds, as well as the relation between DFB and corporate earnings surprises. We conclude this
section by relating DFB to mutual fund performance.
3.4.1 Return Forecasting Power of DFB
To test for the return forecasting power of DFB, we first sort stocks into deciles based on DFB
and examine the subsequent performance of these decile portfolios. As we update DFB each
quarter, the portfolios accordingly get rebalanced. Fama and French (2008) point out that equal-
weight portfolio returns may be driven by tiny stocks that are numerous in number but small in
economic significance, whereas value-weight portfolio returns may be driven by a few very large
caps. To assess whether our results may be representative, we present both equal-weight and
value-weight returns on the decile portfolios in Table 3.3.
The first columns in Panels A (equal-weight returns) and B (value-weight returns) of Ta-
ble 3.3 show that DFB strongly predicts future returns. A portfolio that buys stocks in Decile
10 and sells short stocks in Decile 1 generates average returns of 0.74% and 0.56% per month
on an equal- and value-weight basis. These returns are statistically significant, with t-statistics
of 4.38 and 2.48, respectively. To examine whether the high returns on stocks heavily over-
weighted by mutual funds simply reflect fund managers’ propensity to take high risks, we employ
standard risk-adjustment models to examine the abnormal returns. The specific risk-adjustment
models include the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama and French three-factor
model, a four-factor model including momentum, and a five-factor model that also includes Pas-
tor and Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity factor.10 In addition to linear factor models, we employ
a characteristic-adjustment procedure, as proposed by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(hereafter, DGTW, 1997).
Columns 2–6 in Panels A and B provide the results. The high returns on stocks heavily
overweighted by mutual funds, in excess of the returns on their underweighted counterparts,
remains large and statistically significant after those adjustment procedures. For example, the
spread portfolio that buys stocks in Decile 10 and shorts stocks in Decile 1 earns equal-weighted
abnormal returns of 0.66%, 0.72%, 0.58%, 0.61%, and 0.56% per month after the adjustments
according to the CAPM, three-factor model, four-factor model, five-factor model, and DGTW
adjustment procedure, respectively. All five versions of the alphas are highly statistically sig-
nificant, with t-statistics ranging between 4 and 7. We note that a portfolio characterized by
10We obtain qualitatively similar results if we use a six-factor model that also includes a volatility factor (Ang,
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006).
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long stocks in Decile 9 and short stocks in Decile 2 also delivers superior performance on an
equal-weighted basis. Consistent with stocks highly overweighted by mutual funds tending to
be relatively small, as shown in Section 3.3.4, the value-weighted return on a long-short portfo-
lio that buys stocks in Decile 10 and shorts stocks in Decile 1 is smaller but still economically
meaningful and statistically significant.
To examine the return predictive power of DFB in the presence of other return predictors,
we employ the Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. To examine large overweights
and underweights separately, we discretize DFB into two dummy variables: D1 that represents
the membership in the decile of stocks with the lowest DFB and D10 that represents the mem-
bership in the decile with the highest DFB. The slope coefficient for the dummy variables in
the Fama and MacBeth regressions can be interpreted as the difference in quarterly returns be-
tween stocks in each respective decile and all stocks in other deciles, while controlling for stock
characteristics.
Specifically, at the end of each quarter from 1980Q3 to 2008Q3, we perform cross-sectional
regressions specified as follows:
Ri,t+1 = α + βD1i,t + γD10i,t + δXi,t + εi,t+1, (3.2)
whereRi,t+1is the return on stock i in quarter t in excess of the market return in quarter t, andXi,t
includes a bunch of stock characteristics such as firm size, the book-to-market ratio, past one-year
(skipping the most recent month) returns, idiosyncratic volatilities, turnover, and past one-month
(month t) return. Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), we conduct statistical inference based
on the time-series variation of the coefficients.
The results in columns 1 and 2 of Panel A in Table 3.4 show that stocks in Decile 1 signifi-
cantly underperform other stocks and stocks in Decile 10 significantly outperform other stocks,
even after we control for the influence of other firm characteristics such as firm size, the book-
to-market ratio, past one-year returns, idiosyncratic volatilities, turnover, and past one-month
return.
Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) argue that a trade-based measure of changes in the
fraction of shares owned by mutual funds (MFO) is a significant predictor of future stock
returns. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) argue that changes in the number of mutual funds that
hold the stock, Breadth, correlate with future stock returns. Wermers, Yao, and Zhao (2007)
find that investment strategies based on portfolio holdings, weighted by past fund performance
(WWA), generate superior abnormal returns. Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2010) examine the per-
formance of stocks that represent fund managers’ BestIdeas and find that the stock that active
62 Information Content of DFB
managers display the most conviction towards ex-ante, outperforms the market. Motivated by
these prior studies, we include these variables in our cross-sectional regressions to stress-test the
return forecasting power of our measure of deviations from benchmarks. The results in columns
3 and 4 of Panel A indicate that these variables leave the return forecasting power ofDFB intact.
In summary, we find strong evidence that a stock-level measure that aggregates mutual funds’
deviations from benchmarks, DFB, strongly and positively forecasts the cross-sectional varia-
tion in future returns. The superior (inferior) performance of stocks heavily overweighted (un-
derweighted) by mutual funds is consistent with the notion that actively managed mutual funds
behave as informed investors in stock markets. In the next subsection, we investigate an alter-
native interpretation of the return forecasting power of DFB, that is, mutual funds’ demand
pressure.
3.4 Information Content of DFB 63
Ta
bl
e
3.
4:
D
FB
an
d
Fu
tu
re
St
oc
k
R
et
ur
ns
:F
am
a
an
d
M
ac
B
et
h
(1
97
3)
C
ro
ss
-S
ec
tio
na
lR
eg
re
ss
io
ns
T
hi
st
ab
le
us
es
th
e
Fa
m
a
an
d
M
ac
B
et
h
(1
97
3)
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
lr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
to
ex
am
in
e
th
e
re
la
tio
n
be
tw
ee
n
m
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
’d
ev
ia
tio
ns
fr
om
be
nc
hm
ar
ks
,D
F
B
,a
te
ac
h
qu
ar
te
re
nd
an
d
th
e
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
m
ar
ke
t-
ad
ju
st
ed
re
tu
rn
s
in
th
e
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
(u
p
to
4)
qu
ar
te
rs
.R
t+
1
de
no
te
s
m
ar
ke
ta
dj
us
te
d
re
tu
rn
in
qu
ar
te
rt
+
1
,R
t+
1
,t
+
2
de
no
te
s
m
ar
ke
t-
ad
ju
st
ed
re
tu
rn
ov
er
qu
ar
te
rs
t
+
1
an
d
t
+
2
,a
nd
so
fo
rt
h.
To
m
ak
e
th
e
re
su
lts
co
m
pa
ra
bl
e
w
ith
th
e
po
rt
fo
lio
an
al
ys
is
,w
e
di
sc
re
tiz
e
D
F
B
in
to
tw
o
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s,
D
10
(o
ve
rw
ei
gh
t)
th
at
eq
ua
ls
on
e
if
th
e
st
oc
k
is
in
D
ec
ile
10
w
ith
th
e
hi
gh
es
t
D
F
B
an
d
0
ot
he
rw
is
e,
an
d
D
1
(u
nd
er
w
ei
gh
t)
th
at
eq
ua
ls
on
e
if
th
e
st
oc
k
is
in
D
ec
ile
1
w
ith
th
e
lo
w
es
tD
F
B
an
d
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
M
ar
ke
tc
ap
,b
oo
k-
to
-m
ar
ke
tr
at
io
,r
es
id
ua
lv
ol
at
ili
ty
,a
nd
tu
rn
ov
er
ra
tio
ar
e
de
fin
ed
as
pr
ev
io
us
ly
.
Pr
1Y
ri
s
th
e
pa
st
on
e
ye
ar
re
tu
rn
sk
ip
pi
ng
th
e
m
os
tr
ec
en
tm
on
th
an
d
Pr
1M
ti
s
th
e
pa
st
on
e
m
on
th
re
tu
rn
.
M
F
O
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
fr
ac
tio
n
of
sh
ar
es
he
ld
by
m
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
(C
he
n,
Je
ga
de
es
h,
an
d
W
er
m
er
s,
20
00
),
an
d

B
r
ea
d
th
is
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
th
e
nu
m
be
ro
fm
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
th
at
ho
ld
th
e
st
oc
k
sc
al
ed
by
th
e
to
ta
ln
um
be
ro
fm
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
th
at
ex
is
ta
tt
he
be
gi
nn
in
g
of
a
gi
ve
n
qu
ar
te
r,
as
in
C
he
n,
H
on
g,
an
d
St
ei
n
(2
00
2)
.
W
W
A
is
th
e
w
ei
gh
te
d
av
er
ag
e
fu
nd
al
ph
a
es
tim
at
or
as
de
fin
ed
by
W
er
m
er
s,
Y
ao
,Z
ha
o
(2
00
7)
,i
n
w
hi
ch
th
e
fo
re
ca
st
ed
al
ph
a
fo
ra
gi
ve
n
st
oc
k
is
th
e
w
ei
gh
te
d
av
er
ag
e
of
pa
st
fu
nd
al
ph
as
,w
he
re
w
ei
gh
ts
ar
e
pr
op
or
tio
na
lt
o
cu
rr
en
tf
un
d
po
rt
fo
lio
w
ei
gh
ts
on
th
e
st
oc
k.
B
es
tI
d
ea
s
is
a
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
w
hi
ch
eq
ua
ls
un
ity
w
he
n
th
e
st
oc
k
is
am
on
g
fu
nd
m
an
ag
er
s’
be
st
id
ea
s
an
d
ze
ro
ot
he
rw
is
e.
W
e
id
en
tif
y
th
e
be
st
id
ea
of
a
m
an
ag
er
as
th
e
st
oc
k
w
ith
th
e
hi
gh
es
tt
ilt
in
hi
s
po
rt
fo
lio
.
St
oc
ks
w
ith
pr
ic
es
lo
w
er
th
an
$5
at
th
e
qu
ar
te
r
en
d
ar
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
.
A
s
th
e
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e
re
tu
rn
s
ov
er
la
p,
w
e
co
m
pu
te
th
e
t-
st
at
is
tic
s
ba
se
d
on
th
e
N
ew
ey
-W
es
t(
19
87
)
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
.
**
*
St
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
1%
.
**
St
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
5%
.*
St
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l.
R
t+
1
R
t+
1
,t
+
2
R
t+
1
,t
+
3
R
t+
1
,t
+
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
D
1
t
-0
.0
10
2*
*
-0
.0
07
3*
**
-0
.0
08
9*
-0
.0
05
6*
*
-0
.0
06
3*
*
-0
.0
05
8
-0
.0
08
2*
*
-0
.0
06
4
-0
.0
09
7
-0
.0
05
8
-0
.0
11
1
(-
2.
09
)
(-
2.
64
)
(-
1.
91
)
(-
2.
04
)
(-
2.
44
)
(-
1.
37
)
(-
2.
13
)
(-
0.
98
)
(-
1.
62
)
(-
0.
68
)
(-
1.
46
)
D
1
0
t
0.
01
97
**
*
0.
01
59
**
*
0.
01
70
**
*
0.
01
36
**
*
0.
01
41
**
*
0.
02
29
**
*
0.
02
42
**
*
0.
02
89
**
*
0.
03
19
**
*
0.
02
95
**
*
0.
03
50
**
*
(5
.3
0)
(5
.3
9)
(5
.3
6)
(5
.0
8)
(5
.5
6)
(4
.4
3)
(5
.0
9)
(3
.8
3)
(4
.5
2)
(3
.0
6)
(3
.9
7)
M
a
r
k
et
C
a
p
t
-0
.0
03
2*
*
-0
.0
03
7*
**
-0
.0
03
5*
**
-0
.0
06
1*
*
-0
.0
05
4*
-0
.0
08
3*
-0
.0
07
6*
-0
.0
09
7
-0
.0
08
9
(-
2.
17
)
(-
2.
70
)
(-
2.
63
)
(-
2.
08
)
(-
1.
97
)
(-
1.
72
)
(-
1.
68
)
(-
1.
46
)
(-
1.
46
)
B
M
t
0.
00
38
*
0.
00
38
*
0.
00
39
*
0.
00
79
*
0.
00
80
**
0.
01
17
**
0.
01
15
**
0.
01
53
**
0.
01
52
**
(1
.7
0)
(1
.7
4)
(1
.8
1)
(1
.9
3)
(2
.0
5)
(2
.0
4)
(2
.1
3)
(2
.0
7)
(2
.2
3)
P
r
1
Y
r t
0.
02
76
**
*
0.
02
62
**
*
0.
02
37
**
*
0.
04
06
**
*
0.
03
49
**
*
0.
04
48
**
*
0.
03
73
**
*
0.
04
53
**
*
0.
03
72
**
*
(5
.8
3)
(5
.6
7)
(5
.0
8)
(5
.5
9)
(4
.7
7)
(4
.5
6)
(3
.7
1)
(3
.7
9)
(3
.0
1)
R
es
id
u
a
lV
o
l
-0
.6
94
2*
**
-0
.6
86
2*
**
-0
.6
46
6*
*
-1
.0
48
6*
*
-0
.9
72
6*
*
-1
.3
47
8*
*
-1
.1
88
4*
-1
.5
07
5*
-1
.3
07
9
(-
2.
68
)
(-
2.
68
)
(-
2.
54
)
(-
2.
21
)
(-
2.
07
)
(-
2.
00
)
(-
1.
78
)
(-
1.
84
)
(-
1.
65
)
T
u
r
n
o
v
er
t
-0
.0
10
7*
-0
.0
10
4
-0
.0
10
5
-0
.0
28
2*
*
-0
.0
26
8*
*
-0
.0
42
8*
*
-0
.0
38
6*
-0
.0
56
4*
*
-0
.0
49
9*
*
(-
1.
69
)
(-
1.
60
)
(-
1.
65
)
(-
2.
11
)
(-
2.
00
)
(-
2.
24
)
(-
1.
98
)
(-
2.
35
)
(-
2.
06
)
P
r
1
M
t
-0
.0
17
3
-0
.0
21
7
-0
.0
33
7*
*
0.
01
82
-0
.0
12
3
0.
05
74
*
0.
00
78
0.
09
47
**
0.
03
15
(-
1.
20
)
(-
1.
56
)
(-
2.
44
)
(0
.7
4)
(-
0.
53
)
(1
.7
0)
(0
.2
5)
(2
.2
7)
(0
.8
1)

M
F
O
0.
05
74
-0
.0
09
3
0.
02
07
0.
03
89
0.
17
46
**
0.
03
96
0.
29
57
**
*
0.
04
85
0.
49
20
**
*
(0
.8
9)
(-
0.
18
)
(0
.4
3)
(0
.5
2)
(2
.2
4)
(0
.4
2)
(2
.6
3)
(0
.4
4)
(3
.4
2)

B
r
ea
d
th
0.
24
30
*
0.
11
75
0.
06
69
0.
28
14
*
0.
17
12
0.
48
85
**
0.
36
14
*
0.
51
06
*
0.
35
84
(1
.9
0)
(1
.3
3)
(0
.7
5)
(1
.8
2)
(1
.0
6)
(2
.5
2)
(1
.8
7)
(1
.9
8)
(1
.4
6)
W
W
A
1.
12
94
**
*
0.
87
10
**
*
0.
77
30
**
*
1.
51
63
**
*
1.
20
71
**
*
1.
85
19
**
*
1.
32
80
**
1.
98
81
**
*
1.
24
66
**
(3
.5
4)
(4
.0
9)
(3
.8
0)
(3
.7
9)
(3
.3
0)
(3
.1
1)
(2
.4
9)
(2
.9
0)
(2
.0
2)
B
es
tI
d
ea
s
0.
02
06
**
*
0.
02
10
**
*
0.
02
28
**
*
0.
02
42
**
*
0.
03
09
**
*
0.
03
07
**
*
0.
04
44
**
*
0.
03
59
**
*
0.
05
67
**
*
(4
.7
1)
(5
.8
7)
(6
.1
9)
(4
.8
3)
(5
.6
8)
(4
.7
3)
(5
.4
5)
(4
.3
9)
(4
.9
3)

M
F
O
t+
1
1.
12
78
**
*
(1
0.
21
)

M
F
O
t+
1
,t
+
2
1.
69
64
**
*
(1
0.
02
)

M
F
O
t+
1
,t
+
3
2.
25
10
**
*
(9
.8
9)

M
F
O
t+
1
,t
+
4
2.
77
12
**
*
(9
.3
4)
In
te
rc
ep
t
0.
00
26
0.
03
22
**
0.
00
17
0.
03
36
**
0.
03
02
**
0.
05
49
*
0.
04
51
*
0.
07
46
*
0.
05
88
0.
08
82
0.
06
58
(0
.5
0)
(2
.2
8)
(0
.2
9)
(2
.4
9)
(2
.3
0)
(1
.9
7)
(1
.6
9)
(1
.7
3)
(1
.4
4)
(1
.5
2)
(1
.2
2)
A
v
g
A
dj
−
R
2
0.
60
%
6.
87
%
1.
46
%
7.
19
%
8.
41
%
7.
03
%
9.
42
%
6.
86
%
10
.4
4%
6.
66
%
11
.1
6%
64 Information Content of DFB
3.4.2 Informed Fund Managers or Mutual Fund Herding?
Although consistent with the notion that mutual funds possess value-relevant information that
is not fully reflected in stock prices, the higher returns on stocks with higher DFB may have
alternative interpretations as well. For example, Gompers and Metrick (2001) argue that the
expansion of institutional investors in U.S. stock markets impacted stock prices, driving up the
prices of the stocks they preferred to hold beyond equilibrium levels and thus increasing the in-
sample returns on those stocks. Does a demand pressure story explain the higher future returns on
stocks with large active mutual fund bets? In the context of mutual funds, there is evidence that
mutual funds tend to herd (Wermers, 1999, and Sias, 2004). If funds continue to buy stocks they
previously overweighted, their demand pressure may push up stock prices, leading to positive
returns.
To differentiate this alternative interpretation based on price pressure from our story of in-
formed fund managers, we conduct a number of tests, which uniformly support the information-
based interpretation for our finding. First, we explore their distinct implications for the dynamics
of changes in mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks. Specifically, suppose that, in the world
with informed fund managers, a risk-averse manager receives a positive signal about a stock in
period t and decides to increase his portfolio weight in this stock relative to his benchmark,
which results in an increase in DFB from t− 1 to t. In the next period t+ 1, as his positive pri-
vate information transmits into the stock price, the risk-averse manager has incentives to at least
partially unwind the position that he has built up to capture the gains to his information. This
position reversal takes place because the manager desires to reduce the long-term risk of future
price movements arising from future events he cannot predict. In this scenario, a large increase
in DFB in one period should predict a subsequent decline in DFB. In the world dominated by
mutual fund herds, however, a large increase in the excess weight of a stock in an average fund’s
portfolio attracts further demand from the herd, which leads to increases in the stock price. Ac-
cording to this interpretation, a large increase in DFB in one period should forecast a further
increase in DFB.
To test these different predictions, for each quarter from 1981Q1 to 2008Q3, we perform
cross-sectional regressions of changes in DFB on the lagged changes in DFB and the lagged
level of DFB. We use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure with the Newey-West (1987) ad-
justment for serial correlation to conduct statistical significance. Panel A of Table 3.5 shows that
an increase in DFB in one quarter reliably predicts a decline in DFB in the subsequent quarter,
which concurs with the story of informed fund managers but contradicts the price pressure-based
interpretation. In Panels B, C, and, D of Table 3.5, we perform similar analyses for subperiods
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in our sample. The results consistently show that an increase in DFB in one quarter reliably
predicts a decline in DFB in the subsequent quarter.11
Second, a simple approach to examine the influence of demand pressure on our findings is to
test the return forecasting power of our measure of deviations from benchmarks in the presence of
realized future demand shocks. If active funds’ deviations from benchmarks can forecast future
returns due mainly to their correlation with future demand shocks, the return predictive power
should cease to exist once the association between future returns and future demand shocks is
controlled for. We conduct this test in column 5 of Panel A in Table 3.4. The results indicate that
the return forecasting power of active funds’ deviations from benchmarks remains intact after we
control for future changes in mutual fund demand.
Last, we examine the persistence of the performance of stocks overweighted by mutual funds:
If the high returns on stocks with high DFB arise mainly from demand pressure, these returns
subsequently should reverse. If, however, the high returns come mostly from value-relevant
information possessed by fund managers and the market reacts properly to that information,
we expect to observe no subsequent return reversal.12 In Panels B, C, and D of Table 3.4, we
perform regressions similar to Equation (3.2) with the cumulative market-adjusted returns in
the subsequent quarters as dependent variables. The results show that the positive association
between DFB and future excess returns concentrates for the most proximate quarter, and this
positive association shows no tendency to reverse for the subsequent two to four quarters. Thus,
DFB appears to forecast returns due primarily to the value-relevant information that DFB
aggregates from diverse mutual fund managers, as revealed through their investment decisions.
11The regulatory environment for mutual funds to disclose their portfolio compositions has varied over our sam-
ple period. For example, in 1985 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reduced the mandatory
portfolio disclosure frequency from every quarter to every six months; effective May 2004, the SEC increased the
required portfolio disclosure frequency from every six months to every quarter. To consider the potential influence
of regulatory changes on our results, we split our sample into three subperiods, 1981-1984 (Panel B of Table 3.5),
1985-2004 (Panel C), and 2005-2008 (Panel D).
12One caveat about this prediction on long-term performance is that as managers unwind the positions they have
overweighted relative to their benchmark, other market participants might continue to buy those shares, which could
influence future price movements.
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3.4.3 Stock Characteristics
To increase our confidence in this information-based story, we conduct a series of tests based on
stock attributes. First, we examine the return forecasting power of DFB across size groups. The
idea is that very large firms tend to be more transparent, with better disclosure policy. They also
tend to be more closely followed and researched by market participants. It is therefore more dif-
ficult for mutual funds to gain information advantages on those firms. On the other hand, returns
to analyzing tiny firms appear to be small relative to the costs of information acquisition. These
considerations prompt us to conjecture that mid-cap stocks could be the fields where information
miners or stock pickers have the greatest information advantage. Second, along a similar vein of
thinking, if mutual funds have informational advantages about individual stocks, we expect their
advantages to be greater among stocks with more firm-specific information. Third, we expect
the funds’ informational advantages to be more valuable when the funds have fewer competitors.
To examine these conjectures, we perform two-way sorts of stocks independently on DFB and
firm size as well as proxies for the amount of firm-specific information and the number of mu-
tual funds competing for private information. We use the idiosyncratic volatility, computed as
the standard deviation of residuals from regressions of daily excess stock returns on the Fama
and French factors in the past quarter, to proxy for the amount of firm-specific information, and
the number of mutual funds that hold the stock at each quarter end to proxy for the number of
investors competing for private information.
Specifically, along one dimension we sort stocks into quartiles based on DFB, and in the
other dimension we sort stocks into quartiles based on their stock attributes such as size, idiosyn-
cratic volatilities or the number of mutual fund holders. Sixteen portfolios thus emerge from the
intersection of the two-way sorts. We hypothesize that a strategy that buys high DFB stocks
and sells low DFB stocks generates higher abnormal returns among mid-caps and stocks with
higher idiosyncratic volatilities and a lower number of mutual fund investors.
Table 3.6 presents the results. To conserve space, we only present equal- and value-weight
four-factor alphas, but the results are qualitatively similar if we use other specifications of asset
pricing models. Panel A of Table 3.6 shows that a strategy that buys high DFB and shorts low
DFB stocks generates insignificant four-factor alpha among very large firms (Quartile 4) and
tiny firms (Quartile 1) but produces large and significant four-factor alphas for mid-cap stocks in
Quartiles 2 and 3, ranging between 0.45 and 0.60% per month on both equal- and value-weight
basis. These results support our conjecture based on the economics of information acquisition.
Panel B of Table 3.6 shows that a strategy that is long high DFB and short low DFB stocks
for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatilities yields average monthly four-factor alphas of 0.80%
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(t=4.74) on the equal-weight basis and 0.88% (t=3.55) on the value-weight basis. A similar
strategy invested among stocks with low idiosyncratic volatilities generates average monthly
four-factor alphas of only 0.23% (t=3.44) on the equal-weight basis and only 0.17% (t=1.45)
on the value-weight basis. The difference in abnormal returns between these two strategies is
large and statistically significant for both equal- and value-weighting. These results support our
conjecture that informed mutual funds could have better information advantages in stocks with
more firm-specific information.
The results in Panel C of Table 3.6 also support the information-based story. A strategy that
buys high DFB stocks and sells low DFB stocks generates a value-weight monthly four-factor
alpha of 0.75% (t=4.11) when implemented among stocks with a low number of mutual fund
investors; the same strategy when implemented among stocks with a high number of mutual
fund investors produces a value-weight monthly four-factor alpha of only 0.10% (t=0.80). This
difference in abnormal returns also is large and statistically significant.
3.4.4 Fund Characteristics
The preceding results are devoted to a measure of DFB that reflects the investment decisions
of all active mutual funds in our sample. In this subsection, we consider how different fund
characteristics might influence the return forecasting power of DFB. Prior literature shows het-
erogeneous levels of skills or alphas across mutual funds (e.g., Fama and French, 2010). If fund
managers with a higher level of alphas have better informational advantages, a DFB measure
constructed from the universe of those funds could be a better return predictor than that from
the universe of all active funds. To examine this conjecture, we partition funds into three groups
based on their past performance, construct the measure ofDFB using the portfolio compositions
for each group of funds, and test for the forecasting power of DFB. If past performance relates
to the level of skills of managers and thus to their informational advantages, a strategy that buys
high DFB stocks and sells low DFB stocks should generate higher abnormal returns based on
the portfolio decisions of funds with higher past performance. We measure fund performance
using the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha from rolling-window regressions of monthly fund re-
turns during the past 24 or 36 months. We use both alphas and the precision-adjusted alphas, the
t-statistics. As the results are qualitatively similar, we report those based on alphas estimated in
the past 24 months.
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows the results. We find that a strategy that buys high DFB stocks
and sells low DFB stocks based on the portfolio decisions of mutual funds with high past two-
year alphas generates a equal-weight monthly four-factor alpha of 0.54% (t=5.42), which is more
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than twice as large as the four-factor alpha of 0.25% (t=2.64) on a similar strategy based on the
portfolio decisions of low-performing funds. This difference in returns is large and statistically
significant. These results support the notion that higher alpha fund managers have better infor-
mational advantages.
One concern with these results is that mutual fund flows tend to chase past fund performance
(e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). If high inflows into top-performing
funds induce fund managers to purchase the stocks they have overweighted, their buying pressure
may lead to higher returns on these stocks. A similar story can be told for bottom-performing
managers driven by fund outflows to sell the stocks they have underweighted. Contradicting
these stories, we find that the higher returns on the DFB strategy implemented for higher-alpha
managers come from both the higher returns on stocks that they overweight and the lower returns
on stock they underweight. These results cast doubt on the flow-based explanation but lend
further credit to the story of skilled managers.
We also consider whether funds with different investment styles could have different infor-
mation advantages. For example, growth-oriented mutual funds tend to have better performance
than income funds (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1993). Da, Gao, and Jagannathan (2010) argue
that income funds tend to provide liquidity, whereas growth funds, likely driven by their superior
information, tend to engage in informed trading. Based on these considerations, we conjecture
that a DFB strategy based on the portfolio selection of growth funds could generate higher per-
formance than does a similar strategy based on the investment decisions of income funds. Panel
B of Table 3.7 provides evidence that concurs with our conjecture.
3.4.5 DFB and Corporate Earnings News
If mutual funds have informational advantages about the stocks they overweight relative to their
benchmarks, we expect those stocks to perform particularly well around the days their positive
information gets released to the market. In stock markets, one of the most important corporate
news events is the release of corporate earnings.
To explore the nature of the information content captured by DFB, we start by examining
the relation between DFB and firms’ future earnings surprises. We use two proxies for earnings
surprises: the difference between actual earnings and the consensus analyst earnings forecasts
from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) divided by the absolute value of actual
earnings and that divided by the stock price at the end of the previous quarter. For each quintile
portfolio based onDFB, we calculate the earnings surprises for the median firm in the following
four quarters and report their time-series averages. Panels A and B of Table 3.8 show that stocks
3.4 Information Content of DFB 71
Ta
bl
e
3.
7:
R
et
ur
n
Pr
ed
ic
tiv
e
Po
w
er
of
D
F
B
an
d
Fu
nd
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
re
tu
rn
fo
re
ca
st
in
g
po
w
er
of
D
F
B
co
ns
tr
uc
te
d
us
in
g
th
e
po
rt
fo
lio
ho
ld
in
gs
of
m
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
gr
ou
pe
d
on
th
e
ba
si
s
of
fu
nd
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s.
Pa
ne
lA
us
es
pa
st
fu
nd
al
ph
as
,
es
tim
at
ed
as
in
te
rc
ep
ts
fr
om
ro
lli
ng
-w
in
do
w
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
ex
ce
ss
ne
tf
un
d
re
tu
rn
s
on
th
e
m
ar
ke
t,
si
ze
,v
al
ue
,a
nd
m
om
en
tu
m
fa
ct
or
s
in
th
e
pa
st
tw
o
ye
ar
s.
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
,a
tt
he
en
d
of
ea
ch
qu
ar
te
r
fr
om
19
83
Q
4
to
20
08
Q
3,
w
e
di
vi
de
al
lm
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
by
th
ei
rc
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
in
to
te
rc
ile
s
ba
se
d
on
fu
nd
al
ph
as
.W
ith
in
ea
ch
te
rc
ile
,w
e
co
m
pu
te
m
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
’d
ev
ia
tio
ns
fr
om
be
nc
hm
ar
ks
,D
F
B
,
as
th
e
si
m
pl
e
av
er
ag
e
of
th
e
st
oc
k’
s
w
ei
gh
ti
n
a
m
ut
ua
lf
un
d
po
rt
fo
lio
in
ex
ce
ss
of
its
w
ei
gh
ti
n
th
e
fu
nd
’s
be
nc
hm
ar
k
in
de
x
ac
ro
ss
al
lm
ut
ua
lf
un
ds
.
W
e
so
rt
st
oc
ks
in
to
qu
in
til
es
in
as
ce
nd
in
g
or
de
r
ba
se
d
on
D
F
B
fo
r
ea
ch
te
rc
ile
of
fu
nd
s
an
d
co
m
pu
te
th
e
av
er
ag
e
m
on
th
ly
eq
ua
l-
w
ei
gh
ta
nd
va
lu
e-
w
ei
gh
tp
or
tf
ol
io
re
tu
rn
s
in
th
e
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
qu
ar
te
r.
W
e
al
so
pr
es
en
tt
he
ri
sk
-a
dj
us
te
d
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
of
th
os
e
po
rt
fo
lio
s,
ba
se
d
on
th
e
C
A
PM
,t
he
Fa
m
a
an
d
Fr
en
ch
(1
99
3)
th
re
e-
fa
ct
or
m
od
el
,t
he
C
ar
ha
rt
(1
99
7)
fo
ur
-f
ac
to
r
m
od
el
,a
nd
a
fiv
e-
fa
ct
or
m
od
el
th
at
au
gm
en
ts
th
e
C
ar
ha
rt
m
od
el
w
ith
Pa
st
or
an
d
St
am
ba
ug
h’
s
(2
00
3)
liq
ui
di
ty
.
Pa
ne
lB
gr
ou
ps
fu
nd
s
ba
se
d
on
th
ei
ri
nv
es
tm
en
to
bj
ec
tiv
es
.
St
oc
ks
w
ith
pr
ic
es
lo
w
er
th
an
$5
at
th
e
qu
ar
te
re
nd
ar
e
ex
cl
ud
ed
.
**
*
St
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
1%
.*
*
St
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
5%
.*
St
at
is
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
10
%
le
ve
l.
Pa
ne
lA
:G
ro
up
in
g
Fu
nd
si
nt
o
Te
rc
ile
sB
as
ed
on
Pa
st
Tw
o-
Ye
ar
A
lp
ha
So
rt
in
g
V
ar
ia
bl
e
E
qu
al
-W
ei
gh
tP
os
t-
R
an
ki
ng
Po
rt
fo
lio
R
et
ur
n
(%
/m
on
th
)
V
al
ue
-W
ei
gh
tP
os
t-
R
an
ki
ng
Po
rt
fo
lio
R
et
ur
n
(%
/m
on
th
)
Pa
st
al
ph
a
D
F
B
A
ve
ra
ge
R
et
ur
n
C
A
PM
A
lp
ha
FF
A
lp
ha
C
ar
ha
rt
A
lp
ha
5-
Fa
ct
or
A
lp
ha
A
ve
ra
ge
R
et
ur
n
C
A
PM
A
lp
ha
FF
A
lp
ha
C
ar
ha
rt
A
lp
ha
5-
Fa
ct
or
A
lp
ha
1
0.
80
-0
.0
9
-0
.2
1
-0
.1
6
-0
.1
6
0.
78
-0
.0
6
0.
02
0.
01
0.
01
(2
.8
1)
(-
1.
08
)
(-
3.
89
)
(-
2.
67
)
(-
2.
61
)
(3
.1
7)
(-
1.
05
)
(0
.4
0)
(0
.1
6)
(0
.1
6)
L
ow
5
1.
15
0.
21
0.
14
0.
09
0.
12
1.
09
0.
17
0.
25
0.
11
0.
12
(3
.3
4)
(1
.3
4)
(1
.8
2)
(1
.1
9)
(1
.5
5)
(3
.6
3)
(1
.9
4)
(3
.3
3)
(1
.4
0)
(1
.5
0)
Q
5-
Q
1
0.
36
**
*
0.
30
**
0.
36
**
*
0.
25
**
*
0.
27
**
*
0.
31
**
0.
23
*
0.
23
**
0.
10
0.
11
(2
.7
4)
(2
.3
4)
(3
.7
0)
(2
.6
4)
(2
.7
9)
(2
.3
6)
(1
.8
7)
(2
.5
4)
(1
.0
5)
(1
.1
5)
1
0.
73
-0
.1
6
-0
.2
8
-0
.2
4
-0
.2
3
0.
77
-0
.0
7
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
(2
.5
1)
(-
1.
82
)
(-
5.
2)
(-
3.
91
)
(-
3.
82
)
(3
.1
3)
(-
1.
25
)
(-
0.
11
)
(-
0.
11
)
(-
0.
05
)
M
ed
iu
m
5
1.
26
0.
34
0.
24
0.
20
0.
22
1.
19
0.
29
0.
35
0.
22
0.
23
(3
.7
9)
(2
.2
5)
(3
.2
3)
(2
.8
1)
(3
.2
1)
(4
.0
0)
(3
.0
9)
(4
.0
5)
(2
.7
7)
(2
.9
5)
Q
5-
Q
1
0.
53
**
*
0.
50
**
*
0.
52
**
*
0.
44
**
*
0.
46
**
*
0.
42
**
*
0.
36
**
*
0.
35
**
*
0.
22
**
0.
23
**
(4
.9
6)
(4
.6
4)
(6
.0
5)
(5
.1
4)
(5
.3
6)
(3
.1
3)
(2
.8
0)
(3
.3
9)
(2
.1
6)
(2
.3
1)
1
0.
68
-0
.1
9
-0
.3
4
-0
.2
8
-0
.2
8
0.
77
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
2
(2
.4
8)
(-
2.
25
)
(-
6.
12
)
(-
4.
54
)
(-
4.
48
)
(3
.2
6)
(-
1.
11
)
(-
0.
58
)
(-
0.
5)
(-
0.
43
)
H
ig
h
5
1.
34
0.
39
0.
38
0.
26
0.
28
1.
26
0.
30
0.
49
0.
26
0.
26
(3
.7
4)
(2
.2
9)
(4
.7
4)
(3
.5
3)
(3
.8
0)
(3
.6
3)
(2
.2
6)
(4
.0
5)
(2
.3
5)
(2
.3
9)
Q
5-
Q
1
0.
66
**
*
0.
58
**
*
0.
72
**
*
0.
54
**
*
0.
56
**
*
0.
49
**
0.
35
**
0.
51
**
*
0.
28
**
0.
28
**
(4
.2
0)
(3
.8
8)
(7
.1
2)
(5
.4
2)
(5
.4
8)
(2
.5
7)
(2
.1
9)
(3
.5
8)
(2
.0
4)
(2
.0
6)
1
-0
.1
1*
**
-0
.1
0*
*
-0
.1
3*
**
-0
.1
2*
**
-0
.1
2*
*
-0
.0
1
0.
00
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
2
(-
2.
7)
(-
2.
26
)
(-
2.
84
)
(-
2.
6)
(-
2.
58
)
(-
0.
27
)
(0
.0
8)
(-
1.
44
)
(-
0.
92
)
(-
0.
81
)
H
ig
h-
L
ow
5
0.
19
**
0.
18
**
0.
23
**
*
0.
17
**
*
0.
17
**
*
0.
16
0.
13
0.
24
**
0.
15
0.
14
(2
.5
5)
(2
.3
0)
(3
.3
0)
(2
.7
1)
(2
.6
7)
(1
.5
5)
(1
.2
5)
(2
.1
9)
(1
.4
7)
(1
.4
3)
Q
5-
Q
1
0.
30
**
*
0.
27
**
0.
36
**
*
0.
29
**
*
0.
29
**
*
0.
17
0.
13
0.
28
**
0.
17
0.
17
(2
.9
6)
(2
.5
7)
(3
.6
0)
(3
.1
0)
(3
.0
5)
(1
.3
5)
(1
.0
3)
(2
.1
6)
(1
.4
4)
(1
.3
8)
72 Information Content of DFB
Pa
ne
lB
:G
ro
up
in
g
Fu
nd
si
nt
o
Te
rc
ile
sB
as
ed
on
In
ve
st
m
en
tO
bj
ec
tiv
es
So
rt
in
g
V
ar
ia
bl
e
E
qu
al
-W
ei
gh
tP
os
t-
R
an
ki
ng
Po
rt
fo
lio
R
et
ur
n
(%
/m
on
th
)
V
al
ue
-W
ei
gh
tP
os
t-
R
an
ki
ng
Po
rt
fo
lio
R
et
ur
n
(%
/m
on
th
)
In
ve
st
m
en
tO
bj
ec
tiv
es
D
F
B
A
ve
ra
ge
R
et
ur
n
C
A
PM
A
lp
ha
FF
A
lp
ha
C
ar
ha
rt
A
lp
ha
5-
Fa
ct
or
A
lp
ha
A
ve
ra
ge
R
et
ur
n
C
A
PM
A
lp
ha
FF
A
lp
ha
C
ar
ha
rt
A
lp
ha
5-
Fa
ct
or
A
lp
ha
1
0.
86
-0
.0
1
-0
.1
9
-0
.1
1
-0
.1
2
0.
83
-0
.0
1
0.
00
0.
01
0.
01
(3
.2
8)
(-
0.
16
)
(-
3.
84
)
(-
2.
16
)
(-
2.
27
)
(3
.5
8)
(-
0.
29
)
(-
0.
12
)
(0
.3
0)
(0
.3
6)
A
gg
re
ss
iv
e
G
ro
w
th
5
1.
23
0.
23
0.
23
0.
15
0.
20
1.
04
0.
06
0.
17
0.
07
0.
10
(3
.4
1)
(1
.4
9)
(2
.7
0)
(1
.7
9)
(2
.4
8)
(3
.2
0)
(0
.6
1)
(2
.1
2)
(0
.8
1)
(1
.2
2)
Q
5-
Q
1
0.
36
**
0.
24
*
0.
42
**
*
0.
26
**
*
0.
32
**
*
0.
21
0.
07
0.
18
*
0.
06
0.
09
(2
.2
5)
(1
.6
8)
(4
.2
8)
(2
.7
0)
(3
.3
8)
(1
.3
6)
(0
.5
7)
(1
.7
4)
(0
.5
4)
(0
.8
3)
1
0.
69
-0
.2
1
-0
.3
6
-0
.2
8
-0
.2
7
0.
79
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
(2
.4
3)
(-
2.
19
)
(-
6.
58
)
(-
4.
63
)
(-
4.
48
)
(3
.3
5)
(-
1.
09
)
(-
0.
46
)
(-
0.
47
)
(-
0.
31
)
G
ro
w
th
5
1.
28
0.
34
0.
29
0.
19
0.
21
1.
21
0.
24
0.
41
0.
19
0.
20
(3
.7
7)
(2
.0
8)
(3
.9
6)
(2
.8
3)
(3
.0
2)
(3
.6
7)
(2
.0
4)
(3
.8
7)
(2
.1
3)
(2
.2
5)
Q
5-
Q
1
0.
59
**
*
0.
54
**
*
0.
64
**
*
0.
47
**
*
0.
47
**
*
0.
42
**
0.
30
**
0.
42
**
*
0.
21
*
0.
22
**
(4
.7
0)
(4
.3
9)
(7
.2
0)
(5
.4
1)
(5
.2
8)
(2
.4
3)
(2
.0
2)
(3
.4
1)
(1
.8
9)
(1
.9
7)
1
1.
01
0.
08
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
4
0.
81
-0
.0
7
0.
03
0.
02
0.
01
(3
.3
9)
(0
.7
6)
(-
0.
25
)
(-
0.
79
)
(-
0.
62
)
(3
.1
8)
(-
1.
18
)
(0
.6
7)
(0
.3
8)
(0
.3
0)
G
ro
w
th
&
In
co
m
e
5
1.
09
0.
19
-0
.0
1
0.
02
0.
04
0.
99
0.
11
0.
08
-0
.0
1
0.
02
(3
.7
4)
(1
.5
6)
(-
0.
1)
(0
.3
4)
(0
.5
8)
(3
.9
1)
(1
.5
8)
(1
.1
5)
(-
0.
08
)
(0
.2
2)
Q
5-
Q
1
0.
08
0.
10
0.
01
0.
08
0.
08
0.
18
0.
19
*
0.
05
-0
.0
2
0.
00
(0
.9
2)
(1
.2
6)
(0
.1
1)
(1
.0
2)
(1
.0
8)
(1
.6
5)
(1
.6
7)
(0
.5
7)
(-
0.
22
)
(0
.0
3)
1
0.
14
*
0.
09
0.
17
**
*
0.
06
0.
08
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
6
0.
03
0.
00
0.
00
(1
.7
4)
(1
.1
9)
(2
.7
6)
(0
.8
8)
(1
.2
2)
(-
0.
45
)
(-
1.
25
)
(0
.7
7)
(0
.1
2)
(-
0.
01
)
G
ro
w
th
&
In
co
m
e
-
A
gg
re
ss
iv
e
G
ro
w
th
5
-0
.1
4
-0
.0
4
-0
.2
3*
**
-0
.1
3*
-0
.1
6*
*
-0
.0
5
0.
06
-0
.0
9
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
9
(-
1.
1)
(-
0.
39
)
(-
3.
07
)
(-
1.
7)
(-
2.
19
)
(-
0.
42
)
(0
.5
5)
(-
1.
05
)
(-
0.
82
)
(-
0.
93
)
Q
5-
Q
1
-0
.2
8
-0
.1
4
-0
.4
1*
**
-0
.1
8
-0
.2
4*
*
-0
.0
3
0.
11
-0
.1
2
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
8
(-
1.
45
)
(-
0.
79
)
(-
3.
4)
(-
1.
55
)
(-
2.
05
)
(-
0.
18
)
(0
.8
1)
(-
1.
03
)
(-
0.
65
)
(-
0.
69
)
3.4 Information Content of DFB 73
with high DFB tend to experience large and positive earnings surprises for up to the next four
quarters, and the effect, strongest for the most proximate quarter, decays substantially through
time. There is evidence of earnings momentum (e.g., Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok, 1996).
If active mutual funds trade on earnings momentum, we could observe a positive association be-
tweenDFB and subsequent earnings surprises. To examine this conjecture, we first group stocks
into terciles based on the current quarter’s earnings surprises and then divide the stocks within
each tercile into five quintiles based on DFB. We average the difference in earnings surprises
between high and low DFB stocks across the three terciles and report this averaged difference
as momentum-adjusted earnings surprises. Our results show that this adjustment eliminates the
higher earnings surprises in the next two to four quarters for stocks active funds overweight,
but for the most proximate quarter, stocks with higher DFB remain to experience significantly
higher earnings surprises.
We also examine the three-day abnormal returns surrounding earnings announcements for
each portfolio of stocks sorted on the basis of DFB. Panel C of Table 3.8 shows that an average
stock in the top quintile of stocks heavily overweighted by mutual funds earns, in the time around
earnings announcements in the following quarter, a three-day cumulative abnormal return of ap-
proximately 30 basis points, which is statistically significant. In contrast, an average stock in the
bottom quintile heavily underweighted by mutual funds generates a three-day cumulative abnor-
mal return of only 3 basis points, or 90% lower. Even after adjustments for earnings momentum,
the difference in three-day abnormal returns around earnings announcements is 24 basis points
and statistically significant. These results suggest that a significant portion of the return premi-
ums on the stocks mutual funds heavily overweight occurs around corporate earnings releases,
which in turn implies that part of active funds’ superior information relates to firms’ fundamental
prospects.13
3.4.6 DFB and Mutual Fund Performance
How can we reconcile our evidence that points to strong informational advantages of mutual
funds in stock markets with the overall lackluster performance of mutual funds identified by
13Our evidence is consistent with Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler (2010), who argue that fund managers
actively trade stocks prior to earnings announcements to exploit their informational advantages. We recognize
that the magnitude of the abnormal performance of stocks heavily overweighted by mutual funds around earnings
announcement dates may be insufficient to explain the superior performance of those stocks; the sign of the abnormal
performance of stocks heavily underweighted by mutual funds around earnings announcement dates differs from the
overall performance of those stocks. Our evidence therefore suggests some aspects of informational advantages for
mutual funds, other than their ability to forecast near-term earnings news. We leave the further identification of
specific informational advantages of mutual funds to future research.
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Table 3.8: DFB and Future Earnings News
This table presents the forecasting power of DFB for subsequent earnings surprises. At the end of each quarter
from 1980Q3 to 2008Q3, we sort stocks into quintiles, based on DFB, in ascending order and compute the aver-
age quarterly earnings surprise and the cumulative abnormal returns around the earnings announcement in the four
quarters following the portfolio formation date. The earnings surprise is the difference between actual earnings and
consensus analyst forecast, divided by the absolute value of actual earnings or stock price. The earnings announce-
ment cumulative abnormal return is calculated for the three days around the earnings announcement date. Earnings
data and earnings announcement dates come from I/B/E/S. To adjust for earnings momentum, we first group stocks
into terciles based on the current quarter’s earnings surprises and then divide the stocks within each tercile into five
quintiles based on DFB. We average the difference in earnings surprises for subsequent quarters between high
and low DFB stocks across the three terciles and report the averaged difference as momentum-adjusted earnings
surprises. Stocks with prices lower than $5 at the quarter end are excluded. The t-statistics are computed using
the Newey-West (1987) standard errors. *** Statistical significance at 1%. ** Statistical significance at 5%. *
Statistical significance at 10%.
Quarters
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
A: Earnings Surprise Scaled by Actual Earnings (%)
Q1 0.159 0.393 0.462 0.453
(0.32) (1.05) (1.26) (1.19)
Q5 2.470 1.840 1.262 0.858
(5.62) (4.35) (2.81) (1.85)
Q5-Q1 2.353*** 1.447*** 0.800*** 0.405**
(6.03) (9.05) (5.69) (2.22)
Q5-Q1 (Momentum-Adj) 1.384*** 0.474 0.468 0.467
(5.31) (0.93) (1.38) (1.12)
B: Earnings Surprise Scaled by Price (%)
Q1 -0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003
(-0.39) (0.30) (0.44) (0.42)
Q5 0.033 0.025 0.015 0.010
(5.60) (4.27) (2.44) (1.46)
Q5-Q1 0.038*** 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.007**
(4.06) (6.93) (6.36) (2.10)
Q5-Q1 (Momentum-Adj) 0.024*** -0.010 0.004* 0.062
(4.23) (-0.74) (1.70) (1.02)
C: CARs around Earnings Announcement (%)
Q1 0.034 0.086 0.075 0.063
(1.20) (3.13) (3.01) (2.47)
Q5 0.298 0.163 0.157 0.140
(5.06) (3.25) (3.18) (2.88)
Q5-Q1 0.260*** 0.077 0.082* 0.076*
(4.32) (1.46) (1.97) (1.93)
Q5-Q1 (Momentum-Adj) 0.243*** -0.005 0.017 0.053
(3.13) (-0.15) (0.35) (1.18)
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prior literature? To understand the contribution of stocks with large active fund bets to the overall
performance of active funds, for each decile of stocks sorted on the basis of DFB we calculate
the fund investments-weighted portfolio returns and report the fraction of total mutual fund assets
invested in each decile portfolio. The results in Table 3.9 indicate that stocks in Decile 10 heavily
overweighted by active funds generate high abnormal returns with a four-factor alpha of 6% per
year. But active funds in aggregate invest less than 10% of their assets in those stocks. On
the other hand, although stocks in Decile 1 heavily underweighted by active funds generate a
four-factor alpha close to zero, they receive approximately 34% of total active fund assets. In
other words, a large four-factor alpha of 6% per year on high DFB stocks translates into a small
mutual fund alpha of less than 1% per year before fees and expenses.
Up to this point, we have found evidence consistent with the notion that mutual funds deviate
from their benchmarks to exploit their informational advantages and that their deviations gener-
ate superior performance. Yet we have left unexplained whether funds make optimal portfolio
decisions. For example, could a fund manager have performed better by constructing a more
aggressive portfolio with larger tilts away from its benchmark?
In the model economy outlined in Appendix A, a manager’s portfolio choice is governed by
the desire to maximize the portfolio’s performance relative to its benchmark and an aversion to
taking active risks associated with deviating from that benchmark. The manager’s optimal deci-
sion therefore is jointly determined by three factors: degree of risk aversion, expected returns of
securities conditional on the manager’s information set, and risks of securities. We lack accurate
estimates of these three variables, so we cannot to provide a definitive answer to the question.
The results in Table 3.2 show that the stocks with high DFB tend to be relatively small and
frequently float outside the stock indexes against which mutual funds are benchmarked; on the
contrary, the stocks with low DFB tend to be large and the majority of them appear in the in-
dexes against which active funds are benchmarked. These observations lead us to conjecture that
aversion to taking large active risks could have an important role in shaping the activeness of
fund managers’ portfolios.
In the real world, fund managers seek to maximize their compensation for the portfolio man-
agement services they provide to fund investors. Conventional industry practice rewards mutual
fund managers mainly on the basis of the size of the assets under their management. Accord-
ingly, they have incentives to grow their assets. Berk and Green (2004) thus tell an interesting
story: For skilled fund managers to capitalize on their informational advantages, they combine an
active portfolio that consists of stocks that generate alphas and a passive portfolio that is invested
primarily in a benchmark index. In equilibrium, these skilled fund managers capture economic
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Table 3.9: DFB and Mutual Fund Performance
This table presents the contribution of portfolios sorted on the basis of DFB to the aggregate mutual fund per-
formance. At the end of each quarter from 1980Q3 to 2008Q3, we sort stocks into deciles, based on DFB, in
ascending order and compute the aggregate fund dollar holdings for each decile. We calculate the average monthly
holdings-weighted portfolio returns in the subsequent quarter, and also present the risk-adjusted performance of
those portfolios, based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model, and a five-factor model that augments the Carhart model with the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
liquidity factor. Stocks with prices lower than $5 at the quarter end are excluded. *** Statistical significance at 1%.
** Statistical significance at 5%. * Statistical significance at 10%.
Holdings-Weighted Post-Ranking Portfolio Return (%/month)
Decile
% of
Aggregate
Fund
Investments
Average
Return CAPM Alpha FF Alpha Carhart Alpha
5-Factor
Alpha
1 0.34 0.80 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(3.16) (-1.23) (0.09) (-0.4) (-0.4)
2 0.07 1.08 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.14
(3.81) (1.88) (0.54) (1.49) (1.43)
3 0.05 1.03 0.10 -0.03 0.05 0.07
(3.49) (0.86) (-0.24) (0.55) (0.68)
4 0.03 0.97 0.05 -0.06 0.04 0.05
(3.06) (0.45) (-0.56) (0.33) (0.42)
5 0.05 1.02 0.07 -0.06 0.10 0.11
(3.29) (0.51) (-0.53) (0.84) (0.84)
6 0.07 1.03 0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.06
(3.31) (0.62) (-0.69) (0.44) (0.59)
7 0.09 1.12 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.20
(3.67) (1.77) (1.25) (1.83) (2.31)
8 0.10 1.04 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.04
(3.30) (0.68) (0.52) (0.16) (0.38)
9 0.11 1.38 0.40 0.49 0.32 0.35
(4.20) (2.95) (4.32) (2.95) (3.36)
10 0.09 1.57 0.56 0.81 0.50 0.55
(3.95) (2.61) (3.81) (2.98) (3.34)
D10-D1 0.77*** 0.64*** 0.80*** 0.52*** 0.57***
(2.92) (2.68) (3.64) (2.82) (3.17)
D9-D2 0.30* 0.22 0.44*** 0.18 0.22
(1.81) (1.34) (3.20) (1.33) (1.62)
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rents by managing a large portfolio so that investors, who have no comparative advantages in
competitive capital markets, earn a return that is close to the benchmark. Although our study
is not a direct test of Berk and Green’s model, our evidence is consistent with their predictions
about the behavior of fund managers.
3.5 Robustness Checks
We perform several robustness checks. First, we compute DFB based on an alternative bench-
mark index: the value-weighted portfolio of stocks that a fund actually holds. Second, we con-
sider results based on changes in DFB. Third, we examine the performance of portfolios sorted
by DFB through different subperiods. Four, we consider conditional performance evaluation.
Finally, we consider the influence of mutual funds’ potential preferential access to IPO alloca-
tions.
3.5.1 Alternative Measures of DFB
We have included 19 stock indexes widely used by practitioners as our primary universe of per-
formance benchmarks, and for each fund, we selected for each quarter one index that minimizes
the distance between stocks’ weights in the fund and those in the index. In this subsection,
we consider an alternative way to construct a benchmark index for a specific fund, namely, by
forming market cap-weighted portfolios that consist of stocks actually held by each fund.14
Panel A of Table 3.10 reports the performance of DFB when we use these specifically tai-
lored benchmark indexes. Consistent with the results in Table 3.3, mutual funds’ deviations from
benchmarks captured by this new measure of DFB strongly and positively forecast future stock
returns. For example, Panel A of Table 3.10 shows that stocks heavily overweighted by mutual
funds in Decile 10 generate a monthly equal-weight four-factor alpha of 0.56%, whereas stocks
heavily overweighted by mutual funds in Decile 1 earn a negative four-factor alpha of -0.37% per
month. Therefore, a portfolio that buys stocks in Decile 10 and shorts stocks in Decile 1 earns a
four-factor alpha of 0.93% per month, 3.10 is statistically significant. This positive association
between DFB and future returns is robust to different risk adjustments and reliable for both
equal-weighting and value-weighting.
We also consider a variation of the DFB measure by discretizing the distance between a
14Because a mutual fund might respond to negative information about a firm by avoiding holding its shares, we
also consider a value-weighted benchmark consisting of all stocks that the fund has held during the past five years.
The results are qualitatively similar.
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stock’s weight in a fund’s portfolio and the benchmark portfolio into two categories: over- and
underweighting. In particular, we construct an indicator variable that equals one if the stock is
overweighted by the fund and zero otherwise. Then we average this indicator variable for all
funds whose investment comprises that stock, as in Equation (3.2). This new measure, DFBalt,
captures the fraction of funds that overweight the stock. It also can be viewed as polling each
fund manager to vote for stocks that they perceive as future winners based on their portfolio
weighting decisions. A stock receives a strong buy recommendation if the majority of the funds
polled are bullish about the stock; it receives a strong sell if the majority of the funds are bearish
about it.
DFBalti,t =
Ni∑
j=1
Indicator(wji,t − wbi,t > 0)/Ni, (3.3)
Panel B of Table 3.10 presents the average returns and factor alphas on decile portfolios
formed according to DFBalt. The results indicate that stocks with high DFBalt strongly out-
perform stocks with low DFBalt and that this outperformance is robust to equal- and value-
weighting and remains strong after various risk adjustments. These results reinforce the existence
of informational advantages of mutual funds in stock markets.
We finally consider the influence of the best ideas that Cohen, Polk and Silli (2010) con-
sider on our results. We find that our results remain virtually unchanged after we exclude each
manger’s best one to three ideas from the computation of DFB. To summarize, the return fore-
casting power of DFB is insensitive to different ways of forming benchmark portfolios and
robust to the exclusion of fund managers’ best ideas.
3.5.2 Changes in DFB
Our results have shown that DFB captures information relevant for future returns and that the
value of the information tends to dissipate after one quarter. If fund managers respond to new
information by efficiently adjusting their portfolio weights, a measure based on their portfolio
adjustments should relate to future returns. In this subsection, we examine this conjecture by
relating changes in DFB and stock returns. The changes in DFB contain two components:
changes in a stock’s weights in the mutual fund portfolio and in the benchmark index. If passive
managers who track the performance of their benchmarks adjust their portfolio weights according
to changes in the benchmark weights, changes in DFB should capture the active trades made by
active managers.
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Table 3.11 presents the performance of portfolios sorted according to changes in DFB. Con-
sistent with our conjecture, changes in DFB contain strong return-forecasting power. Panel A
of Table 3.11, for example, shows that stocks with the largest increases in DFB outperform, in
the subsequent quarter, stocks with the largest decreases in DFB by 1.15% per month on the
equal-weighted basis. This difference is highly statistically significant, with a t-statistic of 7.79.
Standard risk adjustments have virtually no effect on this return differential. Panel B further
shows that value-weighted returns yield a similar pattern both qualitatively and quantitatively.
These results lend further support to mutual funds’ informational advantages for the stocks for
which they display the most conviction.
3.5.3 Subperiod Analysis
The information environment of corporations in United States has changed over time.15 Does
this change influence mutual funds’ informational advantages as an investor group? To address
this question, we divide our sample into four subperiods (1980–1987, 1988–1994, 1995–2001,
and 2002–2008) and consider the performance of DFB through time.
Table 3.12 presents the performance of decile portfolios that is formed on the basis of DFB
over four subperiods. Except for the first subperiod, from 1980 to 1987,16 the return forecasting
power ofDFB remains strong across time. Therefore, despite the changing information environ-
ment, active mutual funds appear to maintain a consistent edge in acquiring relevant and costly
information. This evidence is consistent with the idea that mutual funds gain their informational
advantages from their superior skills.
3.5.4 Conditional Performance Evaluation
Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007) argue that mutual funds have superior market-timing ability, which
translates into superior fund performance.17 Could the higher returns on stocks heavily over-
weighed by mutual funds reflect their managers’ correct assessment of future market returns,
15For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) instated the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg
FD) in October 2000 to eliminate selective disclosure by firms to a subset of market participants. In the SEC release
about Reg FD, its stated goal was to eliminate situations in which “a privileged few gain an informational edge –
and the ability to use that edge to profit – from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from their
skill, acumen, or diligence.”
16The mutual fund industry was relatively small during the early part of our sample. During 1980–1987, 200
to 360 funds reported their holdings that accounted for less than 4% of the CRSP sample based on market cap.
Moreover, few benchmark indexes were available during this period, which could be another reason for the weak
results.
17Taliaferro (2009) and Beron-Drish and Sagi (2009) provide recent but less optimistic evidence on the timing
ability of mutual funds.
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instead of their firm-specific information? In other words, could fund managers make portfolio
decisions in a way such that high DFB stocks tend to exhibit higher loadings on the market or
other risk factors in periods with higher expected returns and lower loadings on the risk factors
in periods with lower expected returns?
To address this question, we need to take into account the time variation in those stocks’ load-
ings on the market or other risk factors. Thus, we employ Ferson and Schadt’s (1996) conditional
performance evaluation approach to allow for time-varying betas. Specifically, we augment the
traditional CAPM and Cahart four-factor model with five conditioning variables: the lagged level
of the one-month Treasury bill yield, the lagged dividend yield of the CRSP value-weighted stock
index, the lagged measure of the slope of the term structure (a constant-maturity 10-year Trea-
sury bond yield less the 3-month Treasury bill yield), the lagged quality spread in the corporate
bond market (corporate bond default yield spread as Moody’s BAA-rated corporate bond yield
less the AAA-rated corporate bond yield), and a dummy variable for the month of January. Unt-
abulated results show that the return premium on high DFB stocks remains large and significant
after the adjustments for time-varying betas.
3.5.5 Preferential allocations of IPOs
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) and Reuter (2006) argue that preferential access to IPOs could
lead to boosted mutual fund performance. To assess the extent to which such preferential allo-
cations of IPOs might influence our results, we exclude all stocks whose return history in CRSP
falls below six months from our sample, and repeat our portfolio analysis based on mutual funds’
deviations from benchmarks. We find that the exclusion of those stocks results in negligible in-
fluence on our results.
3.6 Conclusion
We find strong evidence that supports the informational role of actively managed mutual funds in
determining security prices. Using a sample of U.S. equity mutual funds during the period 1980–
2008, we find that stocks heavily overweighted by active mutual funds relative to benchmarks
strongly outperform their underweighted counterparts. The return premium on stocks heavily
overweighted by mutual funds, relative to their underweighted counterparts, reaches more than
7% per year even after adjustments for their loadings on the market, size, value, momentum,
and liquidity factors. A significant portion of this premium occurs around corporate earnings
announcements. These results point to an informational link between mutual fund investing and
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asset prices.
Our research suggests interesting avenues for further research. First, the results indicate that
mutual funds acquire information that is not fully reflected in prices for those stocks about which
they display the most conviction, according to their over- and underweighting decisions. But it
is unclear which potential channels might enable them to gain this superior information. Recent
studies by Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) make some
initial progress by suggesting that geographic proximity and shared educational experiences be-
tween corporate and fund managers provide important channels for mutual fund managers to
access private information. It would be interesting to connect the our findings to these two
informational channels and explore additional networks of information flow to gain a better un-
derstanding of how information finds its way into asset prices.
Second, other types of institutions, such as pension funds, banks, and insurance companies
spend enormous resources in security analysis. These types of institutions might have important
impact on the discovery of stock prices. It would be interesting to explore whether portfolio
decisions made by these institutions similarly contain information relevant for the behavior of
future asset returns.
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3.A An Illustrative Interpretation of DFB
In this appendix, we provide an illustrative interpretation of active funds’ deviations from bench-
mark, DFB, following the intuition in Roll (1992). Suppose there are J fund managers investing
in N risky assets. Each manager is attempting to beat the performance benchmark B. Denote
the returns on risky assets in excess of the risk-free rate as R˜ = [R˜1, R˜2, ..., R˜N ]′. Each manager
forms conditional expectations about future returns on risky assets in the investment universe
based on his information set I . In addition, Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of the risky
assets, which is assumed to be known and agreed upon by all managers; wBj = [w
b
1, w
b
2, ..., w
b
N ]
′
refers to the portfolio weights for fund manager j′s benchmark Bj . Note that certain elements in
wBj could be equal to 0, depending on the composition of the particular index. Fund manager j
makes portfolio choicewj = [w
j
1, w
j
2, ..., w
j
N ]
′ to maximize the benchmark-adjusted, active return
on his portfolio while minimizing the active risk or the tracking error variance of his portfolio.18
We can write manager j′s objective function as:
Max
wj
{(wj − wBj )′E[R˜|Ij]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Active Return
− λj
2
(wj − wBj )′Σ(wj − wBj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Active Risk
},
where E[R˜|Ij] is the expected excess returns on risky assets conditional on the information set of
manager j, and λj is the manager’s risk-aversion coefficient. We can easily show that the optimal
portfolio solution for manager j is
wj − wBj =
1
λj
Σ−1E[R˜|Ij].
If we further assume that the risk-aversion coefficient is a constant λ across fund managers
and Σ is a diagonal matrix, it is apparent that the distance of an asset i’s weight in the manager’s
portfolio from its weight in the benchmark index wi,j−wBi,j is proportional to the expected excess
return of the asset, conditional on manager j’s information set. If we further make a simplify-
ing assumption that Σ is an identity matrix, then wj − wBj = 1λE[R˜|Ij]. In other words, for
any risky asset i in manager j’s investment universe, wi,j − wBi,j = 1λE[R˜i|Ij]. Our measure
DFBi =
Ni∑
j=1
(wi,j − wBi,j)/Ni = 1λ
Ni∑
j=1
E[R˜i|Ij]/Ni, where Ni is the number of funds whose in-
vestment universe comprises asset i. Therefore, DFBi aggregates information about the future
excess return of asset i scattered among fund managers.19
18Consistent with our empirical approach, we only consider funds’ investments in risky assets and ignore their
cash holdings.
19These assumptions are certainly restrictive. To the extent that they introduce noise into our measure of mutual
funds’ DFB, we expect to observe a weaker relation between DFB and future returns. Empirically though, we
find strong evidence that DFB forecasts future stock returns.
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3.B Sample Selection
We start with all U.S. equity mutual funds from the intersection between the CRSP mutual fund
database and the TFN/CDA Spectrum mutual fund holdings database. We use the MFLINKS
data set available from the WRDS to link the two databases. As our benchmark holdings data
start from September 1980, our final sample of stock holdings spans the period from September
1980 through September 2008.
Because we wish to capture active mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equities, we
follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008), by eliminat-
ing balanced, bond, money market, sector, and international funds as well as funds that do not
primarily invest in U.S. common equity. In particular, we use the following steps in sample se-
lection. We select funds with the following Lipper class codes, provided by the CRSP: EIEI,
G, I, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE, MLGE, MLVE, SCCE, SCGE, or
SCVE. If a fund does not have any of these Lipper class codes, we select funds with the follow-
ing strategic Insight objectives: SCG, GRO, AGG, ING, GRI, or GMC. If both codes are missing
for a fund, we pick funds with the following Wiesenberger objectives: SCG, AGG, G, G-S, S-G,
GRO, LTG, I, I-S, IEQ, ING, GCI, G-I, G-I-S, G-S-I, I-G, I-G-S, I-S-G, S-G-I, S-I-G, GRI, or
MCG. If none of the objective codes are available, we require that a fund have a CS policy code.
We eliminate funds with any of the following investment objectives as provided by TFN/CDA
Spectrum: International, Municipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred, and Balanced. Furthermore, we
use the portfolio composition data provided by CRSP to exclude funds that invest less than 80%
or more than 105%, on average, in common equity. To address the incubation bias documented
by Elton, Gruber and Blake (2001) and Evans (2010), we exclude observations prior to the re-
ported fund inception date, those for which the names of the funds are missing in the CRSP
database, and funds whose net assets fall below $5 million. To prevent outliers from driving our
measure of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks, we also require that a fund have at least
10 stock holdings to be eligible for consideration in our analysis.
To ensure that we capture active mutual funds, we eliminate index funds whose names con-
tained the following keywords: INDEX, INDE, INDX, INX, IDX, DOW JONES, ISHARE,
S&P, S &P, S& P, S & P, 500, WILSHIRE, RUSSELL, RUSS, or MSCI. To lessen errors due
to abbreviation and misspelling, we manually inspected fund names and filtered out remaining
international funds, sector funds, tax-managed funds, fixed-income funds, balanced funds, real
estate funds and annuities.
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3.C Benchmark Holdings
Our main method of selecting benchmark indexes for individual mutual funds follows Cremers
and Petajisto (2009). In particular, the universe of benchmark indexes includes the 19 stock
indexes widely used by practitioners: S&P 500, S&P 400, S&P 600, S&P 500/Barra Value, S&P
500/Barra Growth, Russell 1000, Russell 2000, Russell 3000, Russell Midcap, the value and
growth variants of the four Russell indexes, Wilshire 5000, and Wilshire 4500. Data on the index
holdings of the 12 Russell indexes since their inception come from the Frank Russell Company,
and data on S&P 500, S&P 400, and S&P 600 index holdings since December 1994 are from
Compustat. For the remaining indexes and time periods, we use the holdings data of index funds
that track the performance of those indexes as a first approximation. Specifically, for each index,
we select one index fund or ETF that has the lowest tracking error over the sample period. We
use holdings information reported by that fund to approximate the actual index weights. If, in
a particular quarter, the index fund has missing holdings information, we use the holdings data
reported by the fund with the second lowest tracking error, and so on.
In Table C1, we present information about the benchmark indexes. The third column of Table
C1 shows the source of holdings data we used in our sample, and the fourth and fifth columns
show the start and end dates for the holding information.
After we obtain the information on benchmark weights, we select, for each mutual fund in
each quarter, one benchmark index that minimizes the distance in portfolio weights between the
fund and the index. Our measure of the distance between mutual funds and their benchmarks is
the measure of Active Share as proposed by Cremers and Petajisto (2009):
ActivewShare =
1
2
N∑
i=1
|wfund,i − windex,i|,
where wfund,i and windex,i are the portfolio weights of asset i in the fund and in the index, re-
spectively. For each fund in each quarter, we select the index that generates the lowest Active
Share for the fund. The advantage of this dynamic selection of performance benchmarks lies in
its flexibility in allowing for drifts in a fund’s style over time.
We also calculate the number of active funds that benchmark against each of the indexes and
the total assets under their management. Columns 6 and 7 report these numbers for September
2008. Columns 8 and 9 further show the market share for each of the indexes.
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3.D Comparison with Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000)
Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (CJW, 2000) assess the value of active portfolio management by
examining the association between mutual fund trades and future stock returns. They provide
compelling evidence that active funds add value through their trading activities. Following Grin-
blatt and Titman (1993), we may view fund holdings in the prior period as an implicit benchmark
to evaluate fund performance. In other words, the CJW trade-based measure may be viewed as
another way of measuring deviations from benchmarks. We argue that our measure of active
funds’ deviations from benchmarks is superior in aggregating fund managers’ private informa-
tion, because the trading decisions of mutual funds could reflect not only informational motives
but also other motivations such as flow-driven liquidity needs (e.g., Alexander, Cici, and Gibson,
2007). Our measure of deviations from benchmarks is less subject to the influence of fund flows,
because fund managers can simply scale up or down fund assets in response to flows, without
having to substantially alter the composition of their active portfolios.
In Table D1, we provide more evidence that supports our claim. Specifically, at the end
of each quarter from 1980Q3 to 2008Q3, we perform two-way independent sorts. Along one
dimension, we sorts stocks into quintiles based on the magnitude of their deviations from bench-
marks, and along the other dimension, we sort stocks into quintiles based on their quarterly trades
measured as the change in the fraction of shares held by mutual fund in our sample. Twenty five
portfolios thus form from these double sorts, with portfolio (1,1) containing stocks with the low-
est value of the sorting variables and vice versa. We calculate the monthly equal-weight and
value-weight returns on each of 25 portfolios for the subsequent quarter, and report their Carhart
4-factor alpha. The results in Table D1 show that stocks heavily overweighted by active funds sig-
nificantly outperform those they choose to underweight, while controlling for their stock trades.
In contrast, the trade-based measure has no return forecasting power once we control for funds’
deviations from benchmarks.
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Chapter 4
Do Mutual Fund Managers Trade on Stock
Intrinsic Values?∗
4.1 Introduction
When information and trading costs are not trivial in reality, stock prices may diverge from
their intrinsic values.1 Mutual funds, being good candidates for informed investors given their
expertise in fundamental analysis, are supposed to make advantageous valuation-based portfolio
bets and thus facilitate the convergence of price to value.2 However, their informational role in
determining stock prices remains inadequately addressed in the extant literature. Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) suggest that delegated portfolio managers can become most constrained when
they bet against the most mispriced securities. According to their performance-based arbitrage
model, fund managers’ fear of temporary money outflows may significantly limit their trading
effectiveness in achieving price efficiency. This study attempts to shed light on the informational
advantages of actively managed mutual funds in discovering mispricing and their role in bringing
prices to fundamental values.
We use a residual income model operationalized by Frankel and Lee (1998) and Lee, Myers,
∗This chapter is based on the article by Shen, Verbeek, and Wang (2011). I appreciate the valuable suggestions
from the participants in the European Finance Association Meeting (Stockholm, 2011), the American Accounting
Association Meeting (Denver, 2011), and the seminar at RSM Erasmus University (Rotterdam, 2011). I also thank
Kenneth French, Russ Wermers, and Antti Petajisto for making data available through their Web sites.
1See Shiller (1984), Summers (1986), DeBondt and Thayler (1987), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994),
and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for detailed discussion of inequality of price and value. Closed-end fund literature
provides more direct evidence of price-value divergence (e.g. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and Swaminathan
(1996)).
2Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, White (2006) and Fama and French (2010) use bootstrap tests for fund
performance persistence and find supporting evidence of the presence of subgroups of skilled fund managers. For
other recent supportive evidence of fund skills based on fund holdings data, see Avramov and Wermers (2006) and
Wermers, Yao, and Zhao (2007).
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and Swaminathan (1999) to obtain an empirical estimate of a stock’s intrinsic value (V ). We
empirically examine whether active fund managers trade on the mispricing indicated by a value-
to-price ratio (V/P ).3 By examining the quarterly holdings of 2,537 distinct U.S. active mutual
funds over the 1981 to 2008 period, we find that mutual funds in aggregate tend to trade in the di-
rection of V/P , and more intensively from six months before all necessary financial information
for estimating the intrinsic value is publicly released. We attribute the mutual funds’ exploitation
of a stock’s intrinsic value to their superior expertise in forecasting and processing fundamental
information (Cheng, Liu and Qian, 2006). Our findings are not subsumed by controlling for
various common stock return predictors in Fama-Macbeth regressions.
To characterize the portfolio choices of mutual funds based on V/P and assess how success-
fully they exploit such information, we construct a fund-level V/P -timing measure, V PT , in
the spirit of Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) and similar to the accruals investing measure
created by Ali, Chen, Yao, and Yu (2008). V PT is the value-weighted average V/P decile rank
of all stocks held by a mutual fund. A high value of V PT indicates that the fund manager ac-
tively trades on fundamentals and tilts her portfolio toward underpriced stocks (with high V/P ).
We sort all active mutual funds into ten decile portfolios in ascending order (1-10) on the basis
of V PT . Examining the fund characteristics across the V PT deciles, we find that small and
high-turnover funds tend to trade more on V/P mispricing. Further, we show that funds with
high past one year performance and low return gap (the difference between the reported fund
return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings) tend to
significantly exploit the V/P effect.
We use fund returns before fees, net of the realized transactions costs, to evaluate the actual
profitability of trading on stocks’ intrinsic values. In univariate portfolio sorts, D10 funds with
the highest V PT have an average return of 1.19% per month over a six-month horizon starting
from portfolio formation and significantly outperform the lowest-V PT funds in D1 by 0.55%
per month. We also examine how well D10 funds perform relative to D5 funds that are neutral
to the V/P effect with a V PT of 5.5. The return spread of 0.26% per month between D10 and
D5 is statistically significant. Both return spreads are robust to different factor risk adjustments.
More interestingly, the superior performance of D10 funds does not simply reflect that these
3Frankel and Lee (1998) and Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) find that V/P ratio has reliable cross-
sectional and time-series predictive power for U.S. stock returns. They also find that residual income model is a
more robust and richer valuation model than simple heuristics such as B/P and D/P that have been examined
extensively in the prior finance literatures. Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) further show that the V/P effect is
mainly concentrated around earnings announcement, consistent with the mispricing explanation for its return pre-
dictive power. Jiang and Lee (2005) find that book values and earnings in the residual income model contain more
useful information than the traditional dividend discount model (DDM) for stock valuation.
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funds take on high risks. The risk-adjusted returns on the D10 funds are 0.35%, 0.36%, and
0.27% per month based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama and French 3-
factor model, and a 4-factor model including momentum, respectively. Hence, mutual funds
that actively exploit the fundamental mispricing are able to benefit from such information and
generate both statistically and economically significant profits.
Finally, we examine the impact of fund trading on V/P effect and find more pronounced
effect among stocks with less intense past mutual funds’ exploitation. Mutual funds with superior
private information about stock values mitigate the mispricing by trading in the direction of V/P .
We find that high-V/P stocks with the lowest mutual funds’ ownership in each June (the time
of information release) continue to generate a significant 4-factor alpha of 0.42% per month
in the subsequent one year. Furthermore, we also show that high-V/P stocks that have been
heavily sold by mutual funds in the recent past can generate even higher future performance.
This evidence is consistent with our expectation that the tendency of mutual funds to trade in the
direction of V/P facilitates impounding fundamental information into the current stock prices
and thus pushes prices back toward their intrinsic values.
Our paper joins a small but growing literature that connects mutual fund investing to asset
prices. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that fund managers have better access to local in-
formation and that their investments facilitate the transfer of information into the prices of local
stocks. Cohen, Frazzini, andMalloy (2008) provide empirical evidence that information transfers
through the social networks between corporate managers and fund managers into stock prices.
Unlike these two studies that assume a priori links between firms and funds, we examine how ac-
tively managed mutual funds react upon the mispricing revealed by their fundamental analyses.
Boehmer and Kelly (2009) show that institutional trading improves the short-horizon informa-
tional efficiency of prices, measured as deviations from a random walk. Distinct from their study,
this paper is interested in the role of active mutual funds as informed traders in pushing stock
prices toward their intrinsic values over a relatively longer horizon.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is among the first to empirically test the trading
behavior of delegated informed traders using a stock mispricing measure based on a comprehen-
sive valuation model.4 Our findings that mutual funds tend to exploit mispricing opportunities
are consistent with the theoretical prediction of Grossman and Miller (1988), De Long, Shleifer,
Summers, Waldman (1990) and Campbell and Kyle (1993). We show that mutual funds that
tilt their portfolios most aggressively toward underpriced stocks can profit from fundamental
4Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) see short-sellers as informed investors and find that short-sellers
use information in the fundamentals to market values ratios to take positions in stocks with lower expected future
returns.
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analysis, which confirms the findings of mutual funds benefiting from fundamental-relevant in-
formation in Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009), Baker, Litov, Wachter, and Wurgler
(2010) and Jiang, Verbeek, and Wang (2011). In spite of this, our findings do not exclude the
possible existence of limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Our study is also related to a recent line of research in the accounting literature that attempts
to address the issue of implementing the residual income model to measure intrinsic values.
The valuation equation we use in this paper follows Frankel and Lee (1997, 1998), Penman and
Sougiannis (1998), Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1999), Abarbanell and Bernard (2000), Gode
and Mohanram (2003), Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), Baginski and Wahlen (2003) and
Jiang and Lee (2005). While these accounting studies examine the model prediction of both
time-series and cross-section of stock returns, our investigation focuses on whether active fund
managers exploit the fundamental information revealed by such a model. Closely related to ours
is Ali, Chen, Yao, and Yu (2008), who document that on average mutual funds do not trade on
the accruals anomaly. Compared with their study, our primary interest in this paper is in whether
active funds benefit from more complete and comprehensive fundamental analyses and their role
in impounding such fundamental information into stock prices. Moreover, we do find that mutual
funds in aggregate trade on mispricing as indicated by the V/P ratio.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the residual income
model. Section 4.3 describes data, sample selection and summary statistics. Section 4.4 and 4.5
explore whether mutual funds trade on and profit from V/P effect. Section 4.6 investigates the
relation between mutual fund trading and V/P effect. Section 4.7 concludes our paper.
4.2 The Residual Income Valuation Model
To determine the extent of mispricing, it is paramount to measure the stock intrinsic value (V )
with a comprehensive valuation model.5 In this study we use a discounted residual income
approach.6 This section presents the basic residual income equation and discuss the specifics of
the model implementation procedure. A stock’s fundamental value is generally defined as the
present value of its expected future dividends conditional on all currently available information.
5Despite of the consensus that a stock’s intrinsic value is the present value of the expected future cash flows, few
academic studies have sufficiently addressed the problem of measuring it. Exceptions include a stream of studies
in the accounting literature (e.g. Frankel and Lee (1997, 1998), Penman and Sougiannis (1998), Dechow, Hutton,
and Sloan (1999), Abarbanell and Bernard (2000), Gode and Mohanram (2003), Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003),
Baginski and Wahlen (2003), and Jiang and Lee (2005)).
6The residual income model is also referred to as the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) valuation technique. Theo-
retical development of the model can be found in Ohlson (1990, 1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995).
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Specifically,
V ∗t =
∞∑
i=1
Et[Dt+i]
(1 + re)i
, (4.1)
where V ∗t is the stock’s fundamental value at time t, Et[Dt+i] is the expected future dividends
for period t + i based on information available at time t, and re is the cost of equity.
Under the clean surplus accounting assumption, the change in a firm’s book value is equal to
earnings minus net dividends. Following Frankel and Lee (1998), Equation (4.1) can be rewritten
as the reported book value, plus the sum of an infinite series of discounted residual income:
V ∗t = Bt +
∞∑
i=1
Et[NIt+i − (reBt+i−1)]
(1 + re)i
= Bt +
∞∑
i=1
Et[(ROEt+i − re)Bt+i−1]
(1 + re)i
, (4.2)
where Bt is the book value at time t, NIt+i is the net income for period t + i, and ROEt+i is
the after tax return on book equity for period t + i. Equation (4.2) shows that the intrinsic value
of a firm can be decomposed into an accounting measure of capital invested (Bt), and a measure
of the present value of future cash flows not captured in the current book value. Firms whose
expected ROEs are higher (lower) than their cost of equity (re) will have intrinsic values greater
(smaller) than their current book values.
In practice the implementation of the model requires forecasted ROEs (FROEs), dividend
payout rates (k), current book value (Bt), cost of equity (re), and a terminal value, i.e. an estimate
of the firm value based on the residual income earned after the explicit forecasting horizon. To
calculate a stock’s intrinsic value, we use a three-period expansion of the model which is the
primary measure of firm value in Frankel and Lee (1998):
V̂ 3t = Bt +
(FROEt − re)
(1 + re)
Bt +
(FROEt+1 − re)
(1 + re)2
Bt+1 +
(FROEt+2 − re)
(1 + re)2re
Bt+2, (4.3)
where
Bt: book value from the most recent financial statement.
Bt+i: forecasted book value for period t + i. Bt+i = Bt+i−1 + FYt+i − FDIVt+i, where
FDIVt+i is the forecasted dividends for year t + i, estimated using the dividend payout ratio
k. Dividend payout ratio k is computed as the common stock dividends divided by net income
before extraordinary items.7 We assume that FDIVt+i = FYt+i × k.
re: industry-specific cost of equity estimated from a three-factor risk model according to
Fama and French (1997).8
7For firms with negative earnings, we divide dividends by 5% of total assets to derive an estimate of k. 5% is the
average long run ROA in our sample period (see Table 4.1).
8Frankel and Lee (1998) and Abarbanell and Bernard (2000) find that the choice of re has little effect on the
cross-sectional analyses.
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FROEt+i: forecasted ROE for period t+ i. For the first two years, the variable is computed
as FYt+i/[(Bt+i−1 + Bt+i−2)/2], where FYt+i is the I/B/E/S consensus (mean) forecasted i-
year-ahead earnings. For the third year, we use the five-year long term growth rate to compute a
three-year-ahead earnings forecast: FROEt+2 = FYt+2 ∗ (1+Ltg). When Ltg is missing in the
I/B/E/S database, we use FROEt+1 to proxy for FROEt+2.
The model provides a framework for analyzing the relation between accounting numbers and
firm value and features the importance of including forward-looking earnings information in the
valuation. Frankel and Lee (1998) and Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) provide a detailed
and comprehensive discussion of the insights of the model.
4.3 Sample Description and Summary Statistics
In this section, we describe our stock data set to analyze the V/P effect and the criteria of mutual
fund sample selection, followed by the summary statistics for our sample.
4.3.1 Stock Data
The sample of stocks in this study includes all U.S. domestic non-financial companies traded on
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the Compustat/CRSP Merged database (hereafter, the CCM
data) from 1981 to 2008. We require firms to have valid accounting data (for Bt−1, Bt−2, NIt−1,
and DIVt−1) and CRSP stock prices and shares outstanding data for the fiscal-year-end t − 1
and the end of June in year t. We also require firms to have one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead
earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S. We use I/B/E/S forecasts announced in May and constrain our
sample to firms with fiscal-year-ends between June and December, inclusively. This constraint
makes sure that the forecasted earnings correspond to the correct fiscal-year-end.
To ensure that accounting variables are known to the public before portfolio formation, we
form and rebalance our stock portfolios at the end of June in year t using the V/P ratios computed
based on the intrinsic value estimates and market equity values at the fiscal-year-end of calendar
year t− 1. To be consistent with Fama and French (1992), we calculate the book-to-market ratio
based on the book value of last fiscal-year-end and market equity in December of calendar year
t − 1. In estimating Equation (4.3), we remove firms with negative book values and eliminate
firms with absolute values of FROEs above 100% and with dividend payout ratios larger than
100%. To mitigate the concern that stock return tests might be influenced by return outliers, we
eliminate stocks with prices below $1.9 Taken together, our filters eliminate 4,636 observations
(approximately 9%), leaving a final sample of 50,246 firm-years.
9These firms have typically unstable B/M and V/P ratios and poor market liquidity.
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4.3.2 Mutual Fund Sample Selection
We construct our mutual fund database by combining the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database (MFDB) and the CDA/Spectrum Mutual
Fund Holdings Database from Thomson Financial.10 As we wish to examine the informational
advantages of mutual funds in stock markets, we only include, in our sample, active mutual funds
that invest primarily in US common stocks. In particular, we eliminate balanced, bond, money
market, international, index funds and sector funds, as well as funds not invested primarily in
equity securities (see the Appendix A for details on how we select active U.S. domestic equity
funds). Our final sample covers 2,537 distinct active equity funds over the period 1981 to 2008.
Data on monthly returns, prices, and market values of equity for common stocks traded on
the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ come from CRSP. Consistent with previous literature, we
exclude closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REIT), American Depository Receipts
(ADR), foreign companies, primes, and scores (we keep only shares with codes of 10 or 11).
4.3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for our stock (Panel A) and mutual fund samples (Panel
B). The average characteristics are calculated at the end of each June from 1981 to 2007. The
average dividend payout ratio (k) for stocks in our stock sample decreases from 0.33 in 1981 to
0.11 in 2007. The averageROE andROA also exhibit a decreasing pattern over time, though not
strictly monotonically. The averageROE ranges from 0.04 to 0.16, while the averageROA stays
between 0.01 and 0.07 over years. These results illustrate the stability of the key model inputs
over time. Using the residual income model to estimate the intrinsic stock value, we observe that
the average V/P ratio displays a general declining trend over our sample period, from 1.54 in
1981 to 0.65 in 2007. It appears that on average stocks have become more and more overvalued
in recent years. Panel A of Table 4.1 also shows that in an average year mutual funds in aggregate
hold 1,542 stocks out of 1,587 stocks that have valid data to compute V/P . Therefore, the mutual
fund holdings data cover the majority of our stock sample. Furthermore, mutual funds increase
their ownership in an average stock (defined as the fraction of the outstanding shares of a stock
that is held by all mutual funds) almost monotonically from 2.77% in 1981 to 17.26% in 2007.
The corresponding number of funds holding the stock also skyrockets from 8 to 70 over the
sample period. These numbers illustrate that over the past decades mutual funds have become
10Our merging procedure uses the MFLINKS data set maintained by Russ Wermers and the Wharton Research
Data Services (WRDS).
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more important as shareholders of common equity.
Panel B of Table 4.1 presents the average mutual fund characteristics per year. We observe
that the industry of active equity mutual funds has experienced a fast expansion: the number of
actively managed equity funds in our sample increases from 179 in 1981 to 1,518 in 2007, with
the average total assets under management growing from $million 195.51 to $million 1,743.51.
On average, these funds invest 90% of their assets in common stocks, which suggests that our
sample well represents the universe of U.S. active funds with an investment focus on domestic
equity. Over our sample period, the expansion of mutual funds outpaced the growth of stock
markets, which led them to become increasingly important shareholders of common equity. Fi-
nally, the 12b1 fees, expense ratio, and fund turnover ratio also display an increasing trend in
general and a slight decrease after 2003.
4.4 Do Mutual Funds Trade on Intrinsic Value?
In this section, we explore whether intrinsic stock value reveal information concerning future
stock returns over our sample period. More importantly, we investigate how mutual funds trade
on the information content of the V/P effect and whether they can profit from discovering values.
4.4.1 Confirming the V/P Effect
Frankel and Lee (1998) examine an earlier stock sample from 1976 to 1993 and find that the
V/P ratio is a good predictor for future cross-sectional stock returns. Specifically, they find a
one-year return spread of 3.1% between the top and bottom V/P quintiles. The effect cannot
be explained by a firm’s market beta, size and book-to-market ratio. To confirm the V/P effect
for stocks in our CCM stock universe covering the period 1981 to 2008, we employ a univariate
portfolio approach and more comprehensive risk adjustment procedures.
At the end of June in year t, we compute V/P ratios for our sample of stocks using public
financial information. Then we sort stocks into 5 quintile portfolios in ascending order based on
their V/P ratios for the fiscal year that ends in calendar year t − 1. To minimize the impact of
any possible analyst forecast errors on more opaque/small firms, we compute the value-weighted
portfolio returns over the following 12 months from July of year t to June of year t + 1.11 We
also consider value-weighting to be a more conservative approach to discover superior trading
strategies.12 To compute portfolio returns, we use monthly stock returns from CRSP. In case of
11Gu and Wu (2003) show that analysts tend to issue more optimistic earnings forecasts for small firms.
12Fama and French (2008) point out that equal-weight portfolio return may be driven by tiny stocks that are
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stock delisting, we use CRSP delisting returns when they are not missing; otherwise, we follow
Shumway (1997) to replace missing delisting returns with -30% if the delisting is performance
related (CRSP delisting codes 500 and 520-584).
Table 4.2: V/P and Future Stock Returns: Quintile Portfolios
This table presents the performance of the quintile portfolios formed on the basis of value-to-price ratios, V/P . V is
an intrinsic value measure derived based on a residual income model using the current I/B/E/S consensus earnings
forecast available prior to June 30 of each year. Specifically, at the end of each June from 1981 to 2007, we sort
stocks into quintiles in ascending order based on V/P and compute the average monthly value-weight portfolio
returns in the subsequent year. We also present risk-adjusted performance of those portfolios, based on the CAPM,
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and a five-factor model that
augments the Carhart model with the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity. Stocks with prices lower than 1 dollar
at the time of portfolio formation are excluded. The t-statistics are computed using the Newey-West standard errors.
*** represents statistical significance at 1% level, ** represents statistical significance at 5% level, and * represents
statistical significance at 10% level.
Value-Weight Post-Ranking Portfolio Return (%/month)
V/P Quintile Average Return CAPM Alpha FF Alpha Carhart Alpha 5-Factor Alpha
1 0.74 -0.37 -0.36 -0.11 -0.09
(2.47) (-3.82) (-3.73) (-0.99) (-0.82)
2 0.91 -0.09 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
(3.68) (-1.24) (-0.35) (-0.37) (0.07)
3 1.06 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.09
(4.83) (1.61) (1.52) (0.78) (1.27)
4 1.13 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.08
(5.10) (1.89) (1.96) (0.92) (1.08)
5 1.46 0.44 0.46 0.33 0.32
(6.31) (2.73) (3.33) (2.69) (2.52)
Q5-Q1 0.72*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.44** 0.41**
(3.29) (3.65) (4.24) (2.39) (2.22)
The results in Table 4.2 show that the V/P ratio strongly predicts future stock returns. A
portfolio that buys stocks in Quintile 5 and sells stocks in Quintile 1 generates an average raw
return of 0.72% per month on the value-weight basis. These excess returns are highly statistically
significant, with a t-statistic of 3.29. To examine whether the high returns on heavily underpriced
stocks (Q5) simply reflect the high systematic risks, we employ standard risk-adjustment mod-
els to examine the abnormal returns. The specific risk-adjustment models include the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Fama and French 3-factor model, a 4-factor model including
momentum, and a 5-factor model further including the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity
factor.
Columns 2 to 5 of Table 4.2 show the results. The high returns on stocks heavily underpriced
numerous in number but small in economic significance. Furthermore, in a world with mispricing, value-weight
approach tends to overweight overpriced stocks and underweight underpriced stocks. This makes profiting from
mispricing more difficult.
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in excess of the returns on their overpriced counterparts remain large and statistically significant
after the above-mentioned risk adjustments. For example, the spread portfolio that buys stocks
in Quintile 5 and shorts stocks in Quintile 1 earns abnormal returns of 0.80%, 0.81%, 0.44%,
and 0.41% per month on an value-weighted basis after adjustments according to the CAPM,
three-factor model, four-factor model, and five-factor model, respectively. All four versions
of alphas are highly statistically significant with t-statistics ranging between 2.2 and 4.3. We
note that the return-predictive power of V/P is independent of the book-to-market effect that
is widely documented and applied in the prior literature. After adding the momentum factor
in our risk adjustment model, the overpriced stocks in Quintile 1 do not generate significant
negative abnormal return while the underpriced stocks in Quintile 5 continue to have superior
and statistically significant performance. The finding suggests that overpriced stocks tend to have
poor past performance. In contrast, the past good return records for underpriced stocks cannot
explain all of their superior performance in the future. This is important for our subsequent
analysis on mutual fund trading because mutual funds’ informational advantage should be the
most conspicuous among their long positions due to short-sale constraints.
Next, we examine the characteristics of stocks with low and high intrinsic values. We present
univariate results based on quintile portfolios in Table 4.3. Specifically, using the same portfolio
sorts we calculate the cross-sectional averages of stock characteristics, and then report their time-
series means. The results show that the average V/P ratio increases from 0.40 in Quintile 1 to
1.77 in Quintile 5, whereas the corresponding B/M ratio displays much less dispersion across
the V/P quintiles. Furthermore, we find that the most underpriced stocks in Quintile 5 tend
to be small-caps with an average size quintile rank value of 2.17 based on NYSE market-cap
breakpoints in ascending order; they also have a slight tendency to be growth stocks and winners
in the past year. Stocks in the two extreme quintiles exhibit high return volatility and high
turnover, especially for underpriced stocks with an average volatility of 13.80% per year and an
annual turnover of 164.94%.
Due to the high volatility of both underpriced and overpriced stocks, their average mutual
funds’ ownership tends to be smaller than that of the rest of the stock universe. A typical stock
in Quintile 5 with the highest V/P ratio has the average mutual funds’ ownership of 8.60%,
which is lower than the mutual funds’ ownership of 9.22% for a typical stock in Quintile 3
with medium V/P ratio. The average number of mutual funds holding a stock shows a similar
pattern. However, we observe an interesting pattern when looking at the change of mutual funds’
ownership in a stock from June of year t− 1 to June of year t. We observe that both the change
in mutual funds’ ownership and the change in number of funds holding a stock increase in V/P
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ratios. Mutual funds on average tend to buy (sell) underpriced (overpriced) stocks based on stock
fundamental valuation and they start trading on such information during the one year prior to the
release of public financial reports. The last two columns of Table 4.3 suggest that mutual funds
continue to exploit stock intrinsic values after the financial information release at the end of each
June. We will explore this issue in more detail in the next subsection.
4.4.2 Mutual Funds Trade on the V/P Effect
According to De Long, Shleifer, Summers, Waldman (1990) and Campbell and Kyle (1993),
mutual funds can behave as informed traders, trading on the mispricing opportunities and bring-
ing about market efficiency. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that delegated portfolio
managers may become capital constrained when they tilt their portfolios toward severely mis-
priced securities. Moreover, mispricing based on V/P is associated with high return volatility
as shown Table 4.3. Hence, fund managers might have weak incentives to exploit stock intrinsic
values. In this subsection, we examine the trading behavior of mutual funds in response to the
information content of the V/P ratio in more detail.
We first use an event study approach to illustrate howmutual funds trade on V/P information.
At the end of each June between 1981 and 2006, we form 5 quintile portfolios of stocks based on
their V/P ratios calculated using the value and price information at the fiscal-year-end of year
t − 1. Quintile 1 consists of the most overpriced stocks and vice versa. We then investigate the
cumulative characteristic-adjusted portfolio performance of these portfolios during the one year
prior to the portfolio formation and the subsequent two-year holding period (see Daniel, Grin-
blatt, Titman, Wermers, 1997; Cremers, Petajisto, Zitzewitz, 2008).13 To further examine the
trading activities of mutual funds, we calculate the time-series average mutual funds’ ownership
for the quintile portfolios over the same ranking and holding periods. To avoid the instability of
aggregate mutual funds’ ownership as documented by Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Jiang
(2010), we cross-sectionally demean (market-adjusted) the firm-level ownership before comput-
ing the average portfolio-level mutual funds’ ownership.
Figure 4.1 visualizes the results. Panel A plots the cumulative characteristic-adjusted monthly
portfolio returns for the two extreme quintile portfolios from 12 months before to 24 months
13Specifically, we assign a stock to one of the 125 characteristic-sorted portfolios at the time of portfolio formation
and calculate the excess return of the stock relative to its benchmark portfolio. Then we use these excess returns to
compute the equally weighted quintile portfolio returns. The DGTW benchmark portfolio returns are available at
http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm. For a more
detailed description of the concern, see Wermers (2006).
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after the portfolio formation. Month 0 is June of year t, and month -11 is July of year t− 1. The
results clearly show the strong return-predictive power of V/P ratio after the portfolio formation.
The most underpriced stocks in Quintile 5 perform very well from then on till the nine months
after the portfolio formation. After that, the cumulative abnormal returns start to flatten out till
the end of June in year t + 2. Similarly, the cumulative characteristic-adjusted return of the
most overpriced stock in Quintile 1 start to decline after the portfolio formation and the pattern
substantially weakens after one quarter. At the end of the holding period, the abnormal return
differential between the two extreme quintile portfolios amounts to more than 20%, consistent
with the findings of Frankel and Lee (1998). Furthermore, we do not observe a significant return
reversal for stocks in both extreme quintiles, which indicates investors including mutual funds
do not overreact on the information content of V/P .
Panel B of Figure 4.1 plots the equally weighted, market-adjusted mutual funds’ ownership
for these portfolios. Quarter 0 denotes the period of April to June in year t, and quarter -3
denotes July to September of year t − 1. The results suggest that mutual funds in aggregate
trade on the information contained in V/P ratios in a strong manner. Mutual funds start to
increase their ownership in underpriced stocks from Quarter -1 and appear to stop trading on
the same information after Quarter 3. On the other hand, mutual funds tend to decrease their
ownership in overpriced stocks dramatically during a shorter period (from Quarter -1 to Quarter
1). Their trading horizons correspond to the profitability of the V/P effect as we see in Panel A.
Combining the results in both panels, we see that mutual funds, as an investor group, trade on
the mispricing opportunities based on intrinsic value estimation. More importantly, mutual funds
appear to know such valuation information half a year before it is publicly released in June and
they tend to trade on stock intrinsic values in the entire calendar year t. Given the ease to obtain
book value of a firm and the superior earnings forecasts provided by mutual funds’ in-house
fundamental analysts, it should not be surprising to observe their exploitation on the V/P effect.
The results suggest that mutual funds trade in the direction of V/P and are likely to facilitate
impounding fundamental information into stock prices.
To provide a more comprehensive analysis of mutual fund trading behavior in response to
V/P , we use multivariate cross-sectional regressions (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) relating the
changes in mutual funds’ ownership to V/P , while controlling for other stock characteristics.
For each calendar quarter between 1981 and 2007, we estimate the change in aggregate mutual
funds’ ownership in a given stock. The quintile ranks of V/P , B/M and E/P , accruals, and
earnings changes are determined at the end of each June and assigned to each calendar quarter
in the same year. Accruals are constructed following Sloan (1996) and Ali, Chen, Yao, and Yu
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(2008). Earnings changes are computed as the change in actual earnings for the last fiscal year
scaled by price at the last fiscal year end (Bernard and Thomas, 1990). Analyst forecast revisions
are calculated at the end of each June as the difference in consensus analyst earnings forecasts
between June and last December scaled by the stock price at the end of last fiscal year. These re-
visions correpond to the fund trading for each quarter in the same calendar year. All other control
variables are at the beginning of the quarter. We run quarterly cross-sectionally regressions and
then report the time-series average coefficients in Table 4.4 for each calendar quarter (Quarter -1
to Quarter +2 with Quarter 0 denoting the period of April to June). Consistent with the pattern
established in the event study, mutual funds’ trades are positively and significantly associated
with V/P ranks in the first three calendar quarters of a year even after we control for funds’ re-
turn chasing behavior by including the contemporaneous quarterly stock returns in our quarterly
regressions. The quintile ranks of other fundamental-to-price ratios such as B/M and E/P are
either negatively or insignificantly associated with aggregate mutual fund trading. Mutual fund
managers do not trade in the direction of these simple financial ratios and rather exploit mis-
pricing as revealed by more comprehensive valuation models. Controlling for accruals anomaly,
earnings changes, and analyst forecast revisions also does not subsume our findings. When we
replace the V/P ranks with dummy variables indicating quintile memberships, the results show
that mutual funds mainly trade on intrinsic value in the first two calendar quarters. Funds tend
to sell overpriced stocks and buy underpriced stocks in Quarter 0. This positive association is
robust to the inclusion of other return predictors such as firm size, the book-to-market ratio, past
one-year returns, idiosyncratic volatilities, and turnover ratios. Therefore, mutual funds tend to
trade more intensively in the direction of V/P during the first half of each calendar year before
all necessary financial information for estimating stock values is releasesd publicly.
4.5 DoMutual Funds Profit fromDiscovering Intrinsic Value?
In section 4, we have shown that mutual funds tend to trade on the information content of the
V/P ratio, especially in the six months prior to the release of financial information to public.
To ascertain that mutual fund managers have informational advantages in successfully exploiting
the intrinsic value (rather than chasing the V/P effect passively) and that they are able to beat
transactions costs, this section examines the profitability of mutual funds trading on V/P ratios.
The stock holdings data have allowed us to test whether mutual funds actively trade on the V/P
effect. Now we use fund net returns data to assess their actual profitability from implementing
such fundamental-based investments
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4.5.1 Mutual Fund V/P Timing Measure
To measure the cross-sectional dispersion in how actively mutual funds follow a V/P trading
strategy, we construct a V/P timing measure in spirit of the momentum investing measure of
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) and similar to the accruals investing measure of Ali,
Chen, Yao, and Yu (2008). At the end of each June, we rank all stocks in our CCM universe
into decile portfolios based on V/P and assign the ranks of 1 to 10 to each stock, with score
1 representing the 10% of the most overpriced stock and score 10 for the 10% of the most
underpriced stocks.14 The V/P timing measure for fund i at time t, V PTi,t, is defined as the
weighted average V/P rank of all stocks held by the fund:
V PTi,t =
Ni,t∑
j=1
wi,j,t ∗ (V/PRank)j,t, (4.4)
where (V/PRank)j,t is the decile rank of stock j in ascending order based on V/P ratios. Ni,t
is the number of CCM stocks that are held by mutual fund i at time t, and wi,j,t is the stock j’s
weight in the fund i’s portfolio at time t. A high V PT indicates that the fund tilts its portfolio
toward underpriced or high-V/P stocks.
4.5.2 Characteristics of Funds with Extreme V PT
This subsection examines the characteristics of mutual funds across V PT decile portfolios. We
also analyze the possible determinants of V PT using Fama-Macbeth regressions.
At the end of each June, we calculate V PT and sort mutual funds into deciles based on
their V PT scores in ascending order. Then we compute the cross-sectional averages of fund
characteristics and report their time-series means. Table 4.5 reports the results based on the
univariate sorts. D5 funds with an average V PT of 5.5 appear to be neutral to V/P ratios.
In contrast, the average V PT of D1 funds is 4.13 while the average V PT for D10 funds is
7.16, which suggests that D10 funds trade on V/P effect, whereas D1 funds trade against it. The
results also show that funds in the two extreme V PT deciles tend to be younger funds with higher
expense ratios. Besides, high-V PT funds in Decile 10 have smaller size and higher turnover
ratios. A typical fund in Decile 10 with the highest V PT has an average TNA of $million 515,
which is substantially lower than the average TNA in any other decile portfolio. These high-
V PT funds also have the highest average turnover ratio of 102.01% among all deciles. Finally,
there exists no apparent relation between V PT and the 12b1 fees.
14We use decile ranks to increase the variation of V PT . In unreported results, we replace the decile ranks with
quintile ranks and find that the mainly results of our analysis are not affected at all.
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Table 4.5: Fund Characteristics across V PT - Sorted Decile Portfolios
At the end of each June from 1981 to 2007, we compute for each fund a measure of V/P timing, V PT , which is
defined as the weighted average of V/P decile ranks of individual stocks held by the mutual fund. We then sort
mutual funds into deciles in ascending order based on V PT and calculate the equal-weight average fund charac-
teristics for each decile portfolio. The D1 decile has funds with the lowest V PT s and D10 decile has funds with
the highest V PT s. This table reports the time-series average the cross-sectional mean fund characteristics. Our
set of characteristic variables includes the average V/P timing measure V PT , the average fund age (in years), the
average fund size, 12b1 fees expense ratios, and fund turnover ratios. All fund characteristics are extracted from
CRSP MFDB fund summary database. Stocks with prices lower than 1 dollar at the end of each June are excluded.
Decile V PT Age (years) TNA($Millions)
12b1 Fees
(%)
Expense
Ratio (%)
Turnover
Ratio (%)
1 4.13 13.96 852 0.25 1.20 75.10
2 4.76 16.04 907 0.25 1.18 74.37
3 5.05 16.76 879 0.24 1.14 75.04
4 5.29 17.11 871 0.24 1.13 77.52
5 5.49 17.64 912 0.23 1.12 79.05
6 5.69 17.53 721 0.25 1.13 86.07
7 5.91 17.43 808 0.25 1.14 82.35
8 6.16 17.97 840 0.24 1.13 88.45
9 6.49 15.62 649 0.23 1.19 97.02
10 7.16 13.36 515 0.22 1.27 102.01
D10 - D1 3.03 -0.61 -337 -0.03 0.07 26.91
We next run Fama-Macbeth regressions to better understand the determinants of the use of
V/P strategy by mutual funds. We regress V PT on various fund characteristics and fund perfor-
mance predictors at the end of each June and report the time-series average coefficients in Table
4.6. The results of Model 1 confirm our findings using the univariate portfolio approach. V PT
is positively associated with fund turnover and negatively related to fund size. In Model 2 and 3,
we include past fund performance and some other fund portfolio characteristics that have been
shown in prior studies to have predictive power for future fund performance. Past fund perfor-
mance is measured by the cumulative fund return in the past 12 months. Active share measures
the extent of fund portfolio deviation from its benchmark (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). Fol-
lowing Baks, Busse, and Green (2007), we use the normalized Herfindahl index to measure the
fund managers’ willingness to take big bets on a relatively small number of stocks. Return gap
is the difference between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the
previously disclosed fund holdings. It captures the unobserved fund intra-quarter trading activi-
ties (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2008). We use the average monthly return difference over
the past one year in our regressions. We find that past fund performance is positively and signif-
icantly associated with V PT . Replacing past fund performance with two dummy variables (P1
and P10) for the two extreme deciles of funds based on past performance, we find that mainly the
past winning funds are inclined to exploit fundamentals. Among the three fund skills predictors,
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only return gap is significantly and negatively associated with V PT . Intuitively, this suggests
that mutual funds that rely on frequent interim/short-term trades do not exploit investment oppor-
tunities of long-run price-value convergence. To summarize, mutual funds that engage in stock
valuation and trade on such information tend to be small, active, and transparent past winners.
4.5.3 Do High-V PT Funds Profit from V/P Effect?
We have shown a wide cross-sectional dispersion in mutual funds’ tendency to implement a V/P
strategy. To better understand the informational role mutual funds play in financial markets, we
next examine the actual fund performance taking into account the actual transactions costs that
might be incurred in their V/P based trades. Since highly underpriced stocks are generally small
stocks with high return volatility, mutual funds buying such stocks may face large trading friction
and transactions costs. Therefore, it is of significant importance to evaluate the profitability of
fund trading on V/P in reality.
We first compute the V PT scores in June of year t and then sort all active mutual funds
into decile portfolios based on V PT . Since mutual fund manager may have private information
about fundamentals from their in-house analysts at the beginning of the year, the June V PT best
captures how actively managed mutual funds have traded on the fundamental mispricing in the
first half of year t. Then we track the mutual fund performance in the subsequent one year (till
June in year t + 1) and compute monthly TNA-weighted fund portfolio performance. For the
performance evaluation, we use mutual fund performance before fees (by adding back expense
ratios/12 to the net fund returns reported by CRSP) as a measure of the investment profitability
because it is after the actual transactions costs and is not influenced by other fund expenses.
Table 4.7 reports the results on fund performance. Given our finding that active funds tend to
trade on V/P most intensively during the first half of each calendar year, we split the evaluation
period into two half-years to better understand the fund net performance and the possible price
impact of fund trading. Panel A of Table 4.7 displays the performance results for the first six
months after the portfolio formation in June. Over the six-month horizon (July-December in
year t), D10 funds generate a significant return of 1.19% per month and significantly outperform
their D1 counterparts by 0.55% per month. We also examine how well D10 funds perform
relative to D5 funds (with a V PT score of 5.5) that are supposed to be neutral to the V/P effect.
The return spread between D10 and D5 is 0.26% per month and is statistically significant. The
significant return spreads are robust to various forms of risk adjustment. More importantly, the
average return for D10 funds with the highest V PT is significantly positive. In terms of 4-factor
alpha, D10 funds earn 0.27% per month with a t-statistic of 2.70. On the contrary, we observe
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Table 4.6: Determinants of V PT : Cross-Sectional Regressions
This table presents the relation between fund V/P timing measure, V PT , at the end of each June and mutual fund
characteristics, controlling for other stock characteristics at the end of June from 1981 to 2007, following the Fama
and MacBeth (1973) procedure. The dependent variable is the V PT , which is defined as the weighted average of
V/P decile ranks of individual stocks held by the mutual fund. Fund age, fund size (TNA), fund expense ratios and
fund turnover ratios are included in Model 1 as control variables. In Model 2, we fruther add as control variables
past fund performance measured as the cumulative fund return in the past 12 months, the average Active Share in the
past one year, the portfolio concentration, and average return gap in the past one year. Active Share is a measure of
the extent of fund portfolio deviation from their benchmarks developed by Cremers and Petajisto (2009). We follow
Baks, Busse, and Green (2007) to measure portfolio concentration using a normalized Herfindahl inex. Return gap
is the difference between the return on a hypothetical holdings-based portfolio and the realized fund return (see
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2008). For these regressions, we restrict our sample period to 1990-2006 since
the Active Share data are available from 1990Q1 to 2006Q4 from the website of Antti Petajisto. In Model 3, we
rank funds at the end of June into ten deciles based on their past one-year performance and construct two dummy
variables, P1(P10) equals one when a fund in the Decile 1 (10) and zero otherwise. Stocks with prices lower than 1
dollar are excluded when calculating the I measures. The time-series average coefficients are reported in the table.
The t-statistics are computed using the Newey-West standard errors. *** represents statistical significance at 1%
level, ** represents statistical significance at 5% level, and * represents statistical significance at 10% level.
Dependent Var: V PT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Log(1+Fund Age) -0.0067 -0.0076 -0.0095
(-0.54) (-0.48) (-0.65)
Log(TNA) -0.0358** -0.0178* -0.0212**
(-2.58) (-2.04) (-2.34)
Expense Ratio 0.0048 -0.0081 -0.0385
(0.13) (-0.24) (-1.04)
Turnover Ratio 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0011***
(4.02) (5.62) (4.58)
Past Fund Performance 0.0146**
(2.31)
P1 -0.1849
(-1.35)
P10 0.2836**
(2.22)
Active Share 0.2097 0.3439
(0.72) (1.17)
Portfolio Concentration -0.0222 -0.0374
(-0.96) (-1.51)
Return Gap -0.1915** -0.1361**
(-2.70) (-2.30)
Intercept 5.5532*** 5.2213*** 5.2826***
(46.49) (21.83) (17.95)
Adj-R2 3.21% 17.86% 13.96%
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negative risk-adjusted returns for D1 funds although not significantly different from zero. Panel
B presents the results for the second half-year after the portfolio formation (January-June in year
t+1). The alpha generating abilities of the high-V PT funds seem to disappear after the first post-
ranking half-year. Over this more intensive trading period (the first half of each calendar year),
D10 fund managers fail to generate enough profits to offset the transactions costs associated with
exploiting V/P . Besides, the stocks held by D10 funds are very likely to have been exploited
the most over the ranking year. The resulting rapid convergence between price and value for
these stocks over the ranking year renders their V/P anomaly much weaker during the second
half-year after the portfolio formation.
Panel C of Table 4.7 presents the performance results over the entire future one year. D10
funds with the highest V PT have an average return of 1.26% per month and outperform the
lowest-V PT funds in D1 by 0.42% per month. The return spread is highly statistically significant
with a t-statistic of 2.68. However, the results are not robust to controlling for momentum. In
untabulated results based on the post-1999 data, we further find that over the one-year horizon
D10 funds can generate a significant 4-factor alpha of 0.18% per month. Moreover, the 4-factor
alpha of the return spread is 0.31% per month and statistically significant over this subperiod.
This finding suggests that the funds that trade most actively on fundamentals may have benefited
from the operationalization of the residual income model by Frankel and Lee since 1998.
As shown in Table 4.3, stocks with extreme V/P ratios have small market capitalization
and high idiosyncratic volatility, which makes them unattractive to mutual funds. To gain more
insights on the source of profitability of high-V PT funds, we examine how funds exploit fun-
damental mispricing across V/P deciles. At the end of each June, we calculate for each V PT
decile the aggregate portfolio weight of each V/P stock decile. Specifically, for D10 funds, the
aggregate portfolio weight of a V/P decile is computed as the total value of the stocks in the
V/P decile held by D1 funds divided by the total value of their equity holdings. We report the
time-series averages of the portfolio weights for D1, D5, and D10 funds in Table 4.8. Consistent
with our expectation, D5 funds that are neutral to V/P strategy invest almost equally in all ten
V/P deciles. Relative to the neutral funds, D10 funds tend to overweight stocks in the highest
V/P decile (16.99%) and underweight stocks in the lowest V/P decile (3.40%). The reverse
pattern can be observed for D1 funds, which overweight low-V/P stocks and underweight high-
V/P stocks. The portfolio weight differences between D10 and D1 and between D10 and D5
funds in the two extreme V/P deciles are statistically significant. We shall note that D10 funds
are generally small funds (with an average TNA of $million 515, see Table 4.5). Although these
high-V PT funds place large bets on underpriced stocks, their total investments in these stocks
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cannot be substantially large. This explains to some extent why the convergence of price and
fundamental value is not immediate.
Table 4.8: Portfolio Weights of D1, D5, and D10 Mutual Funds across V/P Stock Deciles
At the end of each June from 1981 to 2007, we compute for each fund a measure of V/P timing, V PT , which is
defined as the weighted average of V/P decile ranks of individual stocks held by the mutual fund. We then sort mu-
tual funds into deciles in ascending order based on V PT and calculate the equal-weight average fund characteristics
for each decile portfolio. The D1 decile has funds with the lowest V PT s and D10 decile has funds with the highest
V PT s. This table reports the portfolio weights in each stock V/P decile for different groups of mutual funds, D1,
D5 and D10 funds respectively. The portfolio weight of a stock V/P decile is the total value of the funds’ equity
holdings. We report the time-series means of the portfolio weights. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed
using Newey-West standard errors.
V/P Decile
D1 Funds
Portfolio
Weights (%)
D5 Funds
Portfolio
Weights (%)
D10 Funds
Portfolio
Weights (%) D10-D1 D10-D5
1 21.19 10.38 3.40 -17.79 -6.99
(-11.26) (-6.71)
2 16.70 10.37 2.93 -13.78 -7.44
(-9.04) (-6.91)
3 12.88 11.74 3.23 -9.65 -8.51
(-7.12) (-7.94)
4 9.78 11.93 4.87 -4.91 -7.06
(-4.37) (-5.94)
5 8.21 11.87 5.74 -2.46 -6.13
(-2.13) (-4.45)
6 6.34 11.56 7.43 1.09 -4.14
(1.02) (-2.90)
7 5.26 11.69 8.74 3.47 -2.96
(2.86) (-2.16)
8 4.51 10.78 10.04 5.52 -0.75
(4.60) (-0.51)
9 3.82 9.73 13.78 9.96 4.04
(7.99) (2.76)
10 3.97 9.67 16.99 13.01 7.32
(7.93) (3.86)
The above results suggest that mutual funds actively exploiting the fundamental mispricing
are able to benefit from such information and generate both statistically and economically signif-
icant profits, net of actual transactions costs and before fund expenses, over a half-year horizon.
Overall, our evidence confirms our expectation that mutual funds (at least a subgroup of funds),
being good candidates for informed traders, can profit from their information-based trades.
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4.6 Mutual Fund Trading and V/P Effect
Given the results that mutual funds tend to trade in the direction of V/P , their trading activities
might mitigate mispricing by pushing stock prices back toward the fundamental values. In this
section, we provide evidence consistent with this conjecture.
The idea is that the V/P effect is more pronounced among stocks with less mutual funds’
exploitation. We use mutual funds’ ownership in a stock as a proxy for investor sophistication
for that stock. The more shares of a stock are owned by mutual funds, the more sophisticated
investor base a stock should have. In particular, stocks with higher V/P ratios and lower mutual
funds’ ownership should have high future returns. Besides, change in mutual funds’ ownership
(or the change in the number of funds holding a stock) is a signed measure of the aggregate fund
trading. We expect that less fund trading (in the direction of V/P ) could result in stronger V/P
effect in the future.
We use a two-way independent sorting procedure. Along one dimension, we first sort stocks
into five quintiles on the basis of V/P at the end of each June. Then we sort them into three
tertiles based on mutual funds’ ownership in June or fund trading during the past 6 months
respectively. Then we hold the 15 fractile portfolios for one year and value-weighted monthly
portfolio returns are computed. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of next June. We report
the Carhart 4-factor alphas for these portfolios in Table 4.9. The results confirm our conjectures.
Panel A shows that high-V/P stocks in Quintile 5 with less sophisticated investor base continue
to generate superior performance in the subsequent one year. The Fractile portfolio (1,5) has a
4-factor alpha of 0.42% per month with a t-statistic of 2.04, which is higher than the average
high-V/P stock performance of 0.33% per month reported in Table 4.2. A strategy that buys
high-V/P and sells low-V/P stocks with the lowest mutual funds’ ownership is able to earn a
significant 4-factor alpha of 0.59% per month. When we measure fund trading using the change
in the number of funds holding a stock in Panel B, we observe that stocks in Quintile 5 with
the highest V/P ratios that have been sold by mutual funds in the past 6 months can generate
a significant 4-factor alpha of 0.73% per month. Panel C presents similar results as in Panel B
using the changes in mutual funds’ ownership as a proxy for fund trading.
Therefore, we show that the trading activities of mutual funds help mitigate mispricing and
bring stock prices back to fundamentals. Our results support the view that mutual fund trading
tend to mitigate the mispricing as reflected in a V/P ratio. In unreported results, we postpone
the portfolio formation of the V/P strategy by two months to take into account the reporting
lag of fund holdings. We form portfolios at the end of August based on the V/P ratios known
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Table 4.9: Mutual Fund Trading and the Return-Predictive Power of V/P
This table presents the performance of the quintile portfolios formed on the basis of value-to-price ratios, V/P
conditional on mutual fund trading in the past 6 months. V/P , MFO, and number of funds holding a stock are
defined as previously. We use independent two-way sorts. Specifically, at the end of each June from 1981 to 2007,
we sort stocks into five quintile portfolios in ascending order based on V/P and independently sort these stocks again
into three tertiles in ascending order based on mutual fund aggregate holding and trading information in the past 6
months (We use mutual fund ownership to measure fund holdings (Panel A) and use the changes of ownership or
the changes of number of funds holding a stock to measure mutual fund trading (Panel B and C)). Then we compute
the average monthly value-weight portfolio returns in the subsequent one year. This table presents the risk-adjusted
performance of those portfolios based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Stocks with prices lower than 1
dollar at the time of portfolio formation are excluded. The t-statistics are computed using the Newey-West standard
errors. *** represents statistical significance at 1% level, ** represents statistical significance at 5% level, and *
represents statistical significance at 10% level.
Value-Weight Post-Ranking Portfolio Return (Carhart Alpha %/month)
Ranking Var V/P
Panel A: MFO 1 2 3 4 5 Q5-Q1
1 -0.17 0.03 0.11 0.28 0.42** 0.59**
(-0.92) (0.27) (0.70) (1.89) (2.04) (2.10)
2 -0.13 -0.02 0.05 0.16 0.37** 0.50**
(-1.02) (-0.3) (0.55) (1.29) (2.11) (2.26)
3 -0.07 -0.15 -0.03 -0.06 0.36 0.43
(-0.47) (-1.43) (-0.24) (-0.39) (1.45) (1.51)
T3-T1 0.09 -0.19 -0.14 -0.34 -0.06
(0.46) (-1.16) (-0.67) (-1.56) (-0.19)
Panel B:NoF 1 2 3 4 5 Q5-Q1
1 0.00 -0.12 0.08 0.05 0.73*** 0.73***
(0.04) (-0.96) (0.61) (0.35) (3.38) (3.02)
2 -0.12 -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.29
(-0.84) (-0.44) (0.17) (0.28) (0.91) (1.14)
3 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.25 0.29
(-0.27) (0.24) (0.80) (1.31) (1.60) (1.25)
T3-T1 -0.04 0.14 -0.01 0.09 -0.48*
(-0.27) (0.86) (-0.08) (0.56) (-1.89)
Panel C:MFO 1 2 3 4 5 Q5-Q1
1 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.52*** 0.57**
(-0.32) (-0.15) (0.05) (0.29) (3.17) (2.30)
2 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.11
(-0.04) (-0.64) (-0.01) (0.82) (0.57) (0.40)
3 -0.17 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.37 0.54
(-1.05) (-0.11) (0.42) (0.03) (1.42) (1.57)
T3-T1 -0.12 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.15
(-0.53) (0.06) (0.28) (-0.18) (-0.5)
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in June and holding the portfolios from September to the next August. Imposing this additoinal
implementation lag does not affect the above results. Hence, individual investors may use the
mutual fund trading information to refine the V/P strategy by identifying underpriced stocks
that have not been exploited heavily by mutual funds in the recent past.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper explores how effectively active mutual funds trade on and profit from fundamental
analyses. Over the 1981 to 2008 sample period, we find that active funds tend to trade on the
V/P anomaly as documented by Frankel and Lee (1998). The V/P ratio measures the extent
of stock mispricing relative to its intrinsic value based on a comprehensive valuation model,
namely, residual income model. We use the residual income model and analyst earnings forecast
to measure a firm’s intrinsic value and show that mutual funds start to exploit such mispricing
opportunities far before the financial information becomes public. Using fund returns data before
fees, we show that funds that have the highest weights on underpriced stocks are able to generate
a significant 4-factor alpha of 0.27% per month over a six-month horizon. Therefore, trading on
V/P effect can be profitable even after the actual transactions costs for a relatively short period.
Finally, we find evidence consistent with our conjecture that the V/P effect is more significant
among stocks with less mutual funds’ exploitation.
Our study suggests that mutual funds in aggregate trade on fundamental value and a subgroup
of funds can earn significant risk-adjusted returns from it. This leaves space for the limits-of-
arbitrage explanation for why other funds do not exploit the intrinsic value information as ag-
gressively as those profitable ones. Future research could focus on examining the determinants
of fundamental analyses implementation in different mutual funds. Besides, other types of in-
stitutions, such as pension funds, banks, and insurance companies, have played an increasingly
important role in security markets. Given the enormous amount of resources they spend in the
security analysis, those types of institutions might also be important for the incorporation of
fundamental information into stock prices.
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4.A Sample Selection
We start with all U.S. equity mutual funds from the intersection between the CRSP mutual fund
database and the CDA/Spectrum mutual fund holdings database. We use the MFLINKS data
set available from the WRDS to link the two databases. As our benchmark holdings data start
from September 1980, our final sample of stock holdings spans the period from September 1980
through September 2008.
Because we wish to capture active mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equities, we
follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) and Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2008), by eliminat-
ing balanced, bond, money market, sector, and international funds as well as funds that do not
primarily invest in U.S. common equity. In particular, we use the following steps in sample se-
lection. We select funds with the following Lipper class codes, provided by the CRSP: EIEI,
G, I, LCCE, LCGE, LCVE, MCCE, MCGE, MCVE, MLCE, MLGE, MLVE, SCCE, SCGE, or
SCVE. If a fund does not have any of these Lipper class codes, we select funds with the follow-
ing strategic Insight objectives: SCG, GRO, AGG, ING, GRI, or GMC. If both codes are missing
for a fund, we pick funds with the following Wiesenberger objectives: SCG, AGG, G, G-S, S-G,
GRO, LTG, I, I-S, IEQ, ING, GCI, G-I, G-I-S, G-S-I, I-G, I-G-S, I-S-G, S-G-I, S-I-G, GRI, or
MCG. If none of the objective codes are available, we require that a fund have a CS policy code.
We eliminate funds with any of the following investment objectives as provided by CDA/
Spectrum: International, Municipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred, and Balanced. Furthermore,
we use the portfolio composition data provided by CRSP to exclude funds that invest less than
80% or more than 105%, on average, in common equity. To address the incubation bias docu-
mented by Elton, Gruber and Blake (2001) and Evans (2010), we exclude observations prior to
the reported fund inception date, those for which the names of the funds are missing in the CRSP
database, and funds whose net assets fall below $5 million. To prevent outliers from driving our
measure of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks, we also require that a fund have at least
10 stock holdings to be eligible for consideration in our analysis.
To ensure that we capture active mutual funds, we eliminate index funds whose names con-
tained the following keywords: INDEX, INDE, INDX, INX, IDX, DOW JONES, ISHARE,
S&P, S &P, S& P, S & P, 500, WILSHIRE, RUSSELL, RUSS, or MSCI. To lessen errors due
to abbreviation and misspelling, we manually inspected fund names and filtered out remaining
international funds, sector funds, tax-managed funds, fixed-income funds, balanced funds, real
estate funds and annuities.

123
Chapter 5
Summary and conclusions
Mutual funds have been among the largest investors in the U.S. economy and world financial
markets for the past 20 years. Where does the enormous appeal of mutual funds among investors
come from? Do actively managed portfolios add value? Academics have debated these issues for
many years. The majority of the studies have reached a consensus that actively managed funds,
on average, underperform their passive benchmarks after transactions costs and fund expenses.
This thesis attempt to solve the performance puzzle by looking at the performance of stocks held
by mutual funds. The quarterly mutual fund holdings data allow a more comprehensive look at
the value of active asset management at the security level. With this database, we empirically
examine the information content of mutual fund portfolio holdings.
Chapter 2 analyzes the simplest way in which disclosed holdings can be used by outside in-
vestors. Portfolio disclosure can be costly to actively managed mutual funds because it enables
competitors to construct portfolios that mimic, with a lag, the primitive fund’s holdings. This
chapter shows that, on average, copycat funds can produce returns that are close to their target
funds, taking into account transaction costs and expenses. After extensive discussion and de-
liberation, the SEC increased the mandatory reporting frequency of mutual fund holdings from
semi-annually to quarterly in 2004. Our results show that this policy change leads to an in-
crease in the return differential between copycat funds and their targets, and a strong reduction
in the volatility of the return differentials. This implies that since 2004 it is easier for outside
investors to free-ride on disclosed fund portfolio selection, which might contradict the Commis-
sion’s original intention to protect fund shareholders’ interests. At the same time, the policy
change has increased the representativeness of the reported holdings, which could indicate that
window dressing and other ways of camouflaging the true fund’s holdings have reduced in the sit-
uation where all funds are mandated to quarterly disclose their holdings. In this chapter, we also
characterize certain subgroups of mutual funds whose disclosed holdings are most valuable for
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potential free-riding investors. We show that past fund performance and the representativeness of
reported holdings are important determinants of the relative success of copycat funds. It appears
that the smartest copycat strategy would be to mimic the portfolios of funds that disclose repre-
sentative holdings and exhibit good recent performance. The net performance of such a selective
copycat strategy is in general significantly better than that of the vast majority of mutual funds.
Finally, our findings provide some insights into the hidden cost of frequent portfolio disclosure
for active funds. Policymakers will also have to consider the benefits of portfolio disclosure such
as increased transparency to strike a balance for an optimal disclosure policy design.
Chapter 3 addresses the question whether actively managed mutual funds attain informational
advantages in financial markets as an investor group. We find strong evidence that supports an
informational role of actively managed mutual funds in determining security prices. As the
performance of an active fund is typically evaluated against a performance benchmark, the man-
ager often invests a substantial portion of fund assets in the benchmark. Hence, we compare
a fund portfolio to its own benchmark index and only focus on the excess long or short fund
positions assigned to a stock on top of the benchmark portfolio to more precisely capture the
fund manager’s active forward projection on the stock return. Using a comprehensive sample of
U.S. equity mutual funds during the period from 1980 to 2008, we find that stocks heavily over-
weighted by active mutual funds relative to their benchmarks generate superior performance rel-
ative the market and strongly outperform their underweighted counterparts. The return premium
on stocks heavily overweighted by mutual funds, relative to their underweighted counterparts,
reaches more than 7% per year even after adjustments for their loadings on the market, size,
value, momentum, and liquidity factors. A significant portion of this premium occurs around
corporate earnings announcements. Finally, to reconcile our findings with the overall lackluster
performance of mutual funds as identified in the prior literature, we evaluate the performance
of different portions of an aggregate mutual fund portfolio. We find that active funds in aggre-
gate invest less than 10% of their assets in alpha-generating stocks. On the other hand, although
stocks that are heavily underweighted by active funds generate a four-factor alpha close to zero,
they receive approximately 34% of total active fund assets. As a result, a large four-factor alpha
of 6% per year on largely overweighted stocks translates into a small average mutual fund alpha
of less than 1% per year before fees and expenses. The results are consistent with the prediction
of rational fund behavior by Berk and Green (2004). These results point to an informational link
between mutual fund investing and asset prices.
As an extension of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 examines the nature of the information possessed by
mutual fund managers. In particular, we explore how effectively active mutual funds trade on and
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profit from fundamental analyses. We find that active funds tend to trade on the V/P anomaly as
documented by Frankel and Lee (1998). The V/P ratio measures the extent of stock mispricing
relative to its intrinsic value based on a comprehensive valuation model, namely, residual income
model. We use the residual income model and analyst earnings forecast to measure a firm’s
intrinsic value and show that mutual funds start to exploit such mispricing opportunities far
before the financial information becomes public. Using fund returns data before fees, we show
that funds that have the highest weights on underpriced stocks are able to generate a significant
4-factor alpha of 0.27% per month over a six-month horizon. Therefore, trading on V/P effect
can be profitable even after the actual transactions costs for a relatively short period. Finally, we
find evidence consistent with our conjecture that the V/P effect is more significant among stocks
with less mutual funds’ exploitation. Our study suggests that mutual funds in aggregate trade on
fundamental value and a subgroup of funds can earn significant risk-adjusted returns from it.
This leaves space for the limits-of-arbitrage explanation for why other funds do not exploit the
intrinsic value information as aggressively as those profitable ones.
Our research suggests interesting paths for future research. First, our results indicate that
mutual funds acquire information that is not fully reflected in prices for those stocks about which
they display the most conviction. But it is unclear which potential channels might enable them
to gain this superior information. Recent studies by Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Cohen,
Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) make some initial progress by suggesting that geographic proximity
and shared educational experiences between corporate and fund managers provide important
channels for mutual fund managers to access private information. It should be promising to
connect the findings in this thesis to these two informational channels and explore additional
networks of information flow to gain a better understanding of how information finds its way
into security prices.
Second, a fund manager’s optimal decision is jointly determined by three factors: degree of
risk aversion, expected returns of securities conditional on the manager’s information set, and
risks of securities. We lack accurate estimates of these three variables, so we cannot provide a
definitive answer to the question why fund managers only focus on the stocks for which they have
private information. Our results lead us to conjecture that aversion to taking large active risks
could have an important role in shaping the activeness of fund managers’ portfolios. One exciting
path for future research is to properly measure these important determinants of fund portfolio
decision and integrate them with our current research. This can also shed some light on why
certain mutual funds do not rely on fundamental analysis to explore mispricing opportunities.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Sinds het baanbrekende werk van Jensen (1968) hebben academici zich verdiept in de waarde
van actief portefeuillebeheer en de toegevoegde waarde van actieve beleggingsfondsen en hedge-
fondsen. Gezien de grote hoeveelheid geld en tijd die hiermee gemoeid is, is het te verwachten
dat beleggingsfondsen geloofwaardige kandidaten zijn om de rol van geı¨nformeerde belegger
te vervullen, dat wil zeggen dat de informatie die door hen wordt vergaard mede hierdoor haar
weg vindt naar, en verwerkt wordt in, de aandelenkoersen. Desalniettemin komt een groot deel
van de recente literatuur tot de conclusie dat actieve beleggingsfondsen, gemiddeld genomen,
slechtere prestaties laten zien dan passieve benchmarks, na aftrek van kosten. Dit proefschrift
probeert de mogelijkheid dat actieve fondsmanagers informatievoordelen bezitten te verenigen
met hun globaal gezien tegenvallende performance, gebruikmakend van openbare informatie uit
de portefeuille samenstelling van de fondsen. Hierdoor is het mogelijk een beter beeld te krijgen
van de toegevoegde waarde van beleggingsfondsen en de mate waarin beleggers hiervan kunnen
profiteren. De drie empirische hoofdstukken in dit boek geven op verschillende manier inzicht
in de informatieve waarde van de portefeuille-samenstelling van beleggingsfondsen. Hoofdstuk
2 bestudeert de waarde van deze portefeuille-samenstelling voor externe partijen en analyseert in
hoeverre copy-cat strategiee¨n winstgevend zijn. Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 relateren de fonds portefeuilles
aan aandelenkoersen om te analyseren of en in hoeverre beleggingsfondsen een rol spelen bij het
verwerken van fundamentele informatie in de prijzen op financie¨le markten.
Als eerste analyseren we een eenvoudige manier waarop beleggers gebruik kunnen maken
van de portefeuille-samenstelling van actieve beleggingsfondsen, simpelweg door het kopie¨ren
van de gepubliceerde portefeuilles. Op het moment van publicatie zijn deze portefeuilles max-
imaal twee maanden oud. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat gemiddeld genomen een hypothetisch
copy-cat fonds rendementen kan produceren die slechts weinig afwijken van het fonds dat wordt
gevolgd, rekening houdend met transactiekosten en beheerskosten. Een interessant resultaat is
dat het relatieve succes van copy-cat strategiee¨n significant is toegenomen na 2004, toen de
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Amerikaanse SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) voor alle beleggingsfondsen de ver-
plichting invoerde van kwartaalrapportages over de portefeuille-samenstelling (in plaats van half-
jaarlijks). Tegelijkertijd is ook de “representativiteit” van deze informatie toegenomen, door een
afname van “window dressing” en andere activiteiten die de investeringswaarde van de open-
baarmaking reduceren. In dit hoofdstuk laten we verder zien dat de relatieve performance van
copy-cat fondsen in belangrijke mate afhangt van de historische presentaties van het gevolgde
fonds, en de representativiteit van de gepubliceerde portefeuilles.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt het actieve deel van de portefeuilles van beleggingsfondsen door
het analyseren van de afwijkingen, op aandeelniveau, van een fonds van zijn benchmark. We
gebruiken dit om voor elk aandeel een maatstaf te cree¨ren die gebaseerd is op het aggregeren
van informatie waarover individuele fondsen de beschikking hebben, en die tot uiting komt in
de mate van over- of onderweging van een aandeel. Op basis van een uitgebreide steekproef van
Amerikaanse beleggingsfondsen over de periode 1980-2008, blijkt dat de gemiddelde afwijking
van de benchmark, in sterke mate toekomstige aandelenrendementen voorspelt. Aandelen die
het meest worden overwogen laten positieve abnormale rendementen zien in de daaropvolgende
maanden, en het omgekeerde geldt voor aandelen die het meest worden onderwogen. Een belan-
grijk deel van deze rendementen concentreert zich rond de dagen waarop nieuws over onderne-
mingswinsten wordt vrijgegeven. Deze resultaten wijzen erop dat beleggingsfondsen beschikken
over superieure informatie die nog niet verwerkt is in de aandelenkoersen, en op basis waarvan
abnormale rendementen te behalen zijn. Desondanks slagen beleggingsfondsen er gemiddeld
genomen niet in dit voordeel tot uitdrukking tot laten komen in hun netto rendementen. Slechts
een beperkt deel van het belegd vermogen wordt belegd in aandelen die abnormale rendementen
vertonen, terwijl ca. een derde van het vermogen zich in benchmark-aandelen bevindt die wor-
den onderwogen. Uiteindelijk leidt dit tot een gemiddelde bruto alpha van slechts 1% per jaar
(voor aftrek van kosten).
Hoofdstuk 4 gaat verder door de rol die actieve beleggingsfondsen spelen bij het verwerken
van informatie in aandelenkoersen nader te onderzoeken. In het bijzonder wordt onderzocht
in hoeverre actieve fondsen kunnen profiteren van fundamentele analyse. We meten de mate
waarin een aandeel verkeerd geprijsd is ten opzicht van zijn intrinsieke waarde op basis van
een veel gebruikt residual income model. De resultaten laten zien dat het gemiddelde fonds
handelt op basis van dergelijke prijsafwijkingen. Fondsen die “te goedkope” aandelen een groot
gewicht in hun portefeuille geven zijn in staat over een horizon van zes maanden significante
outperformance te laten zien. Dit toont aan dat de groep actieve fondsen die gebruikmaakt van
het modelleren van de intrinsieke waarde van aandelen hiervan sterk profiteert. Blijkbaar zijn
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fondsmanagers in staat fundamentele informatie beter te begrijpen of te voorspellen, en daarmee
beter te benutten, dan de markt.
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Academic financial economists have been keenly interested in the value of active
portfolio management since the seminal paper of Jensen (1968). This book examines the
information advantages that active mutual fund managers attain in financial markets
through an analysis of disclosed fund holdings. Performance evaluation at the security
level allows us to paint a more comprehensive picture of fund managers’ security-selection
talents. The three chapters in this book constitute an empirical investigation of the
information content of mutual fund portfolio disclosure. Chapter 2 examines the value of
active funds’ portfolio disclosure from an outside investor’s perspective. Hypothetical
copycat funds that duplicate the disclosed asset holdings of actively managed funds can
generate performance that is comparable their primitive targets. More interestingly, their
relative success increases after the U.S. SEC mandates more frequent portfolio disclosure.
Chapter 3 studies the information content of the active portion of fund investments by
creating a stock-level measure that seeks to aggregate various pieces of information
scattered among active funds, as revealed through their over- and underweighting
decisions. Active funds’ portfolio deviations from benchmarks can strongly and positively
predict future stock returns. The findings establish a robust link between active fund
investments and asset prices. Chapter 4 further explores the role that active mutual funds
play in bringing about price efficiency. Active funds are able benefit from fundamental
analysis and their information advantages are mainly attributed to their expertise in
forecasting and processing fundamental information. 
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